Opuscula

A collection of personal reflections. Copyright © 2005-2011 K. Gurries

Monday, May 18, 2009

On Rupture Theology

In his Address of December 22, 2005 to the Roman Curia, Pope Benedict XVI spoke of the need for a proper understanding of Vatican II and referred to it as the “hermeneutic of reform”.  According to this view the council is rightly interpreted only when understood in substantial continuity with the past or as “renewal in the continuity of the one subject-Church which the Lord has given to us.  She is a subject which increases in time and develops, yet always remaining the same, the one subject of the journeying People of God.”  The Holy Father contrasted this true understanding of the council with the “hermeneutic of discontinuity and rupture” that “risks ending in a split between the pre-conciliar Church and the post-conciliar Church.”[1]  Given this basic definition of the “hermeneutic of rupture”, one can identify two basic classifications of “rupture theology” that can broadly be characterized as “progressive” and “reactionary”.  These two variations of rupture theology are particularly distinguished by their unique understanding and approach to Vatican II, the magisterium of the Popes, Tradition and the development of doctrine.  We will explore each of these areas while attempting to discover where the two sides of rupture theology either converge or find themselves radically opposed.

 

The Second Vatican Council

Rupture theology of either variety (progressive or reactionary) seems to express the following with respect to Vatican II:

“It asserts that the texts of the Council as such do not yet express the true spirit of the Council. It claims that they are the result of compromises in which, to reach unanimity, it was found necessary to keep and reconfirm many old things that are now pointless. However, the true spirit of the Council is not to be found in these compromises but instead in the impulses toward the new that are contained in the texts.”[2]

In other words, they both understand Vatican II as something fundamentally “new” in the life of the Church insofar as it represents a “constituent that eliminates an old constitution and creates a new one”.   In this sense, rupture theologians essentially view Vatican II as a new starting point for the Church where there is a substantial divide between the pre-council and post-council Church. 

 
The main difference between the two groups is their attitude towards this so-called new “post-council Church”.  On one hand, the progressives view this “change” as a great event in the Church that now liberates us from the traditions and baggage of the past and those “many old things that are now pointless”.  On the other hand, the reactionaries view this “change” with horror and as an unprecedented crisis in the Church requiring emergency measures.   The common misunderstanding of the council, however, sets up a tense relationship between “rupture theology” and the Papal magisterium.
 

The Papal Magisterium

It has become commonplace in recent years to hear the voices of representatives of rupture theology dissenting from various acts of the Magisterium.   Theologians of this persuasion will often attempt to justify a position of dissent on the pretext that Papal infallibility had not been expressly invoked.  Progressives, for example, call into question authoritative (even definitive) teachings of the magisterium on contraception, the male priesthood, the sacrificial nature of the Mass, etc.  Reactionaries, on the other hand, call into question the orthodoxy of some of the constitutions and decrees promulgated at Vatican II.   In some cases, rupture theology will go as far as to accuse the Papal Magisterium of teaching doctrinal error against the faith or divinely revealed truth.[3] 

 
What is implicit in rupture theology is an assertion that the Papal Magisterium, as such, can defect in faith and morals by teaching heresy.  Opposed to this view, however, is the constant teaching of the Papal Magisterium concerning its own indefectibility in the realm of faith and morals.[4]  For example, Pope Sixtus IV condemned outright the proposition that: “The Church of the city of Rome can err.”[5]  The First Vatican Council would later set forth this teaching as follows:

"...in the Apostolic See the Catholic religion has always been kept undefiled, and her well known doctrine has been kept holy...knowing full well that this See of Saint Peter remains ever free from all blemish of errors, according to the divine promise of the Lord Our Saviour..."[6]

 

This teaching has been continually affirmed by the Popes.  Pope Pius XI, for example, reminds us of the “perfect and perpetual immunity of the Church from error and heresy.”[7]  A few years later Pope Pius XII would affirm that the Church is “spotless in the Sacraments” and also “in the faith which she has always preserved inviolate…”[8]

 

Some may ask whether the Second Vatican Council, by virtue of its "pastoral" character, can be considered an exception to the rule as if the divine assistance could somehow be suspended for a period of time and the Magisterium of the Popes could now suddenly defect from faith and morals.  Pope Paul VI explicitly rejected such a notion:

 

“Nothing that was decreed in this Council, or in the reforms that We enacted in order to put the Council into effect, is opposed to what the two-thousand-year-old Tradition of the Church considers as fundamental and immutable.   We are the guarantor of this, not in virtue of Our personal qualities but in virtue of the charge which the Lord has conferred upon Us as legitimate Successor of Peter, and in virtue of the special assistance that He has promised to Us as well as to Peter: ‘I have prayed for you that your faith may not fail’ (Lk 22:32).”[9]  

Formulated in a positive manner, this means that the Magisterium, as such, "enjoys the certain charism of truth" when guarding and expounding the deposit of faith as well as those truths necessarily connected to the deposit of faith. (Cf. CCC, 86-88; Compendium of the CCC, 16)    

Degrees of Authority

Rupture theologians, however, are quick to point out that there are various levels of magisterial authority and not all magisterial teaching can be considered infallible insofar as they lack a definitive and irreformable character.  Indeed, the concluding formula of the professio fidei of 1989 identifies three general categories or degrees of Catholic doctrine.[10]  The first degree concerns those truths of faith that are divinely revealed and involve the great dogmas of the faith (e.g., Creed, Christological and Marian dogmas, sacrificial nature of Mass, Papal Primacy & Infallibility, etc.).  The second degree of doctrine concerns those definitive teachings that are connected to divine revelation by “logical or historical necessity” (e.g., moral teachings concerning abortion, contraception, euthanasia; the all male priesthood; the invalidity of Anglican Orders, etc).  These first two degrees, therefore, concern truths that must be held as infallible.  The third degree of doctrine concerns those authentic and non-definitive teachings that lead to a better understanding of faith and morals.  This broad third category itself contains various levels of authority depending upon the extent that the teaching is of a general or particular nature as well as its frequency and “tenor of expression”.   

 
Consequently, rupture theologians argue that those fallible teachings of the third degree are subject to error and can justify a certain degree of dissent.[11]  Such logic, however, fails to take into account other important aspects of the truth.  Firstly, the existence of non-infallible or fallible teachings of the third degree does not imply the possibility that the Papal Magisterium, as such, can defect from faith and morals by teaching heresy.  The indefectibility of the Church and the Papal Magisterium need not be expressly engaged as it is perpetually operative by virtue of Our Lord’s promise and the protection of the Holy Ghost.  Secondly, while the Magisterium, as such, can’t teach heresy or defect in the order of faith and morals, it can err in the “prudential order” with respect to doctrines of the third degree.[12] 

 

The Prudential Order

Prudence is the habit of intellectual discernment regarding what should be done or left undone.  The prudential order, therefore, involves practical reason or the application of reason to action.  While speculative reason deals with universals and principles of a general order, practical reason, on the other hand, deals with the particular order or the application of general principles to individual cases.[13]  How do we identify magisterial acts that involve aspects belonging to the prudential order?  Cardinal Journet provides a general description as follows:

 

“Thus then, God has not left us without guidance in the immense accumulation of ideas bearing on the speculative life, on private, economic and political morality, on artistic activity, in the spheres into which the full light of revelation has not yet descended and in which nevertheless convictions are formed, syntheses elaborated and decisive choices taken which may either open or obstruct the road to the fullness of the faith. He helps us through His Church to whom He entrusts a new mission, no longer that of irrevocably defining the data of the faith, but that of prudentially marking the truths which point towards the things of faith or the errors that turn men away from it, that of ratifying or rejecting certain suggestions of the theologians and the philosophers and certain beliefs of popular piety.  In this sphere the Church acts no longer in virtue of her declaratory power, as a simple messenger or mandatory for utterances of divine origin. She acts now in virtue of her canonical power, as promulgator of what can fittingly be taught and believed if the minds of the faithful are to be kept from the dangers that threaten their faith.”[14]

 

We can think here of various teachings that form part of the social doctrine of the Church.  The social teachings will often involve prudential aspects where the weight of a given teaching may vary to the extent that it teaches principles of a general order or whether it addresses matters that relate to the particular order (i.e., the prudential application of general principles to particular circumstances).  Doctrines of a general order will carry more weight and demand a higher degree of assent to the extent that it is “independent from contingent and variable elements”.[15]  In the area of liturgical discipline there are also many pastoral decisions that involve prudential judgement.  We can consider here, for example, questions regarding liturgical orientation, the manner of distributing Holy Communion or the use of female altar servers.  Many of these questions involve prudential judgement including the possibility of errors that lead to unintended results or harmful effects related to the spiritual life and the salvation of souls.  Other examples involving the prudential order could include the practical guidelines for initiatives such as ecumenism or interreligious dialogue.[16]  The prudential judgement in such cases involves weighing the desired good effects against unintended yet possible harmful effects (e.g., scandal, indifferentism, etc.).  Yet even such examples of pastoral and prudential error should not be confused with the teaching of heresy or defection from faith or morals, per se.   

 

Therefore, some magisterial acts while resting on immutable principles or linked to infallible truths of faith yet commingled with certain “contingent” or “conjectural” elements may be subject to review and are “reformable” in light of changed circumstances[17] or even subsequent correction on account of new research or some other prudential error.[18]  The CDF explains as follows:

 

“Finally, in order to serve the People of God as well as possible, in particular, by warning them of dangerous opinions which could lead to error, the Magisterium can intervene in questions under discussion which involve, in addition to solid principles, certain contingent and conjectural elements. It often only becomes possible with the passage of time to distinguish between what is necessary and what is contingent...When it comes to the question of interventions in the prudential order, it could happen that some Magisterial documents might not be free from all deficiencies. Bishops and their advisors have not always taken into immediate consideration every aspect or the entire complexity of a question.”[19]

 

Therefore, it is important to distinguish these various aspects when considering Vatican II and its subsequent reforms.  While we should never entertain the thought that the Magisterium, as such, has taught heresy, it is possible to consider deficiencies within doctrines of the third degree that involve matters related to the prudential order.[20]  The CDF instruction continues: “…some judgments of the Magisterium could be justified at the time in which they were made, because while the pronouncements contained true assertions and others which were not sure, both types were inextricably connected. Only time has permitted discernment and, after deeper study, the attainment of true doctrinal progress.”[21]

 

In addition to the possibility of prudential error, one has to consider non-definitive and reformable magisterial teaching in light of a contingent order that is subject to changing circumstances.  Pope Benedict XVI highlighted this aspect in his famous address to the Roman Curia on the “Hermeneutic of Reform” in continuity with Tradition:
 

“It is precisely in this combination of continuity and discontinuity at different levels that the very nature of true reform consists. In this process of innovation in continuity we must learn to understand more practically than before that the Church's decisions on contingent matters…should necessarily be contingent themselves, precisely because they refer to a specific reality that is changeable in itself. It was necessary to learn to recognize that in these decisions it is only the principles that express the permanent aspect, since they remain as an undercurrent, motivating decisions from within.  On the other hand, not so permanent are the practical forms that depend on the historical situation and are therefore subject to change…Basic decisions, therefore,continue to be well-grounded, whereas the way they are applied to new contexts can change.”[22]

 
Doctrines of the third degree are reformable to the extent that they relate to the contingent order or to particulars related to a given time and place framework.  This necessarily involves the use of practical reason (prudential order) that is not immune to error in every instance.  Therefore, there is an inverse relationship between the immutable truth of a doctrine and the degree that practical reason is employed.  In other words, if a given doctrine is free from contingent and variable aspects then it does not involve practical reason or the prudential order.  In such cases we can be virtually certain that the doctrine expresses immutable truth.
 
In light of this we may now explore the question of dissent from teachings of the Magisterium.[23]  While serious reservations or doubt may prevent one from giving assent in the internal forum[24], there is no so-called right to openly dissent from the Magisterium in the external forum.   Neither does the rupture theologian have a legitimate appeal to “conscience” as a pretext to dissent from Church teaching because Catholics are obliged to form their conscience in conformity with the Magisterium.[25]  Opposed to the example of rupture theologians we may contrast the example of Archbishop Lefebvre at the time of the close of the Second Vatican Council.  After having argued against various aspects of some hotly-debated schemas that were put to vote by the Council Fathers, it was upon the dictates of his duly formed conscience that Archbishop Lefebvre felt morally obliged to sign each of the 16 Vatican II documents.[26]

 

Tradition and Doctrinal Development

Characteristics that divide “progressive” and “reactionary” rupture theologians can also be noted in their understanding and approach to sacred Tradition and the development of doctrine.  The former tendency seeks “progress” by creating artificial novelties that more or less deliberately and explicitly reject the past (i.e., sacred Tradition and doctrinal development admit substantial change according to this view).  In this sense, progressive rupture theologians “need to be reminded that Vatican II embraces the entire doctrinal history of the Church.  Anyone who wishes to be obedient to the Council has to accept the faith professed over the centuries…”[27]

 
The tendency for reactionary rupture theologians, on the other hand, is to seek a past state while rejecting a present state that has not been recognized or appreciated as an organic development of the same substantial reality.  Tradition, according to this view, is understood in a limited or narrow sense[28] that corresponds to an “inert” conception of the deposit of faith rather than a living and organic deposit.[29]  Therefore, the risk inherent in this view is to confuse accidental change with substantial change. 
 
Each variety of rupture theology, therefore, carries its own risks and dangers.  The progressive, for example, will seek progress by cutting down and uprooting the oak tree in order to pave the way for new designs and the man-made structures of the future.  The reactionary, on the other hand, not recognizing the oak tree for what it really is, will cut it down and uproot it while searching for the acorn of the past.  In either case the result is practically the same insofar as each will “sever the roots from which the tree draws its life.”[30]

 

Conclusion

In order to avoid the pitfalls of the theology of rupture one must retain simultaneously the Catholic doctrine on both Papal Infallibility and Indefectibility that rests on Peter’s unfailing faith.  In addition, one must strive to maintain a “hermeneutic of continuity” where magisterial documents are understood within the full context of sacred Tradition and according to the mind of the Church guided by the living magisterium.  In some cases one may find apparent discontinuities that are reconciled only by giving due consideration to contingent aspect as well as those aspects that relate to the prudential order.  Some of the Vatican II documents, such as Dignitatis Humanae on Religious Freedom, for example, require a careful consideration of contingent and historical aspects.  These resulted, for example, in some immutable principles being especially highlighted or newly applied in light of modern history and circumstances.[31]  Other Vatican II documents have either a pastoral goal or attempt to position the Church anew in her relations with society and other religions based on considerations of the requirements of circumstances in the modern era.  While resting on immutable principles that remain sound, many aspects relate to the contingent and practical prudential orders.  In this respect, and certainly without taking extremely rigid or “one-sided positions”[32], Catholics in good standing ought to be free to discuss in charity the prudential aspects of a question and the degree to which certain reforms, pastoral initiatives  and disciplinary practices remain capable of meeting their stated goals for the good of the Church and the salvation of souls.  This involves staying far away from rupture theology or the “hermeneutic of discontinuity” and pursuing a “hermeneutic of reform” in various areas that are in real need of reform.             



[1] Cf. Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Roman Curia, December 22, 2005

[2] Ibid.

[3] It is not uncommon to hear even in some traditionalist circles, for example, the claim that Vatican II contained “doctrinal errors” that signify a break or rupture from the Faith and sacred Tradition.  It is also important to recognize that not all traditionalists follow the “hermeneutic of rupture”.  For example, Bishop Bernard Fellay (SSPX) had expressly distanced himself from the hermeneutic of rupture while expressing his will to accept Vatican II in the light of Tradition (Cf. Fellay, Press Release of March 12, 2009, DICI): “Far from wanting to stop Tradition in 1962, we wish to consider the Second Vatican Council and post-conciliar teaching in the light of this Tradition which St. Vincent of Lérins defined as ‘what has been believed at all times, everywhere and by all’ (Commonitorium), without rupture and in a perfectly homogenous development. Thus we will be able to contribute efficaciously to the evangelization requested by the Savior (see Matthew 28; 19-20)."

[4] Cf. Matthew 16:18; Matthew 28:20. 
Some representatives of rupture theology conceive the concept of indefectibility in a seemingly narrow and conditional manner.  According to this narrow view, indefectibility is not an inherent and permanent charism of the teaching office (magisterium) that is always active  Rather, indefectibility and the protection from corruption in faith must be actively engaged in a deliberate mode of solemn or "ex cathedra" teaching:  "Some seem to think that the Vicar of Christ exercises his authentic teaching authority only when he speaks 'ex cathedra'.  They seem to think that only in those solemn circumstances are they bound in conscience to accept his teaching.  They seem to think that in all other cases, even in the case of a papal encyclical, or a similarly authoritative document, they are at liberty to challenge, to argue, to criticize, to accept or reject.  They do not hesitate to weigh the doctrine imparted against their own arbitrary judgements and reasoning, seemingly oblivious or ignorant of the fact that Christ our Lord has sealed the teaching authority of His Vicar on earth with a special charism for the protection of the People of God, not only against overt error but also against speciousness and plausibility.  Such a mentality is radically uncatholic, radically unorthodox.  Plainly it is a rejection of the authentic ordinary magisterium of the Vicar of Christ." (Cf. Norman Cardinal Gilroy, L'Osservatore Romano, Weekly Edition in English, April 4, 1968)  
Cardinal Journet notes that the indefectibility of the magisterium or “teaching Church” is linked to the indefectibility of Peter: “At the end of St. Matthew's Gospel, Jesus, to whom all power has been given in heaven and on earth, sends His disciples to evangelize the world, promising His assistance till the end of the world. What is explicitly designated here is the indefectibility of the teaching Church. But the teaching Church, and every believing Church sustained by her, has Peter for foundation (Matt. xvi. 13-20). To say that the Church is truly indefectible, and that it is truly based on the assistance promised to Peter, is to say in a way that is as yet implicit but already real that the assistance promised to Peter is indefectible….To say that the flock of Christ has a visible pastor on earth, and to say that this flock is indefectible, is to say in a way that is still undoubtedly latent, but real, that the visible pastor of the Church is, as such, indefectible” (Cf. Journet, The Church of the Word Incarnate, Sheed and Ward, 1955, pp. 440-441).  Maritain makes the same point as follows: “We know that a Pope can be a great sinner, but that – a condition presupposed by his charisma (“strengthen your brothers”) – he will never lose the faith; and that the Episcopal body also will never lose the faith (although bishops individually taken can fall into heresy, at least through weakness, - one saw this too well, and very abundantly, at the time of Arianism).”  In an endnote to the foregoing, Maritain comments: “This is why the questions which the medieval theologians posed to themselves concerning a Pope who would become heretical seem to me wholly academic” (Cf. Maritain, On the Church of Christ, UND Press, 1973, p. 139).

[5] Cf. DZ, #730

[6] Cf. First Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ, July 18, 1870.  In his official Relatio of July 11, 1870 on chapter four of the Dogmatic Constitution Pastor Aeternus Bishop Gasser stated the following: “This prerogative granted to St. Peter by the Lord Jesus Christ was supposed to pass to all Peter’s successors because the chair of Peter is the center of unity in the Church.  But if the Pontiff should fall into error of faith, the Church would dissolve, deprived of the bond of unity.  The bishop of Meaux speaks very well on this point, saying: ‘If this Roman See could fall and be no longer the See of truth but of error and pestilence, then the Catholic Church herself would not have the bond of a society and would be schismatic and scattered – which in fact is impossible.’” (Cf. Gasser, The Gift of Infallibility, Ignatius, 2008, pp. 24-25) 

Indeed, the Catechism of the Council of Trent taught as follows: "That all, therefore, may know the true Catholic Church, the Fathers, guided by the Spirit of God, added to the Creed the word "APOSTOLIC;" for the Holy Ghost, who presides over the Church, governs her by no other than Apostolic men; and this Spirit, first imparted to the Apostles, has, by the infinite goodness of God, always continued in the Church.  But as this one Church, because governed by the Holy Ghost, cannot err in faith or morals, it necessarily follows, that all other societies arrogating to themselves the name of Church, because guided by the spirit of darkness, are sunk in the most pernicious errors both doctrinal and moral." (Cf. Catechism of the Council of Trent, p. 102)

Cardinal Manning affirms that it is the "perpetual divine assistance, derived from the perpetual presence of the Spirit of Truth in the Church, which sustains the Faith of the See and of the successor of Peter, stable, indefectible, and infallible; that is, in one word, 'Yesterday, and today, and the same forever.' (Manning, The Oecumenical Council and the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, 1869, p. 150)

[7] Cf. Quas Primas, #22; See also Pope Gregory XVI (Mirari Vos, 9-10, 1832): "Furthermore, the discipline sanctioned by the Church must never be rejected or be branded as contrary to certain principles of natural law. It must never be called crippled, or imperfect or subject to civil authority. In this discipline the administration of sacred rites, standards of morality, and the reckoning of the rights of the Church and her ministers are embraced.  To use the words of the fathers of Trent, it is certain that the Church "was instructed by Jesus Christ and His Apostles and that all truth was daily taught it by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit."  Therefore, it is obviously absurd and injurious to propose a certain "restoration and regeneration" for her as though necessary for her safety and growth, as if she could be considered subject to defect or obscuration or other misfortune."

[8] Cf. Mystici Corporis, #66; In the same encyclical (n. 31), Pope Pius XII teaches as follows: "For both the juridical mission of the Church, and the power to teach, govern and administer the Sacraments, derive their supernatural efficacy and force for the building up of the Body of Christ from the fact that Jesus Christ, hanging on the Cross, opened up to His Church the fountain of those divine gifts, which prevent her from ever teaching false doctrine and enable her to rule them for the salvation of their souls through divinely enlightened pastors and to bestow on them an abundance of heavenly graces."

[9] Cf. Pope Paul VI, Letter to Archbishop Lefebvre, October 11, 1976; taken from Apologia Pro Marcel Lefebvre, Davies, Angelus Press, 1979, vol. I, p. 322

[10] The three degrees of doctrine outlined in the 1989 profession of faith are as follows: “[1] With firm faith I believe as well everything (ea omnia) contained in God's word, written or handed down in Tradition and proposed by the church--whether by way of solemn judgment or in the ordinary and universal Magisterium--as divinely revealed and calling for faith (tamquan divinitus revelata credenda).  [2] I also firmly accept and hold each and every thing (omnia et singula) that is proposed by that same Church definitively (definitive) with regard to teaching concerning faith or morals.  [3] Moreover, I adhere (adhaereo) with religious submission of will and intellect to the teachings which either the Roman pontiff or the college of bishops enunciate when they exercise the authentic Magisterium even if they proclaim those teachings in an act that is not definitive” (Text taken from “Magisterium”, Avery Cardinal Dulles, Sapientia, 2007, p. 136).

[11] To each of the three levels of magisterial teaching corresponds a required level of assent.  The highest degree of teaching requires the assent of “divine and Catholic Faith” (credenda).  The second degree of teaching requires the assent of “ecclesiastical faith” (tenenda).  The third degree of teaching requires “religious submission of will and intellect” (obsequium religiousum). (Dulles, op. cit., pp. 163-173)   

[12] In this sense, magisterial teachings that define matters of faith and morals, per se, are necessarily “definitive” and irreformable in themselves and such teachings are protected from all types of error insofar as their definitive character necessarily abstracts from the practical prudential and contingent orders.   

[13] Cf. Summa Theologica, ii-ii, q. 47, art. 1-3

[14] Cf. Journet, The Church of the Word Incarnate, Sheed and Ward, 1955, p. 351

[15] Cf. Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, #80

[16] Certain “gestures” toward non-Catholics could also be considered here.  For example, Pope John Paul II reportedly kissed a Koran upon receiving it as a gift.  Regardless of good intentions, such gestures involve the risk of misinterpretation and scandal among the faithful.

[17] The 1917 code, for example, reformed the teaching and practice concerning the payment of interest in connection with usury (C. 1543).  Contingent aspects and changed circumstances required reform precisely in order to preserve the foundational immutable principles (Cf. Fr. Heinrich Pesch, Lehrbuch der Nationalokonomie, Edwin Mellen Press, Vol. 5-b, pp. 196-197).   

[18] The Galileo case is often referenced as an example of a judgement involving both doctrinal and prudential errors.  Journet notes, however, that the decree was “issued in revocable matter, and by a fallible authority.”  According to Journet, the decree could not lay claim to an infallible prudential assistance since it was issued by a Roman Congregation in forma communi rather than forma specifica and therefore the canonical and prudential power was not fully engaged.  It can also be argued that the censure against Galileo (suspect of heresy) was prudent at the time given the circumstances and the common understanding of science and scripture at the time.  (Cf. Cardinal Journet, The Church of the Word Incarnate, Sheed & Ward, 1954, pp. 354-358)

[19] Cf. Donum Veritatis, 24.  While noting the possibility of prudential error in rare and isolated cases, the CDF instruction asserts the following: “…it would be contrary to the truth, if, proceeding from some particular cases, one were to conclude that the Church's Magisterium can be habitually mistaken in its prudential judgments, or that it does not enjoy divine assistance in the integral exercise of its mission.”  Therefore, the CDF instruction affirms:  “The willingness to submit loyally to the teaching of the Magisterium on matters per se not irreformable must be the rule.”

[20] I am referring again here to doctrines of the third degree as outlined in the 1989 profession of faith (the third paragraph of the concluding formula).  The official CDF commentary to the Professio Fidei highlights a particular distinction within doctrines of the third degree insofar as they relate to the prudential order and noting also the corresponding censures:  “A proposition contrary to these doctrines can be qualified as erroneous or, in the case of teachings of the prudential order, as rash or dangerous and therefore ‘tuto doceri non potest’.” (Cf. AAS 90 (1998) 542-551, CDF doctrinal note on the concluding formula of the Professio Fidei, June, 29, 1998; Text taken from Dulles, op. cit., p. 169)

[21] Cf. Donum Veritatis, 24

[22] Cf. Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Roman Curia, December 22, 2005

[23] Dissent against a particular level of doctrine carries a corresponding canonical censure.  For example, dissent against the highest level of teaching (first degree) carries the canonical censure of “heresy”.  Dissent against the second degree of doctrine is designated as “contrary to Catholic doctrine”.  Dissent against doctrines of the third degree can carry the canonical censure of “erroneous”, however, those doctrines involving prudential aspects instead may carry the censures of “rash” or “dangerous”. (Dulles, op. cit., p. 169)   

[24] Cf. Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, TAN, 1974, p. 10

[25] Cf. Donum Veritatis, 38

[26] In the Biography of Archbishop Lefebvre, Bishop Tissier de Mallerais relates the following: “Once a schema was promulgated by the Pope, it was no longer a schema but changed in nature to become an act of the Magisterium.  Archbishop Lefebvre himself underlined the weight of papal approval in his talk on September 15, 1976, when he admitted having signed lots of Council texts ‘under moral pressure from the Holy Father,’ because, as he said, ‘I cannot separate myself from the Holy Father: if the Holy Father signs, morally I am obliged to sign.’” (Cf. Marcel Lefebvre, Angelus Press, 2004, p. 312)    

[27] Cf. Pope Benedict XVI, Letter to the Bishops of the World, March 10, 2009

[28] Again, this “reactionary” view of Tradition is not intended to apply to all varieties of traditionalists or to any particular congregation or community.  It is true that this distorted view of Tradition has sometimes been attributed to Archbishop Lefebvre by the Popes (Cf. Pope Paul VI, Letter to Archbishop Lefebvre, October 11, 1976; taken from Apologia Pro Marcel Lefebvre, Davies, Angelus Press, 1979, vol. I, pp. 320-321; Pope John Paul II, Ecclesia Dei Afflicta, 1988; Pope Benedict XVI, Letter to Bishops, March 10, 2009), however, it must also be noted that Bishop Fellay (SSPX) has clarified his intention to view Vatican II in the light of Tradition and “without rupture and in a perfectly homogenous development.” (Cf. Fellay, Press Release of March 12, 2009, DICI)

[29] Cardinal Journet puts it as follows: “The handing on of the deposit involves its explanation.  For there are two kinds of deposits, lifeless deposits, such as a gold ingot, which is kept just as it is, and living deposits, such as a plant, or a child, which are preserved by being allowed to grow.  The evangelical deposit is of this kind” (Cf. Journet, What is Dogma?, Hawthorn, 1964, p. 53).  Congar develops other aspects of the question as follows: “The conservative reflex is also shared at times by the most careful and best-informed men in history.  Dedicated to the study of documents, they are apt to refuse to recognize the existence of definite ideas, albeit subconscious and unexpressed, beyond the explicit statement of a document.  Since the advent of the historical and documentary sciences, that is, since the sixteenth century, there have been periodic protests against innovation, protests made in the name of textual authority, and against “living tradition”, in the name of the monuments of tradition.  It is no coincidence that the expression “living tradition” was first used during the Jansenist debate.  The Jansenists were followers of the sacred Text, men of the past and of the literal words of St. Augustine, who, according to them, condemned the practice of the time.  Their conception of tradition was documentary, historical and static.” (Cf. Congar, The Meaning of Tradition, Ignatius, 2004, p. 118)

[30] Cf. Pope Benedict XVI, Letter to the Bishops of the World, March 10, 2009

[31] See, for example, “Religious Freedom and the Catholic Church” by Bishop Ketteler of Mainz (1862) available from The Remnant online: http://remnantnewspaper.com/Archives/2008-1115-religious_freedom_and_the_cathol.htm

[32] Cf. Pope Benedict XVI, Letter to the Bishops of the World, March 10, 2009


Labels: , , , ,

Tuesday, May 16, 2006

Ratzinger on Love and Redemption

The recent interview of Bishop Tissier de Mallerais by Stephen Heiner (Remnant, April 30, 2006) provides a good opportunity to reflect on the mystery of the redemption. Indeed, I find many "surprises" after reviewing the book by Fr. Ratzinger, "Introduction to Christianity", especially in light of the recent interview. The following is a short reflection on some of the main "surprises" that I encountered.

In a certain way one can view various aspects of the book as "revolutionary". What I mean is that, for Fr. Ratzinger, the starting point for the redemption is the "love" of God rather than the "justice" of God. This seems to be a "revolution" compared to a seemingly "perfectly logical divine- cum-human legal system erected by Anselm [that] distorts the perspectives and with its rigid logic can make the image of God appear in a sinister light." (Ratzinger, Introduction to Chritianity, p. 174) Indeed, Fr. Ratzinger rejects the idea that the "cross is to be understood as part of a mechanism of injured and restored right...which insists on the precise balance of debit and credit..." that "...visualizes a God whose unrelenting righteousness demanded a human sacrifice..." making "...the message of love incredible." (ibid, pp. 213-214) In other words, Fr. Ratzinger is arguing that Anselm's "rigid" legal or juridical system is incompatible and does not reconcile with the love of God and that it ultimately makes the message of love "incredible".

This is precisely the point that Bishop Tissier de Mallerais understands as "the negation of the dogma of the Redemption...that Christ did not satisfy for our sins, did not - atone...did not make satisfaction for our sins. This book denies Christ's atonement of sins...the necessity of satisfaction." (Cf. Remnant, April 30, 2006)

Rather than justice as the foundation of the redemption, Fr. Ratzinger explains that it was divine love that reconciled divine justice and that God "restores disturbed right on the initiative of his own power to love..." (ibid, p. 214) and quoting 2 Cor. 5.19 that "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself." (ibid, p. 215)

We may ask whether it is permissible to question St. Anselm’s theory of the Redemption as expressed by his famous work "Cur Deus Homo?" According to the Catholic Encyclopedia, however, some theologians at the time were “unable to accept Anselm's view that an equivalent satisfaction for sin was necessary, and that this debt could only be paid by the death of the Divine Redeemer.” For example, “St. Thomas and the other medieval masters agree with Abelard in rejecting the notion that this full Satisfaction for sin was absolutely necessary” arguing instead that “the restoration of fallen man was a work of God's free mercy and benevolence.” According to the Catholic Encyclopedia, the various theories of the Redemption each seemed to express an emphasis on certain aspects of the truth, however, “most, if not all, of these theories had perils of their own, if they were isolated and exaggerated.” (Cf. CE, 1910, "Doctrine of the Atonement")


This leads us to another "revolutionary" aspect of Fr. Ratzinger’s work in that for him the redemptive value essentially consists in the oblation of the love and obedience of Christ - rather than a mere "material gift" (e.g., a physical measure of blood, etc.). Fr. Ratzinger explains the vicarious satisfaction and atonement of Christ as follows:





He took from man's hands the sacrificial offerings and put his sacrificed personality, his own "I". When our text says [Hebrews] that Jesus accomplished the expiation through his blood (9.12), this blood is again not to be understood as a material gift, a quantitatively measurable means of expiation; it is simply the concrete expression of a love of which it is said that it extends "to the end" (John 13.1)...The gesture of the love that gives all - this, and this alone, according to the Epistle to the Hebrews, was the real means by which the world was reconciled... (ibid, p. 218)

Fr. Ratzinger then takes the idea of love to new heights by describing a "radical" Christian love that inherently involves a kind of interior immolation with total self-abandonment - the process of "dying to oneself":





...Christian sacrifice is nothing other than the exodus of the "For" that abandons itself, a process perfected in the man who is all exodus, all self-surpassing love. The governing principle of Christian worship is consequently this movement of exodus with it two-in-one direction towards God and fellow man...Now to the extent that this exodus of love is the ex-stasy of man outside himself, in which he is stretched out infinitely beyond himself, torn apart, as it were, far beyond his apparent capacity for being stretched, to the same extent worship (sacrifice) is always at the same time the cross, the pain of being torn apart, the dying of the grain of wheat that can only come to fruition in death. But it is thus at the same time clear that this element of pain is a secondary one, resulting only from a preceding primary one, from which alone it draws its meaning. The governing principle of the sacrifice is not destruction, but love. And even this principle only belongs to the sacrifice to the extent that love breaks down, opens up, crucifies, tears - as the form that love takes in a world characterized by death and self-seeking. (ibid, p.220)

Interestingly, this section above is related in very similar terms much later by Pope Benedict in "Deus Caritas Est" (Cf. #6):





...love looks to the eternal. Love is indeed "ecstasy", not in the sense of a moment of intoxication, but rather as a journey, an ongoing exodus out of the closed inward-looking self towards its liberation through self-giving, and thus towards authentic self- discovery and indeed the discovery of God: "Whoever seeks to gain his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life will preserve it" (Lk 17:33), as Jesus says throughout the Gospels (cf. Mt 10:39; 16:25; Mk 8:35; Lk 9:24; Jn 12:25). In these words, Jesus portrays his own path, which leads through the Cross to the Resurrection: the path of the grain of wheat that falls to the ground and dies, and in this way bears much fruit. Starting from the depths of his own sacrifice and of the love that reaches fulfilment therein, he also portrays in these words the essence of love and indeed of human life itself.

Fr. Ratzinger then re-emphasizes that "it should now also be plain that with the cross it is not a matter of an accumulation of physical pain, as if its redemptive value consisted in its involving the largest possible amount of physical torture...or even see in it the currency with which reconciliation has to be purchased from him?" (ibid, p. 221)

Indeed, the Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC, 1992) seems to make an attempt at clarifying this point on the specific redemptive value of the offering of Christ's Love and obedience to the Father - rather than assigning the redemptive value to a "material" offering:





It is love "to the end" that confers on Christ's sacrifice its value as redemption and reparation, as atonement and satisfaction. (CCC #616)

By his loving obedience to the Father, "unto death, even death on a cross" Jesus fulfills the atoning mission of the suffering Servant. (CCC #623)

But if love is the dominant and decisive factor in the doctrine of the redemption, how would Fr. Ratzinger explain its relation with justice? Incidentally, almost 40 years later, Pope Benedict explores this in "Deus Caritas Est" (#10):





We have seen that God's eros for man is also totally agape. This is not only because it is bestowed in a completely gratuitous manner, without any previous merit, but also because it is love which forgives. Hosea above all shows us that this agape dimension of God's love for man goes far beyond the aspect of gratuity. Israel has committed "adultery" and has broken the covenant; God should judge and repudiate her. It is precisely at this point that God is revealed to be God and not man: "How can I give you up, O Ephraim! How can I hand you over, O Israel! ... My heart recoils within me, my compassion grows warm and tender. I will not execute my fierce anger, I will not again destroy Ephraim; for I am God and not man, the Holy One in your midst" (Hos 11:8-9). God's passionate love for his people—for humanity—is at the same time a forgiving love. It is so great that it turns God against himself, his love against his justice. Here Christians can see a dim prefigurement of the mystery of the Cross: so great is God's love for man that by becoming man he follows him even into death, and so reconciles justice and love.

And again the Pope returns to the theme a little later in the encylclical (#12):





His death on the Cross is the culmination of that turning of God against himself in which he gives himself in order to raise man up and save him. This is love in its most radical form. By contemplating the pierced side of Christ (cf. 19:37), we can understand the starting-point of this Encyclical Letter: "God is love" (1Jn 4:8). It is there that this truth can be contemplated. It is from there that our definition of love must begin. In this contemplation the Christian discovers the path along which his life and love must move.

We also find this contemplation of the “pierced side of Christ” in connection to the kind of spirituality as expressed by the Sacred Heart devotion. Turning to Pius XII in his beautiful Encyclical on the devotion to the Sacred Heart (Haurietis Aquas, 1956) we find this message repeated concerning the centrality of love in the mysteries of the incarnation and redemption. Indeed, the approach of Pius XII does not seem to reflect the kind of "juridical" framework of St. Anselm insofar as the starting point and essense of these mysteries is taken as the love of God. Pope Pius XII articulates the primary “object” or motivation behind the incarnation and redemption as follows (#44):

The holy Fathers, true witnesses of the divinely revealed doctrine, wonderfully understood what St. Paul the Apostle had quite clearly declared; namely, that the mystery of love was, as it were, both the foundation and the culmination of the Incarnation and the Redemption. For frequently and clearly we can read in their writings that Jesus Christ took a perfect human nature and our weak and perishable human body with the object of providing for our eternal salvation, and of revealing to us in the clearest possible manner that His infinite love for us could express itself in human terms.

It is interesting to note here that the very "object" of the incarnation is presented as providing for our "eternal salvation" rather than as a juridical mission to restore injured rights. This message seems consistent with the article of the Nicene creed that tells us that is was "for us men and for our salvation" that Christ became man. Pius XII also explains the nature and cause of the Redemption as follows (#35):





The mystery of the divine redemption is primarily and by its very nature a mystery of love, that is, of the perfect love of Christ for His heavenly Father to Whom the sacrifice of the Cross, offered in a spirit of love and obedience, presents the most abundant and infinite satisfaction due for the sins of the human race; "By suffering out of love and obedience, Christ gave more to God than was required to compensate for the offense of the whole human race."

Perhaps the most enlightening explanation on the interplay between the love of God and His justice was provided by Cardinal Ratzinger on his reflection of Matthew 5:38-39 and 41:





You have heard that it was said, ’An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.’ But I say to you, do not resist one who is evil. But if any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also.

Cardinal Ratzinger remarks as follows on this “revolutionary” command:





Jesus did not reject the principle of equality as a basic legal principle but rather wanted here to open up to man a new dimension of his behavior. Law in isolation and made absolute becomes a vicious circle, a cycle of retaliation from which finally there is no way out any longer. In his relationship with us God has broken through this circle. In the face of God we are in the wrong, having turned away from him in the search for our own glorification and thus fallen victim to death. But God renounces the punishment that would be just and replaces it by something new: salvation, our conversion to renewed “yes” to the truth of ourselves. For this transformation to occur he goes ahead of us and takes the pain and suffering of transformation upon himself. The cross of Christ is the real discharging of the saying: not eye for eye, tooth for tooth, but the transformation of evil through the power of love. In his whole human existence, from the incarnation to the cross, Jesus does and is what is said here. He burst our “no” open by means of a
stronger and greater “yes.” (Cardinal Ratzinger, The Yes of Jesus Christ, 1991)

Turning back to the Catholic Encyclopedia we can note that it makes an attempt to reconcile the various theories of the redemption including those that are founded primarily on a "juridical" basis as compared to others founded primarily on the "love" of God. Each seems to take into account both attributes of God, however, the point of departure seems to be in their approach towards reconciling these in view of their proper relation and in interpreting the respective roles of the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of the cross:




That great doctrine has been faintly set forth in figures taken from man's laws and customs. It is represented as the payment of a price, or a ransom, or as the offering of satisfaction for a debt. But we can never rest in these material figures as though they were literal and adequate. As both Abelard and Bernard remind us, the Atonement is the work of love. It is essentially a sacrifice, the one supreme sacrifice of which the rest were but types and figures. And, as St. Augustine teaches us, the outward rite of Sacrifice is the sacrament, or sacred sign, of the invisible sacrifice of the heart. It was by this inward sacrifice of obedience unto death, by this perfect love with which He laid down his life for His friends, that Christ paid the debt to justice, and taught us by His example, and drew all things to himself; it was by this that He wrought our Atonement and Reconciliation with God, "making peace through the blood of His Cross". (Cf. CE, 1910, Doctrine of the Atonement)

It is worth pausing here to consider how the interior and exterior aspects of the cross correspond to a respective intrinsic and extrinsic value of the sacrifice of the cross. Whereas the intrinsic effects of the cross (as with the Mass) "relate to God alone" the extrinsic effect "reverts to man." (Cf. CE, 1910, Sacrifice of the Mass) In other words, man's nature requires the exterior or extrinsic aspects in order to apply in a finite way the infinite "fruits" of the cross. In "Introduction to Christianity" Fr. Ratzinger describes the intrisic aspect of the cross as "that inner centre that bears and fulfils the pain..." (p. 222) while the extrinsic aspect of the cross is "truly the centre of revelation, a revelation that does not reveal any previously unknown principles but reveals us to ourselves, by revealing us before God and God in our midst." (p. 223)

In summary we can observe that there seems to be two key points of contention with regard to this mystery. Many traditionalists indeed view the ideas expressed by Fr. Ratzinger as part of the "new theology" of the "Paschal Mystery":


Is the Paschal mystery a total innovation? Not according to the new theology. It is a fresh look at the traditional dogma of the Redemption...classic theology is thought to have overemphasized the satisfaction of justice, the cooperation of man and the pains of Christ's Passion. The Paschal mystery will seemingly put things back into their proper perspective by emphasizing the great importance of love, the intitiative of God, and the new life of the Resurrection. (The Problem of the Liturgical Reform, Angelus Press, pp. 39-40)

We have followed the main lines of this argument above inasmuch as (a) the incarnation and redemption is approached from the basis of divine love and (b) that the redemptive value or "currency" essentially consists in Christ's offering of love and obedience to the Father and thereby reconciling divine love with divine justice. In contrast to this view we have the arguments in favor of (a) the primacy and centrality of satisfaction of divine justice where the divine goal of man's salvation is viewed as "secondary" (Cf. Romano Amerio, Iota Unum, Angelus Press, p. 480). In addition, (b) Christ's vicarious satisfaction for sin is especially considered in its exterior aspects where the elements of "pain" and "death" are stressed as "essential to the work of redemption." (Cf. The Problem of the Liturgical Reform, Angelus Press, p. 51, 88). Indeed, one wonders whether the main lines of this "debate" has not been going on since the time of St. Anselm and perhaps the discussion will continue for some time...

Labels: , ,