Basile Valuet On Hermeneutic Of Reform

Sandro Magister brings us another important contribution by Benedictine theologian Basile Valuet to the ongoing debate concerning the nature and interpretation of the "hermeneutic of reform" proposed by Pope Benedict XVI.  As we have seen previously, the philosopher Martin Rhonheimer considers that Vatican II had "corrected" previous teaching relative to the nature and function of the state in relation to the Church and its duties towards religious truth.  Furthermore, Rhonheimer considers the logic behind the "due limits" taught by DH to correspond to a conception of a civil order that has a secular character in the sense of being "neutral" towards the diverisity of religious traditions.  This is precisely where Rhonheimer identifies the "discontinuity" introduced by vatican II -- even if not at the level of a dogmatic rupture.  According to Rhonheimer, the previous Magisterium seemed to demand the "confessional" Church-state model (where the state acts as a department or "secular arm" of the Church) whereas Vatican II seemed to propose the secular model of the state where the spiritual and temporal powers are each considered mutually autonomous.

    

Basile Valuet rejects this conclusion and indicates that Vatican II leaves open the possibility for a variety of governmental forms -- including a confessional state.  The Benedictine theologian also stresses that the errors of liberalism, condemned in the 19th century, remain condemned today and are perfectly compatible with DH and the "hermeneutic of reform" proposed by Pope Benedict XVI:   

"According to Benedict XVI, Pius IX was taking aim at the "radical liberalism" of the 19th century, but not at other forms of the organization of society, rising from a further evolution of liberalism. The discontinuity between Vatican II and Pius IX stems from the fact that RF is not the "freedom of conscience" condemned in the 19th century: it did not have either the same foundation, or the same object, or the same limitations, or the same goal. So it will always remain true that the liberalism condemned by Pius IX was condemnable (R. does not see this), but it will not always remain true that the theories or the states of law that we have before us are the ones that Pius IX condemned (R. grasps this perfectly)."

The principles of RF are universal whereas the application can vary accrording to the circumstances of time and place.  In other words, there is no universal or "one size fits all" juridical formula to implement RF in every possible circumstance or social context.  The development or "novelty" introduced by Vatican II was to formulate the principles governing RF in a more general way -- taking into account changing circumstances and the wide diversity of legitimate social and governmental forms in the modern era:

"If a change of situation cannot change the natural law, it can nevertheless make a principle of the natural law (let's call it P1: it is not contrary to the natural law that the state should repress religious error), valid in a previous situation of ius gentium (in which RF is not yet recognized in reciprocal form), no longer apply in the same way in a new situation of ius gentium (in which RF is mutually recognized), and make another principle be applied now (P2: the modern state does not have penal competency, not even delegated, in religious matters).  In this way, if one wishes to have a truth that is valid in every situation, one is obligated to formulate a principle P3, more general, which combines P1 and P2, and which DH has made an effort to formulate: it is contrary to the natural law that the state - in any age - should repress religious error, unless, in the circumstances considered, it disturbs the just, objective public order."