The Intervention of Mgr. Dupanloup (Part I)

Introduction

The Papal Encyclical Quanta Cura (1864) and the accompanying “Syllabus” (a list of modern errors compiled and formulated by the Vatican from various Papal Allocutions, Encyclicals and Apostolic Letters given during the Pontificate of Pope Pius IX) caused great uproar in many countries including France.  Much of the tension and confusion was stirred up and spread by journalists that were ill-equipped to present the true meaning or sense of the Papal act.  In the face of unrelenting attacks against the Church and the Papacy, Mgr. Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, intervened in 1865 with his work, “The Convention of the 15^th September and The Encyclical of the 8^th December”, that set out to defend Pope Pius IX while dispelling the confusion running rampant an all sides.  In response to his intervention, the Bishop of Orleans received 630 letters of praise and commendation from Catholic Bishops all over the world including Mgr. Pecci of Perugia (future Pope Leo XIII), Mgr. Ketteler of Mainz, Mgr. Chigi (Apostolic Nuncio, Paris), Cardinal Caterini and finally, on February 4, 1865, from Pope Pius IX himself (Cf. F. Lagrange, Life of Monseigneur Dupanloup, 1885, pp. 261-265).  On the other hand, not everyone was pleased by Mgr. Dupanloup and his intervention.  Those who would use the Encyclical and the Syllabus as a kind of political device in pursuit of regime change in favor of the royalist cause in France would label Mgr. Dupanloup’s work the “anti-Syllabus”.   

We will tackle this in three parts by taking a look at various aspects of this intervention that shed much needed light on both Quanta Cura and the Syllabus.  Part I begins by reviewing some “rules of interpretation” that Mgr. Dupanloup calls to our attention.  Part II provides an analysis of the origin and development of the thesis-hypothesis distinction.  Finally, Part III provides an explanation and conclusions on the topic of religious freedom.        

 

The Contradictory and The Contrary

Bishop Dupanloup identifies some false interpretations of the Encyclical and responds by outlining true principles and rules of interpretation.  He begins with an important clarification insofar as a given proposition only affirms the contradictory while not necessarily intending to affirm the contrary position.    

Is the rigorous consequences of a condemned proposition well known in the world?  Or rather, to show the manner in which they have exaggerated the Pontifical condemnations, are not most of those who have written on the Encyclical absolutely ignorant of it?  I shall doubtless astonish them, by recalling to their minds elementary principles, not only in theology, but in logic.  For example:

It is an elementary rule of interpretation, that the condemnation of a proposition rejected as false, erroneous, and even heretical, does not necessarily imply the affirmation of its contrary, which often might be another error; but only of its contradictory.

The contradictory proposition is that which simply excludes the condemned proposition.  The contrary is that which goes beyond this simple exclusion.

Well, of this common rule they seem to have been entirely ignorant, in the inconceivable interpretation they have given us of the Encyclical and the Syllabus, during the last three weeks past.

The Pope condemns this proposition: “It is permitted to refuse obedience to legitimate princes.” (Prop. 63.)

They affect to conclude from this, that, according to the Pope, the refusal of obedience is never permitted, and that submission to the will of princes is always obligatory.  This is to go at a single leap to the last extreme of the contrary, and, through the Vicar of Christ, to consecrate the most brutal despotism, and servile obedience to all the caprices of princes.  It is the extinction of the noblest of liberties – the holy liberty of the soul.  And yet they make the Pope affirm it! 

The Universal and the Conditional

The Bishop proceeds to a second basic rule of interpretation.  We must be attentive to those propositions that condemn a universal position.  Such a proposition does not exclude every qualification dictated by circumstances or facts.

There is another rule of interpretation, not less elementary, viz: that it must be seen whether the condemned proposition be universal and absolute; for then it may often happen that such a proposition is censured only because of its universality and its too absolute sense.

Example: “The principle called non-intervention must be proclaimed and observed.” (Prop. 62.)

In condemning this proposition, did the Pope intend to say that intervention should be maintained, right or wrong, without discernment, always?

[…]Neither intervention, nor non-intervention can be an absolute rule.  The Pope means simply that non-intervention should not be made a universal principle, that is necessary to be observed, like an axiom of international right…Intervention, like non-intervention, belongs to discipline – to discipline, either good or bad, just or unjust, wise or imprudent, according to the case or circumstances.  

The Scope

In his third basic rule of interpretation, Mgr. Dupanloup points out the necessity to consider each and every term with attention to determine the scope and limit of the condemnation.

Another rule of interpretation, and of good sense, requires that all the terms of a condemned proposition should be studied and weighed with attention, to understand upon what the condemnation does or does not touch…Thus:

The Pope condemns this proposition: “The Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile and accommodate himself to modern civilization.”

Therefore, they conclude, the Papacy declares itself the irreconcilable enemy of modern civilization.

All that constitutes modern civilization is, according to the journals hostile to the Church, condemned by the Pope.  This interpretation is simply an absurdity.  The words demanding attention here are, to reconcile and accommodate himself.

In that which our adversaries designate under the name, so vaguely complex, of modern civilization, there is good, indifferent, and also much that is bad.  With whatever is good or indifferent in modern civilization, the Pope has no need to reconcile himself.  To say so would be an impertinence and an insult, as if one said to an honorable man, “Reconcile yourself with justice.”

With what is wrong, the Pope neither can nor ought to reconcile or accommodate himself.  To pretend to such a thing would be an outrage.  Here, then, is the sense (which is very simple) of the condemnations directed against the 80^th proposition, to which I shall return.

It is also the same in this very proposition, No. 80, regarding other words, equally vague and complex, viz: progress and liberalism.  Whatever may be good in these words and things, the Pope does not regret.  What is indifferent is also so to him.  What is wrong he reproves…

The Absolute and the Relative

Mgr. Dupanloup then makes a critical distinction between the absolute and the relative.  The former he called the “thesis” while the latter he termed the “hypothesis”.  This basic framework would serve as the basis for ongoing theological discussion and debate on the Church in her relations with modern states.  Catholic theologians would develop this model in different directions according to various philosophies.  We will have more to say about this later.  For now, it is sufficient to note this key distinction and that the relative view (hypothesis) may be considered admissible insofar as it is a legitimate application of immutable principles to concrete circumstances.  On the other hand, a relative good should never be raised to the level of the good considered in the absolute sense (thesis).

There are yet other rules.  In the interpretation of condemned propositions, it is necessary to remark all the terms, all the slight shades of expression; for the vice of a proposition is often found in a shade, in a word, which alone forms the error.  The absolute propositions must be distinguished, as well as the relative propositions; for that which might be admissible in hypothesis will often be false in thesis.  There are also equivocal or dangerous propositions, which can be condemned only because of the equivocation itself, and from the bad sense to which they may be applied, although they may also have a good sense.       

Context is Key

The last rule of interpretation noted by Mgr. Dupanloup draws our attention to the importance of understanding the proposition in the sense that it was given by the Pope.  For example, in the case of the Syllabus, it should be understood according to the sense given in the original Papal Allocution cited and never completely removed from its proper context.  It is in this sense that Cardinal Newman considers that “the value of the Syllabus…lies in its references.”  To get a better sense of this, Newman cites Prop. 77 of the Syllabus and explains as follows: “When we turn to the Allocution, which is the ground of its being put into the Syllabus, what do we find there?  First, that the Pope was speaking, not of States universally, but of one particular State, Spain, definitely Spain; secondly, he was not speaking of the proposition in questions directly, or dogmatically, or separately, but was protesting against the breach in many ways of the Concordat on the part of the Spanish government.”  Then, commenting on the true sense of the proposition, Newman states that “the Pope does merely not think it expedient for every state from this time forth to tolerate every sort of religion on its territory, and to disestablish the Church at once…for this is all that he denies.  As in the instance of the foregoing section, he does but deny a universal…”  (Cf. Newman, Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, 1875) 

Finally, there are propositions (and the Syllabus includes several) which are condemned only in the sense given by their authors, and not in the absolute sense of the words when separated from the context, etc.  

A Principal Mistake

Mgr. Dupanloup then proceeds to enumerate several “principal mistakes” in regards to the sense that many have incorrectly attributed to the Papal act.  One such mistake involves the matter of religious freedom.

I ask to be permitted to produce some other examples of propositions, of which the condemnation has been strangely understood, because all the rules of interpretation have been misconceived or forgotten, or rather because the translators have read, with an inconceivable levity, the theological formularies, edited in the brief and learned terms of the schools, somewhat as they are accustomed to read newspapers and romances.

To confine myself to the principal mistakes, there is in the Encyclical a proposition relative to the freedom of worship.  This proposition has been interpreted in such a manner that the half of France, at this moment, imagines the Pope has really condemned the constitutions of nearly all the states of Europe, who admit the free exercise of worship; and that, consequently, it will not be permitted henceforth to take the oath for the maintenance of the constitution of our country.

Here is the proposition, whose absolute and excessive character is plain enough: “The highest social perfection and civil progress imperiously exact that human society should be constituted and governed without taking any more account of religion than if it had no existence, or at least without acknowledging any difference between true religion and false.” (Encycl.)

Would any one seriously ask us to subscribe to so exorbitant a doctrine?  If the Pope brands it, how call that logic, in the name of which they would conclude that he condemns the political constitution which admits of tolerance and civil liberty to dissenting forms of worship?  But I shall return to this point; it is too serious to be left without the full expressions of my thoughts.

 Continued in Part II

On Religious Freedom and Natural Law

Religious freedom, as a civic right, has its foundation in the natural law:

“The believer has an absolute right to profess his faith and live according to its dictates.   Laws which impede this profession and practice of faith are against the natural law.” (Pius XI, Mit Brennender Sorge, 1937)

This basic right is closely linked to another right rooted in the natural law and mentioned by Pius XI in the same context: “Parents who are earnest and conscious of their educative duties, have a primary right to the education of the children God has given them in the spirit of their Faith, and according to its prescriptions.  Laws and measures which…fail to respect this freedom of the parents go against natural law, and are immoral.” (ibid.)  Such rights are correlative to duties belonging to all men (Catholic and non-Catholic) by virtue of the natural law that has been inscribed onto all hearts.  In this sense, St. Thomas teaches: “Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can know Him.  Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason, under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of the child in all matters relating to God.”  (S.T. ii-ii, 10, 12)  But must the temporal authority tolerate any kind of religious practice?  Here we must distinguish, following St. Thomas, the two kinds of religious practices.

Two Kinds of Religious Practices 

All men have a duty and corresponding right to obey the prescriptions of the natural moral law.  Therefore, all men have a natural right to civic religious freedom within the [due] limits of the objective moral order as expressed by the natural moral law.  In this sense, we may distinguish between two kinds of religious practices:

St. Thomas…rightly distinguishes two kinds of religious practices: there are those which go against reason and against God insofar as he can be recognized through nature and through the natural powers of the soul, e.g., the worship of idols, etc. Others are contrary to the Christian religion and to its commands not because they are evil in themselves or contrary to reason as, for example, the practices of Jews and even many of the customs of Mohammedans and such unbelievers who believe in one true God.  (Suarez, Tract. de Fide Disp. 18 Sect. III, n. 10)

Religious practices in violation of the natural moral law should not be tolerated by civil authorities unless greater evils would ensue.

Regarding the first, the Church may not tolerate them on the part of her own unbelieving subjects. But that is merely the general principle. It may happen often that Christian rulers cannot prevent even such practices without causing greater harm to the nation and to the Christian inhabitants. In that case, the ruler may tolerate such evil with a clear conscience on the basis of what Christ said to the servant who asked the master whether they should remove the weeds from the field. He replied, 'No, or perhaps while you are gathering the tares you will root up the wheat with them.' (idid. sect. IV, n. 9)

But what are we to think of the second type of non-Catholic religious practice that conforms to the natural law but not to divinely revealed truth?  At a first glance, it could seem tempting to follow the Jansenist error by condemning all that does not univocally conform to supernatural truth: “Everything which is not in accordance with supernatural Christian faith, which works through charity, is a sin.” (DZ. 1301)  Here we must distinguish the “believer” in relation to the supernatural Christian faith from the “believer” in relation to the natural law.  Thus, Suarez indicates those “practices of Jews and even many of the customs of Mohammedans and such unbelievers who believe in one true God.”  Additional light is shed on this distinction by Pope St. Gregory VII in his letter to King Anazir: 

Thou and We are bound therefore by this charity peculiar among us, compared to the remainder of the nations, that we believe in and confess one God, although in a different way, Who we praise and venerate daily as Creator of the ages and Ruler of the same world. (Pope St. Gregory VII, Ep. 21, to Anzir, King of Mauritania, PL 148, col. 451A)

Hanc itaque charitatem nos et vos specialibus nobis quam caeteris gentibus debemus, qui unum Deum, licet diverso modo, credimus et confitemur, qui eum Creatorem saeculorum et gubernatorem hujus mundi quotidie laudamus et veneramur. 

Therefore, religious practices that are in conformity with the natural moral law must be tolerated for the sake of “greater benefits” or a superior good – natural liberty or the right to exercise responsible human freedom:

"Temporal government has its origin in divine government, and it must, therefore to the extent that it can, imitate it. God, however, though He is almighty and infinite, permits certain evils to occur on earth, even though He could prevent them from occurring. He does this because, first of all, by preventing evil in this manner He would deprive man of greater benefits and secondly, because therefore greater evils would result." (ST. ii-ii, 10, 11)

To this Bishop Ketteler adds the following commentary: “The greater benefits which St. Thomas had in mind here are not hard to determine. God would have to deprive a man of his liberty which is the highest endowment that man has, if He were to deny a man every possibility of abusing that liberty.  Applying that principle to temporal governments, St. Thomas concluded that they too must tolerate certain evils, and he stated finally: ‘Even though the non-believers sin because of their religious practices, these must nevertheless be tolerated, either because of the good that they still have in them, or because of the greater evil that would result.’” (Cf. Ketteler, Freedom, Authority and the Church)  In addition to the “greater benefits” of natural liberty required for moral action, we have to consider the [due] limits of temporal authority in the religious sphere as well as the [due] limits of ecclesiastical authority over those “not subject to the spiritual authority of the Church”:

“As regards the other religious practices of unbelievers which go contrary to Christian beliefs but not counter to natural reason, there is no doubt but that the unbelievers, even though they are subjects, may not be forced to abandon them. Rather the Church has to tolerate them.  St. Gregory addressed himself clearly to this problem regarding Jews, and he forbade anyone to deprive them of their synagogues or to prevent them from observing their religious practices therein. (Lib. I Epistol. 34) Elsewhere he reaffirmed that no one should prevent Jews from participating in their religious observances. (Lib. II. Ep. 15) The reason is that such observances do not in themselves violate the natural law, and therefore, the temporal power of even a Christian ruler does not confer a right to forbid them. Such action would be based on the fact that what is being done goes contrary to the Christian Faith, but that is not enough to compel those who are not subject to the spiritual authority of the Church. This opinion is also supported by the fact that such a ban would involve, to some extent, forcing people to accept the Faith; and that is never permitted.” (Suarez, op. cit.)

But what are the consequences of this in terms of the political organization of states?  The religious practices of the second type that conform to the natural moral law can give rise to two basic types of temporal regime depending upon the unity or plurality of faith convictions in the body politic (Cf. Journet, The Church of the Word Incarnate, Sheed and Ward, 1955, pp. 214-215).  The secular state is constituted on the basis of temporal affinities of nature whereas the sacral state is constituted also on the basis of supernatural bonds or unity of faith.

The Sacral State

The relational model between Church and State as it existed in the Middle Ages was constituted on the basis of supernatural bonds or unity in faith in addition to merely natural bonds (natural law + divine positive law).  In such circumstances there is virtually no distinction between the citizen of the civil society (state) and the member of the Mystical Body of Christ (Church).  In this context, full civic rights of citizenship (including religious freedom) are accorded on the basis of unity in faith and membership in the Church.  Such a model conforms to the teaching of Suarez insofar as all the citizens are morally and socially bound by the same faith convictions.  In this case, obedience to the natural law and the positive divine law is univocally applied to each member of civil society.  The "due limits" in such a social context necessarily excludes the spread of heresy that militates against public order and the common good in a society held together by common bonds of faith.  A member who renounces his Catholic faith or falls into formal heresy, in this civil context, violates the natural moral law insofar as he violates the norms of public order and the subjective norm of morality (conscience).  Such a state naturally treats heresy as an act of sedition that militates against public order and the common good of society held together by a common faith.  While non-Catholics were generally not accorded rights of citizenship in this context, the worship of non-Catholics legally residing in a territory was tolerated (privately and publicly) by the civil authorities to the extent that it conformed to the prescriptions of the natural moral law.       

The Secular State

With the advent of globalization the supernatural bonds of a common faith linking together the various members of civil society began to erode.  In this modern context the secular state is constituted exclusively on the basis of natural bonds (natural law) rather than supernatural ones.  In this scenario there is a clear distinction between membership in the supernatural society (Church) and citizenship in the natural and temporal society (state).  Civil rights are granted to all regardless of faith convictions and the various religious practices are tolerated according to the principles and within the [due] limits outlined above.  The Catholic who falls into formal heresy, while subjectively guilty of a serious sin, does not violate the [objective] moral order as expressed by the natural moral law nor does he pose a threat to public order in civil society.  In this context heresy, no longer punishable as a civil crime, is dealt with exclusively by ecclesiastical authorities.

Letter In Defense of Bishop Ketteler

 

Editor, The Remnant:

I would like to respond to the letter by Arnaud de Lassus printed in the edition of June 30, 2009 where some surprising statements appear in reference to Bishop Ketteler of Mainz (1811-1877).  Naturally, since the Bishop is not able to defend himself against the charge of liberalism, and since I had originally submitted his work for publication in The Remnant, I feel obliged to make some response in order to set the record straight. 

May and Must

Considering first the question of translation Arnaud de Lassus objects to “tolerati possunt” being rendered into English as “these must…be tolerated” and instead insisting on the term “may”.  It should be noted that the English translation to Ketteler’s works are by Dr. Rupert J. Ederer.  I do not know whether the quote from St. Thomas was translated from Ketteler’s German original or if it was simply taken from some other existing English translation of the Summa.  Putting that aside, it seems to me that Arnaud de Lassus misses the point insofar as “may” simply indicates the possibility of two scenarios.  In the first case are those situations where we have a moral obligation [must] to repress error or vice.  In the second case are those situations where we have a moral obligation [must] to tolerate error or vice.  In other words, we [may] tolerate inasmuch as the duty to repress religious and moral error is not absolute or unconditional (Cf. Pius XII, Ci Riesce).  Yet in those circumstances that dictate either repression or tolerance – our response is not optional (i.e., “may” in the morally neutral sense) but has the character of a duty or moral obligation [must].  Therefore, an exact translation within the context cited (ST. ii-ii 10, 11) does not rule out the rendering of “must” inasmuch as it reflects the meaning indicated – one of two scenario where there is a moral obligation [must] to tolerate – in imitation of the divine governance – by virtue of the existence of one of the following: (a) a superior good that should not be prevented or (b) a greater evil that would ensue upon repression.  In this sense, “must” is entirely faithful to the meaning of the text insofar as it conveys a moral duty – and it avoids the possible ambiguity rendered by the use of “may” that can easily be taken in the mistaken sense of an optional choice that is morally neutral.   

Private and Public

We are then presented with a second objection in reference to Ketteler’s assertion that the Church “rejects as immoral and illegitimate any use of external force against those who are not her members.”  Arnaud de Lassus counters as follows: “According to the traditional doctrine on civil liberties, public expression of heretical and pagan rites is forbidden…”  Yet in Ketteler’s following sentence he makes the following qualification:

“At the same time, she recognizes definite limits beyond which religious freedom would constitute a wrong that would jeopardize the moral well-being of society. Even in the area of morality, freedom reaches its limits when it constitutes a wrong which poses a threat to society. Therefore, religious freedom too must have its limits, not only where it is a threat to the state, but also if it threatens the rights of others to the higher moral benefits of society.  That becomes the case, when, as at present, sects are founded which under the guise of religion add up to a denial of Almighty God, foster crass materialism, and thereby lay the groundwork for destroying the entire moral foundations of human society. Such religious liberty is in fact immoral and unreasonable abomination which God is bound to curse; and states which tolerate it are doomed.”

Therefore, Ketteler clearly does not rule out the use of “external force” absolutely and unconditionally.  On the contrary, he outlines here the [due] limits to religious freedom.  We are left to wonder whether the objection is based on an absolute and unconditional rejection of the principle of toleration concerning the public profession of non-Catholic worship.  This runs directly counter to the teaching of Suarez (quoted by Ketteler) insofar as it entails both private and public worship: 

“As regards the other religious practices of unbelievers which go contrary to Christian beliefs but not counter to natural reason, there is no doubt but that the unbelievers, even though they are subjects, may not be forced to abandon them. Rather the Church has to tolerate them.[14]  St. Gregory addressed himself clearly to this problem regarding Jews, and he forbade anyone to deprive them of their synagogues or to prevent them from observing their religious practices therein. (Lib. I Epistol. 34) Elsewhere he reaffirmed that no one should prevent Jews from participating in their religious observances. (Lib. II. Ep. 15) The reason is that such observances do not in themselves violate the natural law, and therefore, the temporal power of even a Christian ruler does not confer a right to forbid them. Such action would be based on the fact that what is being done goes contrary to the Christian Faith, but that is not enough to compel those who are not subject to the spiritual authority of the Church. This opinion is also supported by the fact that such a ban would involve, to some extent, forcing people to accept the Faith; and that is never permitted.”

Man is a social being according to his nature and therefore he has the duty and corresponding right to worship in private and in public according to the dictates of conscience.  Pope Pius XI stresses that this [outward profession of one’s faith] is a basic natural right rooted in the natural law: “The believer has an absolute right to profess his faith and live according to its dictates.  Laws which impede this profession and practice of faith are against the natural law” (Pius XI, Mit Brennender Sorge, 1937).  Note that he speaks of the right as one founded on “natural law” rather than positive divine law.  Pope Pius XII affirms the same principle when outlining the basic natural rights belonging to man including the right to…“Promote the respect of the fundamental rights of the human person - that is, the right to maintain and develop corporal, intellectual, and moral life, specifically the right to religious formation and education; the right to worship God in public and in private, including charitable religious action” (Pius XII, Radio Message of December 24, 1942).

Duties and Rights

Arnaud de Lassus seems to consider, in his third objection, that the right to religious freedom, in the sense outlined by Ketteler, is necessarily opposed to the “duty of the State to uphold the One True Faith”.  This is an entirely natural question arising from an [apparent] contradiction.  In fact, Ketteler opens the chapter on Religious Freedom by posing the following set of questions:

“We come now to the all important question whether religious freedom...is opposed to the principles of the Catholic Church. May Catholics who wish to remain true to the principles of their church concede to those of other religions such a position in the state? May Catholic rulers legally permit to their subjects such freedom of conscience without violating their own consciences? Can there be situations in which rulers are even bound in conscience to grant such freedom? Would not such a position be completely opposed to the way the Church operated in the Middle Ages?” 

Ketteler begins to tackle these head on [Part II of the article] and refers to Suarez who essentially poses the same general question in different form:

“It appears as though the religious practices of the unbelievers, notably all of the unbaptized as, e.g., pagans and Mohammedans, may not be tolerated in Christian nations since they involve superstition and injury to the honor that is owed to the true God, whose honor Christian rulers have an obligation to uphold.” 

Suarez proceeds to answer the [apparent] contradiction by distinguishing, after St. Thomas, the two classes of unbelievers:

“St. Thomas, however, rightly distinguishes two kinds of religious practices: there are those which go against reason and against God insofar as he can be recognized through nature and through the natural powers of the soul, e.g., the worship of idols, etc. Others are contrary to the Christian religion and to its commands not because they are evil in themselves or contrary to reason as, for example, the practices of Jews and even many of the customs of Mohammedans and such unbelievers who believe in one true God.” 

Suarez then concludes that the religious practices of the first type of unbeliever ought not to be tolerated – unless greater evils would ensue.  However, the religious practices of the second group [must] be tolerated insofar as they adhere to the natural moral law:

“As regards the other religious practices of unbelievers which go contrary to Christian beliefs but not counter to natural reason, there is no doubt but that the unbelievers, even though they are subjects, may not be forced to abandon them…The reason is that such observances do not in themselves violate the natural law, and therefore, the temporal power of even a Christian ruler does not confer a right to forbid them.”

The other key distinction made by Ketteler [Part III of the article] is a natural consequence of disunity in religious belief.    Ketteler laments the destruction of Christian unity in formerly Catholic countries, however, he also asserts that civil rulers could then only have recourse to the principle of toleration by respecting the religious convictions of all members of society.  Pius XII makes the same point as follows:

“The increasingly frequent contacts between different religious professions, mingled indiscriminately within the same nation, have caused civil authorities to follow the principles of tolerance and liberty of conscience.  In fact, there is a political tolerance, a civil tolerance, a social tolerance, in regard to adherents of other religious beliefs which, in circumstances such as these, is a moral duty for Catholics.” (Pius XII, Allocution to the Roman Rota, October 6, 1946)

The principle of tolerance and freedom of conscience in this context extends even to heresy.  Here it is important to distinguish “punishable heresy” from innocent error. The former has to do with baptized Catholics obstinately rejecting the authoritative teaching of the Church in matters of dogma. Therefore, the very notion of punishable heresy excludes those who are not visible members of the Catholic Church.  Ketteler explains that the treatment of heresy as a civil crime in former times presupposed a state constituted on the basis of unity in faith: “From what we have said, it is clear that treating heresy as a civil matter is no longer legitimate once the unity of the Faith has been shattered. Disunity destroys the essential prerequisites...” 

From all of this it is clear that the “traditional Catholic teaching on the moral duty of individuals and societies toward the true religion and the one Church of Christ” (Cf. DH, 1) does not entail an absolute and unqualified right or duty of repression of all that is opposed to supernatural truth.  Therefore, just as grace presupposes and builds on nature, the first duty of the State toward the true religion and the one Church of Christ is to uphold the natural law.  In this sense, one can’t pretend to honor and defend the spiritual, social and temporal Kingship of Christ without first having reference to His natural law – which is the participation for all rational creatures (Catholic and non-Catholic) in His Eternal Law.       

The Life and Work of a Liberal?

Bishop Ketteler is regarded as the pioneer of Catholic Social Teaching in our time and was highly esteemed by the Popes who knew him and his work.  Pope Pius IX highly regarded Bishop Ketteler calling him “everything that a Bishop should be” (Cf. Rupert Ederer, The Teachings of Wilhelm Emmunuel von Ketteler, University Press of America, 1981).  Pope Leo XIII often drew from Bishop Ketteler’s teaching and would later refer to him as “our great predecessor from whom I have learned” (Cf. Rupert Ederer, op. cit.).  So much so was his life and work esteemed that Pope St. Pius X “placed a loving tribute upon his honored tomb” (Cf. Cardinal O’Connel, Christian Social Reform, 1912).  The work of von Ketteler continues to manifest itself in the encyclicals of the Popes.  Pope Benedict XVI credits Bishop Ketteler as a “pioneer” in the leadership of the Church who recognized earlier than most that “the just structuring of society needed to be approached in a different way” (Cf. Deus Caritas Est, 27).  Based on all of this, it would be unwise to dismiss Bishop Ketteler as some sort of early “liberal”.  The better approach, it seems to me, would be to see what he has to teach us today.

 

 

FAQ's On Religious Freedom

1. Doesn’t religious freedom apply only to those professing the true religion since error has no rights?

It is true that error, per se, has no rights (CCC #2108; Pius XII, Ci Riesce).  At the same time, however, persons retain natural rights in spite of their errors since error does not cancel a natural right.  In other words, a person following the dictates of an honestly erroneous conscience acts in true moral freedom – in spite of his error.  The reason is that the moral law commands us to obey a certain conscience under pain of sin – even when honestly erroneous.  Furthermore, the moral law confers the corresponding moral right (the means) to fulfill ones moral obligations.  Therefore, the moral law confers freedom of conscience in religious matters even when it is honestly erroneous.  For example, all men have the duty and corresponding natural right to educate their children according to their religious convictions (S.T., ii-ii, 10, 12).  Therefore, this duty and corresponding natural right is not cancelled merely by the fact that the parent adheres to objective religious error.  The right is not founded on error, per se, but can continue to exist in spite of error for the sake of a superior good.   

   

2. In what sense does religious freedom apply "even in those who do not live up to their obligation of seeking the truth and adhering to it"?

It is important to distinguish between "moral freedom" and its foundation -- "natural freedom" or self-determination (Cf. Leo XIII, Libertas, 1-3; this is also called ontological freedom).  Ontological or natural freedom excludes interior necessity and exterior compulsion.  In other words, it includes interior psychological freedom as well as [due] freedom of action or freedom [immunity] from coercion in the external forum (DH, 2).  Therefore, one cannot deny natural freedom without undermining the foundation or necessary pre-condition required for moral freedom.  It is this foundational natural liberty of self-determination that continues to exist even when we turn away from God.  Bishop Ketteler puts it as follows: “Christianity accords to man his full right of self-determination and recognizes in this right his fullest dignity and nobility. In fact, Christianity by its doctrine of eternal damnation recognizes the ultimate consequence of this right, because this teaching implies that God will even permit men to eternally contradict Him rather than violate man's sacred right to self-determination." (Cf. Ketteler, Sermon on "The Christian Concept of Human Freedom", December 17, 1848)  

 

3. But don’t we tolerate error only in those cases where it is not practical to repress it?

It is true that we sometimes have to tolerate that which can’t practically be repressed in order to avoid greater evils.  On the other hand, sometimes we tolerate error or evil for the sake of a higher good or a superior right (e.g., toleration in order to respect the rightful domain of conscience or even to preserve the nature of man as man).  Therefore, there is no inherent contradiction between toleration and rights as these can co-exist.  For example, Suarez teaches that we have to tolerate the religious convictions of others insofar as they conform to the “objective moral order” (DH #7) as expressed by the natural moral law: “As regards the other religious practices of unbelievers which go contrary to Christian beliefs but not counter to natural reason, there is no doubt but that the unbelievers, even though they are subjects, may not be forced to abandon them. Rather the Church has to tolerate them…The reason is that such observances do not in themselves violate the natural law, and therefore, the temporal power of even a Christian ruler does not confer a right to forbid them. Such action would be based on the fact that what is being done goes contrary to the Christian Faith, but that is not enough to compel those who are not subject to the spiritual authority of the Church. This opinion is also supported by the fact that such a ban would involve, to some extent, forcing people to accept the Faith; and that is never permitted.” (Suarez, Tract. de Fide Disp. 18 Sect. III, n. 10) 

 

4. Where do we draw the “due limits” to religious freedom?

On one hand, nobody has an absolute right to an error-free or even a sin-free environment.  On the other hand, everyone has a right to a social and civil environment that enables him to tend towards his final end and transcendent goal.  Therefore, the natural right to religious freedom is not unlimited and unqualified -- it has natural limits within the confines of the objective moral order as expressed by the natural moral law.  Bishop Ketteler puts is as follows: “…religious freedom has its own natural limits as dictated by reason, by natural morality, and by the natural order of things. No reasonable moral freedom can go so far as to destroy moral order to which everyone has a right.  Therefore, Christian as well as non-Christian rulers and those who hold temporal authority are obliged to oppose religious teachings and practices which are in latent violation of the laws of reason and morality.” (Cf. Ketteler, Freedom, Authority and the Church)  The “due limits” inherent in religious freedom must also be applied analogically according to the requirements of a given context or social situation (CCC #2109).  What this means is that the “due limits” will be applied differently in the context of a confessional (sacral) state than in the context of a “secular” state that is lacking true religious unity among the body politic.  The sacral state, for example, will not permit the spread of heresy insofar as it militates against public order and the common good in a social context that is constituted on the very basis of unity in faith.  The secular state, on the other hand, being constituted on the basis of affinities of nature, will not permit those religious practices in latent violation of the natural moral law. 

 

5. Doesn’t religious freedom apply only in the privacy of the home and not in public?

Man is a social being according to his nature and therefore he has the duty and corresponding right to worship in private and in public.  Furthermore, to ban the public expression of all false worship is to apply another form of coercion as Suarez noted: “…such a ban would involve, to some extent, forcing people to accept the Faith, and that is never permitted.” (Suarez, op. cit.)  

 

6. How does religious freedom reconcile with the treatment of heresy as a civil crime during the Middle Ages?

It is important to distinguish punishable heresy from innocent error.  The former has to do with baptized Catholics obstinately rejecting the authoritative teaching of the Church in matters of dogma.  Therefore, the very notion of punishable heresy excludes those who are not visible members of the Catholic Church.  Additionally, the legitimacy of treating heresy as a civil crime presupposes religious unity.  If that essential religious unity is weakened or destroyed then treating heresy as a civil crime loses its basis and is no longer legitimate.   

 

7. Isn’t religious freedom condemned by the Syllabus of Pope Pius IX?

The Syllabus of 1864 did not condemn religious freedom in its true and proper sense.  Rather, it condemned the errors of religious indifferentism and moral license (Syllabus 15).  In addition, it condemned those propositions (Syllabus 77-79) that would deny in principle the very right of existence of the Catholic sacral regime constituted on the basis of unity in faith.  The prerequisite condition of unity in the faith must still exist, however, in order for a Catholic sacral regime to be a legitimate reality in law (de jure) and in fact (de facto).  The Catholic Encyclopedia (1912), however, notes some important dynamics -- effects of "globalization" -- that have impacted the requisite conditions for such states since the time of the Syllabus:     

 

“The mixture of races and peoples, the immigration into all lands, the adoption of international laws concerning colonization and choice of abode, the economic necessity of calling upon the workers of other lands, etc., have so largely changed the religious map of the world during the last fifty years that propositions 77-79 of the Syllabus published by Pius IX in 1864 (cf. Denzinger, op. cit., 1777-79), from which enemies of the Church are so fond of deducing her opposition to the granting of equal political rights to non-Catholics, do not now apply even to Spain or the South American republics to say nothing of countries which even then possessed a greatly mixed population (e.g. Germany).  Since the requisite conditions for the erection of new theocratic states [ed. consecrational regimes], whether Catholic or Protestant, are lacking today and will probably not be realized in the future, it is evident on the basis of hard facts that religious liberty is the only possible, and thus the only reasonable, state principle.”

  

8. Didn’t the Second Vatican Council deny in principle the idea of the Catholic consecrational regime constituted on the basis of unity in the faith?

While the principle is nowhere denied, the decree on Religious Freedom (DH) does not seem to contemplate as a norm the possibility of such consecrational Catholic states in light of circumstances in the modern era that presuppose mixed populations in every region of the world -- notwithstanding individual cases where circumstances call for the "special civil recognition" of the Church (DH 6; CCC 2107).  Charles Cardinal Journet illustrates this point by using the metaphor of the wheat and the tares that have providentially become increasingly co-mingled in our time:

 

"Consider the hypothesis of a civil society, a cultural world, whose aim it was to bind together politically a religiously disparate multitude, and in which the ruler, even were he Catholic, would represent only the political union of that multitude. None can doubt that such a union has become legitimate and necessary today. Since the days of the medieval Church, a field in which wheat alone was sown, but enclosed in the narrow limits of the West, Providence has prepared a new era in which tares are to be mixed with the wheat but the field is to cover all the earth. On this hypothesis, it is clear that heresy, no longer anti-constitutional simply as heresy, cannot be justly made the object of a constitutional repression, either on the initiative of the State or the injunction of the Church. This applies to any sort of repression whatever, and with all the more reason therefore to repression by the sword." (Cf. Journet,The Church of the Word Incarnate pp. 283-284)

        

9. Doesn’t religious freedom contradict the rights of the Church to a “privileged status” in society?

Let us distinguish here between rights and privileges.  Temporal rulers must always respect the essential freedom and rightful autonomy of the Church in pursuit of her divine mission.  Bishop Ketteler states: “Freedom of the Church means the right of the church to manage her own affairs according to her own principles and to be subject only to the general laws of the state.  We distinguish between freedom of the Church and privileges. In earlier times, the Church enjoyed various privileges which developed spontaneously because unity of Faith prevailed.  Those are virtually extinct in our time, but the Church is able to survive without them.  Nevertheless, let us not confuse privileges with legitimate rights, as often happens nowadays.  The Church is entitled to the protection of her legitimate rights, just as any other legal personality.”  In his 1953 “Ci Riesce” Address to Catholic Jurists, Pope Pius XII stated that Concordats are an "expression of collaboration between the Church and State...The Concordats, therefore, must assure to the Church a stable condition in right and in fact in the State with which they are concluded, and must guarantee to her full independence in the fulfillment of her divine mission."  In recent times, the Church in her concordats with states has even formally rejected certain “privileges” insofar as they no longer were considered helpful to her divine mission.  This process of adaptation to modern circumstances seems to have begun already in the pontificate of Pius XII and was made manifest, for example, in the concordat of 1940 between the Holy See and Portugal.  Cardinal Cerejeira, patriarch of Lisbon, commented on the new concordat as follows:

 

 “Another aspect of the agreement instituted by the Concordat is the reciprocal autonomy of the Church and the State. Each one is independent and free in its respective sphere of competence. Neither does the State keep the Church under its tutelage, nor does the Church interfere with matters pertaining to the State.  The advocates of the supremacy of the State would like to add: enslavement of the Church, and, by the same token, of Catholic conscience. But we say: according to the very doctrine of the Church, the State has full authority, but only in its own field.  It was Christianity which introduced into the world that separation between the temporal and the spiritual, upon which rests the foundation of all Christian civilization. Here is the fountainhead of liberty of conscience...The Portugese State recognizes the Church as she is, and ensures her freedom; but it does not support or protect her as a State established religion...What the Church loses in official protection, she regains in virginal freedom of action. Free from any liability toward the political power, her voice gains greater authority upon consciences. She leaves Caesar a completely clear field, in order for herself better to attend to the things that are God's. She is the pure crystal from which the treasure of the Christian revelation is streaming forth.” (Cardinal Cerejeira, patriarch of Lisbon, November 18, 1941) 

  

10. Doesn’t religious freedom violate the rights of Christ the King?

Religious freedom, properly understood, is a necessary prerequisite for the reign of Christ the King to be realized in society (CCC 2104-2109).  The reason for this is that Christ does not impose His will by force.  Rather, Christ chooses to reign by being freely accepted in individual hearts, families, social institutions, and civil society.  Therefore, any “Christendom” imposed by force is a false and counterfeit social reign of Christ the King.  Christendom will reemerge when Christian principles once again begin to inform all aspects of social life, however, it will reemerge in a form adapted to the requirements of our age.  The implication here is that “Christendom” in our time does not simply call for a return to the “social and political institutions of a bygone era…we cannot tell beforehand what civil and social institutions the spirit of Christianity may give rise to when it has again permeated all of humanity…All of those first principles and laws are in themselves unchangeable. Only their application is remarkably adaptable in many different ways”  (Cf. Ketteler, Freedom, Authority and the Church).  Christendom, therefore, can be manifested according to a variety of forms.  Journet distinguishes between two basic types of “Christendom” depending upon the existence of unity or plurality of religious belief among a people: 

“Under the influence of the kingdom of grace, that is to say, in a Christian climate, we can envisage the flowering of two general types of political regime.  Those of the first type—which are not to be dreamed of save in a region populated exclusively or mainly by Christians, indeed by visible members of the Church of Christ—seek to form a political unity of Christians alone, or visible members of the Church alone; granting civic rights to no others.  Those of the second type would try to weld into a political unity all the inhabitants of a region, granting citizenship to all no matter what their religion, but directing them to temporal and political ends which Christianity would regard as legitimate and would not disavow.  In the first case, Christian values permeate the whole political order; the notion of Christianity, of visible membership of the Church, enters into the very definition of the citizen. That is the Christian consecrational conception of the temporal regime. In the second case, Christian values affect the political order from without, to sustain, enlighten and sublimate it; the notion of Christianity, of visible membership of the Church, remains outside the definition of the citizen; it designates only a perfect way of being a citizen, distinguishing a spiritual family of citizens. That is the Christian secular conception of the temporal regime.  We may use the word "Christendom" in a limited and recent sense, not directly of the Church nor yet of her successive stages of development and internal organization, but directly of a certain temporal regime of peoples who welcome her, a certain cultural complex which she maintains and inspires, a Christian civilization, a Christian world.  In this sense there are two possible realizations—not univocal, but proportional and analogical—of the idea of Christendom, two specifically distinct types of Christendom: the consecrational and the secular.” (Cf. Journet, The Church of the Word Incarnate, Sheed and Ward, 1955, pp. 214-215)

On Human Freedom

The following extracts from the works of Bishop Von Ketteler provide insights into the various aspects of human freedom. Taken together, these also help to provide an introduction to his chapter on "Religious Freedom and the Church". While Von Ketteler addresses both the true and false notions of liberty, we will focus primarily on the authentic Christian concept of human freedom. (Taken from "The Social Teachings of Wilhelm Emmanuel Von Ketteler", University Press of America, Inc., 1981, Translation by Rupert J. Ederer)


The Christian Concept of Human Freedom
The Christian concept of human liberty assumes the existence of a personal transcendant God in whom dwells all truth, all goodness, and all beauty. From all eternity, He had the notion of our earth in His mind, and He created the earth according to this notion. He alone enjoys the absolute right of self-determination, absolute sovereignty, and dominion. Nevertheless, He created man according to His own image, and therefore He incorporated in human nature something of His own freedom and self-determination. Yet, the nature of human freedom is such that is implies in man the capacity to either use it to pursue God's goodness, truth, and beauty, or to turn aside from these. In other words, human freedom means that man is capable of developing according to God's plan, or to rebel against it at the peril of his own self-destruction! Because of original sin, the full liberty of man was dealt a crippling blow inasmuch as he was more disposed to rebel against God. It was by the Redemption that full liberty was restored to man. Christianity accords to man his full right of self-determination and recognizes in this right his fullest dignity and nobility. In fact, Christianity by its doctrine of eternal damnation recognizes the ultimate consequences of this right, because this teaching implies that God will even permit men to eternally contradict Him rather than violate man's sacred right to self-determination. The ultimate cause for eternal damnation is abuse of free will by setting it in final opposition to God's will. Christianity sees in such a disposition of the will, not an exercise of legitimate freedom, but rather a punishable violation of liberty, a transgression against God and His liberty which, of course, is higher than our own. According to the Christian conception, man is a free agent of God, who is entitled to help God complete His work. As a master builder originates a construction project in His mind and authorizes His employees to bring it to fulfillment, so God has conceived in His mind the design for the human race and entrusted us to carry it into fulfillment. Inspired by the goodness, truth, and beauty of this ideal, we ought to adopt it freely as sons of God and carry it into execution. In this way God proposes to make His work our own and to reward us for our free compliance.
(Sunday Sermon in the Cathedral of Mainz, December 17, 1848; op. cit. pp. 47-48)


Liberty in General
One can only speak of freedom when dealing with human beings. Everything else on this planet is un-free. Christianity makes this clear to us. Human freedom is a direct consequence of the fact that man is made in God's image. Therefore it follows that human freedom is like the very freedom that God enjoys, though there is still an essential difference.

The freedom of God is, like God's essence, unlimited and unconditional. He alone possesses this supreme sovereignty. His being, His will, His acts are determined by Him alone. His freedom in dealing with anything outside Himself is without limit. It is this freedom which man enjoys, to a degree, and only to the degree that his human nature permits.

The freedom of man can only be a conditional freedom. It is restricted by obligation -- the obligation to submit itself freely to the Divine Will. God subjects human freedom to certain well-defined limits which man cannot transgress, because if he did so, he would be frustrating the Divine plan.
Human freedom does not apply to every aspect of man's existence. In some matters man is only partly free, and in others he is even totally unfree. Man has no control at all over the fact of his birth and over the fact that one day he must die. Nor can he control certain of his most basic needs. He does not have anything to say about what his proper destiny is. The same necessity which determines his existence also compels him to strive for happiness. Here he is limited in his freedom to the choice of means for seeking his proper end, not in the choice of the end, itself. (ibid. pp. 117-118)

Moral Freedom
According to the teaching of the Catholic Church, moral freedom here on earth is the power of a man freely to seek the good -- a power of choice which brings with it also the capacity to choose evil. The concept rules out all external compulsion which would appear to lead a man to do good, but which does not move a man internally to what is good. It also rules out any kind of inner necessity, the kind that compels the will, not by external force, but by some inner pre-determination to choose one or the other option, without the real possibility of rejecting it. In other words, moral freedom would become something other than "voluntary". Finally, moral freedom implies the existence of this possibility, as is the attainment of our reward, the fulfillment of the purpose for which we are here on earth. That is the achievement of our final destiny, heaven.

It is on this exalted concept of freedom which gives to man his true dignity that the Catholic Church has erected its entire body of doctrine for leading a Christian life. Teachers of the Church who deal with moral doctrine preface their discussion by distinguishing between specifically human acts, those which are free actions in the sense we have mentioned, and those actions of man which are unfree. Only such free actions, according to universal traditions of Catholic moral theology, are then treated as specifically human actions, e.g., actions in which the full dignity of human nature comes to bear. Christian moral theologians distinguish these from the unfree acts which man has in common with unreasoning beings and indicate that Christian moral teaching deals only with the former, not with the latter. The three essential components of a moral action which they propose for us are: first, a judgement regarding the worth of an action which is made before the action is taken; second, a free inner decision to take or not to take an action, which becomes the source of the action; and third, the existence of the possibility to decide otherwise.

Closely related to this doctrine is the other important teaching having to do with human conscience. It is especially apparent in the matter of conscience what high regard the Church has for the special dignity of man which he has by virtue of his inner freedom. It is conscience, according to Catholic teaching, which represents that inner judgement that man makes after mature deliberation as to the truth and correctness of an action, that he applies to his life's actions and all of his dealings, and on the basis of which he then takes action. We have here a remarkable inner activity whereby a man sits in judgement of his own actions and of the whole world around him; and does so in an uncomparably higher and more universal manner than human courts do since they act in a far more restricted fashion in that limited range of activities over which they have special competence. The Church assigns a degree of sovereignty to conscience which is so sublime that it teaches even the little child that no matter what, one must not go against one's conscience. The Church recognizes, of course, that a conscience can be wrong. That is why she teaches unfailingly what great harm can come from an erroneous conscience and what a great responsibility we have before God, who will one day measure the judgements of this personal court of ours against those of His eternal court, according to whose laws he will eventually be judged. (ibid. pp. 119-120)

Freedom of Conviction
Just as the Catholic Church holds with reference to moral freedom that what goes against a man's conscience is sinful, so she also teaches as the Apostle Paul did about freedom of conviction, the necessity of following one's convictions - rationabile obsequium - in the area of religious beliefs. That too is a freedom of the human spirit at the second level of man's spiritual nature, namely, in the recognition of truth. As the Catholic Church makes a moral good the object of inner free choice, so too she requires that the acceptance of any truth which is worthy of man's recognition must be the object of free inner conviction in human reason. The motivations for accepting what is good and what is true must not be merely external, but they must stem from an interior disposition as is worthy of man's proper dignity. A man connot build his house on someone else's foundation. This means that he cannot establish true moral behavior on someone else's will, or genuine conviction of what is true on someone else's intellectual grasp of the truth. No matter how proper another person's will may be and no matter how correct another person's grasp of the truth may be, a man has to reconcile his own free will and his own intellect, in other words - his own soul - to what is good and what is true, before his own judgements and actions become morally valid. God instilled this truly frightening freedom as an essential quality of human dignity; and perilous though it may be, He expects us to use it not only in our relationship to other men but even in our relationship to God Himself.

The Church applies the self-same principle to man's religious beliefs. St. Thomas Aquinas, who gives us the authentic Catholic position on this matter, said:

"For Faith two things are necessary: first, a credible object for one's belief, and second, an acceptance of such an object of faith. This acceptance cannot be fully accomplished by mere external motivation, e.g., by miracles which we witness, or by the conviction of the person who present the object for our acceptance. There must be, even more importantly, an inner motivation which disposes a person to accept an article of faith. Such inner motivation represents the principal and proper basis of faith.

This inner basis, the Pelagians insist, is nothing more than free will of man. Here they are in error.

The Faith does, in fact, rest on man's free will acceptance, but his will must first be predisposed for such acceptance by God's grace. Thus, insofar as acceptance is concerned - and that is the principal act of faith - God is the source of our faith inasmuch as, by His grace, He provides us with the all important inner motivation." (Summa ii-ii, 6, 1)

We may, therefore, define Christian Faith as the concurrence of free will and intellect in the truths revealed by God, under the influence of Divine grace...These two actions together - the act of God and the act of man - constitute that great miracle in history, that great, firm faith, that holy conviction which far surpasses all merely human conviction, and which has produced countless numbers of martyrs for the Faith.

It is in this twofold freedom, the freedom of will and intellect, that you have the real essence of human freedom. He who has such freedom has true human dignity, even if he is deprived of other freedoms. He who lacks it, lacks human dignity even if he enjoys all other human freedoms and worldly esteem. The abuse of basic human freedom consists in the choice of evil by the will, and in the choice of untruth by the intellect. Such abuse then leads to the ultimate debasement of man, as when a man uses the will which is meant for freely accepting the highest Good to , instead, become a slave of evil passions, or as when a man uses that intellect, which is intended of recognizing the eternal Light to become the slave of untruth and of darkness...

It is in this freedom of will and of intellect that we have the basic foundation for all other freedoms as well as for a proper understanding of such other freedoms... (ibid. pp. 121-124)

Faith and Freedom of Inquiry
The teaching of the Church on this matter can be summed bp briefly. Man lost all supernatural grace through original sin. He did not, however, lose his natural capacities which mark him as a rational human being. In other words, he did not lose his free will nor his reasoning intellect. These were simply weakened an impaired. As a consequence of his condition, man can no longer perform any supernaturally meritorious works. He can, however, even without the supernatural assistance of Jesus Christ perform certain virtuous acts and come to recognize certain natural truths. That is why we find much natural goodness and recognition of various truths also among pagans. That is why, furthermore, the Redemption is not te be regarded merely as an imputation of all guilt onto the shoulders of Jesus Christ, who then covers our guilt over in purely exterior fashion as with a great mantle. It is rather a restoration, a healing of our nature. Therefore, finally, revealed truth is not to be regarded as an indictment against fallen human nature, but rather as a mysterious, blessed healing and an elevation of man's spiritual nature. It is bequeathed to man as a saving grace to restore his wounded nature and to strengthen and lift him up the the very presence of God.

The Church has taught these proposition from its very beginning, as she has forcefully rejected any notion that Christianity requires that we must acept what is contrary to reason...The Church waged bitter battles with the old orthodox Protestant reformers precisely over this issue, because the latter rejected free will and the free cooperation of human reason with the grace of God.

How does one explain this remarkable turnabout, wehre modern rationalistic Protestantism attacks the Catholic Church as the enemy of human reason and freedom, inasmuch as it was the Catholic Church which defended these against the attacks of the original reformers? The answer is to be found only partly in the enormous residue of bigotry. More important, it lies in the fact that Protestant rationalism is a reaction and, to a degree, a justifiable one against the old Protestant orthodoxy. But now it has gone to the other extreme and declared the absolute independence of human reason and of the will - a position which rejects all authority and is irreconcilable with human nature that is dependent on God and subject to His Divine plan. That is how rationalism has lost sight of any basic relationship between authority and freedom as well as between any reasonable and free acceptance of legitimate authority... (ibid. pp. 125-129)

Self-Determination
The essence of liberty, whatever the context, lies in free self-determination stemming from inner conviction rather than from external force. Such free self-determination and free choice are the necessary prerequisites for social and political freedom. What it all means is that a man, in his personal, social, and political life, to the extent that he is able to take care of his own needs without violating the rights of others, enjoys the widest possible latitude in managing his own affairs. This liberty is therefore aptly designated as self-determination or individual autonomy.

If this liberty is to have true meaning, however, it must extend beyond the most immediate personal affairs also to those social concerns which are a part of everyday human existence. Man is by nature utterly social to the extent that he cannot survive in isolation. He is scarcely born when he finds himself in need of his first social contact in the family, so that he can preserve his fragile existence. Gradually his circle of social relations widens much in the same way as ripples in a pond spread outward after a stone has been thrown into it. Human life carries on within a structure of manifold social arrangements some of which are quite universal, like the family, the local community, the state, and others of which are established for achieving more specialized purposes. The right of man to guide his own destiny in all such societies, whether one is speaking of the family, the community, the province, or the corporate bodies which men establish, is what social and political liberty are all about. Where this is missing, liberty is missing.

We will have frequent occasion to discuss the great value of the social, civil, and political liberty. For the moment it is sufficient to point out that this freedom determines the character of a man in his relationships with his fellow man, whether we are speaking of his grass-roots social contacts of his activities in the higher levels of civil society. It represents a great school for developing true and healthy and realistic perspectives in the life of the state and at the same time it instills strength and dignity in the state itself.

It is self-evident, however, that such individual autonomy is not unlimited and unconditional. It does not imply total independence. Rather it brings with it the obligation of self-control, the need to submit to the law of God and to the order which God has established in the universe. It implies also the need to respect the rights of all other men with whom one comes in contact. Freedom does not absolve from obedience. Rather it is intimately related to it. It is from obedience that freedom receives its true dignity. In the mind of God all of the various creatures on which He bestowed life have their proper relationship to each other. The more these creatures conform to their respective roles, the more nearly will that harmony be realized which God envisions, where all creatures will acheive their highest destiny and their greatest happiness. The true meaning of that liberty which man, a rational creature of God, enjoys lies in his ability to cooperate freely with God in the fulfillment of the Divine plan, and in that he freely seeks out the role which God has destined for him and which he then carries out according to God's will. That applies in all of his human activities whether in the family or in the state. Therefore his liberty is always conditioned by obedience! (ibid. pp. 135-136)

Religious Freedom (Part IV)

Conclusions & Application to Modern Circumstances

If now, after our discussion of the question, to what extent the Church must use external compulsion against the abuse of religious freedom, and whether Catholics may regard religious freedom as essential, we wish to answer the questions as they apply to our own times, we have to present the following conclusions:

1. In general, the Church regards the acceptance of religion as a matter for inner self-determination, and would contest the right to use external force by either the state or by ecclesiastical authority. [Ed: Created according to God's own image, the right to inner self-determination is man's ontological dignity and would appear to be the ultimate foundation for Religious freedom: "Christianity accords to man his full right of self-determination and recognizes in this right his fullest dignity and nobility. In fact, Christianity by its doctrine of eternal damnation recognizes the ultimate consequence of this right, because this teaching implies that God will even permit men to eternally contradict Him rather than violate man's sacred right to self-determination." (Von Ketteler, Sermon on "The Christian Concept of Human Freedom", December 17, 1848, op. cit., p. 47 )]

2. The punishment of heretics by the Church in relatively few instances was not undertaken to effect conversion by external force, but rather in the sense that a Christian accepted certain responsibilities when he was baptized, and that he ought to be held accountable for them. Such external punishment, however, only took place in special circumstances and in the case of proclaimed formal heretics in the sense which we discussed above. Validly baptized Protestants are still by virtue of baptism in a certain union with the Church. However, even aside from all other reasons which ought to make it abundantly clear that the Catholic Church has not the remotest inclination to wish to use force against them, the very notion of formal and punishable heresy cannot be applied to them. Any suggestion to the contrary is therefore an irresponsible scare tactic.

3. Heresy as a violation of civil law presupposed unity in Faith, and with the disappearance of that unity it too has become a dead letter.

4. Where other religious organizations exist legally, a Catholic ruler is required to give them the full protection which the law affords. If he were to use external force against them he would violate the principles of his Church. [Ed. Civil rulers have an obligation to defend the rights of the Church and other legally established religious societies: "The state must see to it that the Church's rights are safegaurded not merely because God demands this, but because the state's own well-being requires it. If it separates itself from the Church and from the religious convictions of its subjects, it separates itself from God and thereby destroys its own foundation. Finally, the state is obligated to protect these rights and to support the Church on behalf of its own citizens. They have a right to expect that the state will respect their religious convictions, and to the protection and support of their ecclesiastical society. The state is not some arbitrary abstraction which floats on clouds but rather a reality determined according to the needs of the people who make it up. Therefore, to separate it from their highest interests represents delinquency to duty on the part of state authority. What I have said here regarding the obligation of the state to protect the rights of the Church and to support it, is meant to apply not only to the Catholic Church. It applies to any religious society once it is recognized as such by the state, provided only that such a society upholds the requirements of natural morality and honors the one true God, as we discussed earlier." (Von Ketteler, op. cit., p. 243)]

5. In this sense, there exist in Germany along with the Catholic Church also the Lutheran and the Reformed Church. A Catholic ruler, without question, owes them full legal protection as well as love and concern for their well-being.

6. To what extent civil authorities wish to afford to other religious groups the free legal right to operate, the Church leaves this up to their own free self-determination. There is no ecclesiastical principle which would prevent a Catholic from upholding the principle that under given conditions, the civil authorities would best afford full religious freedom to all, subject to the conditions we have now to mention.

7. We have to insist upon the limits of religious freedom referred to earlier, whereby it is an abuse of that freedom if the state, under the guise of religious freedom, tolerates sects which deny the existence of a personal God, or which jeopardize morality. Such conduct stands in open contradiction to the obligations of civil authority, first of all by virtue of the origin of civil authority. Ultimately, all authority comes from God, and therefore, there can be no more flagrant abuse of that authority than to tolerate the denial of God. Secondly, the ultimate goal of civil authority sets certain limits. That goal is to preserve peace and justice on earth, and neither of these is possible without morality; and morality is impossible without fear of the Lord.

8. The Church will not cease, however, to use that force upon its own members which Christ Himself has entitled her to use, namely, to expel from her midst those members who deny their Faith.

Related Church Documents:

LIBERTAS (1888)

CI RIESCE (1953)

DIGNITATIS HUMANAE (1965)

ADDRESS TO THE ROMAN CURIA (December 22, 2005)

Other Readings:

On Human Freedom (Von Ketteler)

Religious Toleration, Catholic Encyclopedia (1912)

Religious Freedom: Innovation and Development (Avery Cardinal Dulles)

Various Articles

Table of Contents:

Religious Freedom (Part I)

Religious Freedom (Part II)

Religious Freedom (Part III)