The Intervention of Mgr. Dupanloup (Part II)

Thesis-Hypothesis Distinction

Before proceeding to discuss Mgr. Dupanloup’s conclusions regarding religious freedom, it will be profitable to inquire into the concepts and the meaning behind the “thesis-hypothesis” distinction.  This is an area that has been subject to much confusion and debate since the concept has been introduced – especially as it has been applied to the topic of relations between Church and State.  In order to adequately discuss this matter we will need to borrow some concepts from Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics.

Mgr. Dupanloup identifies the “thesis” as a kind of "absolute" ideal (perfectus) in the abstract order or in the realm of “theory” and speculative ideas.  On the other hand, the “hypothesis” is supposed to represent the “relative” view – that relatively best “application” of universal principles to particular circumstances (optimus).  In other words, the thesis-hypothesis is simply the distinction between the absolute and the relative orders.  How do these two distinct orders relate to one another and what are the linkages?  To get a clearer picture of this we will need to broaden the scope and take a wider view of the metaphysical framework.

Metaphysical Framework

The absolute principle ultimately has to do with perfection – perfection in itself.  God is absolute perfection itself and He is the ultimate principle and source of being and perfection.  His divine attributes are known as the transcendental universals: one, true, good and beautiful.  These terms are said to be convertible since they are various expressions of being and ultimately the one supreme being.  God’s perfection is reflected – not univocally but analogically and proportionally – in all being insofar as the universal essences exist – not subsisting on their own (Platonic idealism) – but in some individual concrete subsisting being (Aristotelian-Thomistic realism).  Therefore, the absolute principle is related to the contingent and relative principle insofar as they share the same essence or universal transcendent principles – not univocally but analogically and proportionally according to the nature of each contingent being.¹

Philosophy of Analogy

The analogical conception of Thomistic metaphysics enables the philosopher to see something of the perfection of God even in a tiny grain of sand or a blade of grass.  We can get a better sense of this by considering the command of Our Lord: “Be ye therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect” (Matt. v, 48).  This is not a command given in the univocal sense.  In other words, Our Lord does not command us to attain God’s perfection in the absolute sense.  Rather, the command is given in a relative sense where we are to imitate God’s perfections according to our nature and state in life.  Similarly, all are called to imitate Christ.  But not all are called to imitate Him in exactly the same (univocal) manner.  For example, those who are called to the sacramental priesthood share more fully in Christ’s eternal priesthood.  In the absolute sense, the ordained priesthood, in itself, is a greater perfection than the secular state of life, in itself.  On the other hand we should not diminish the relative view insofar as all are not called to individual perfection by way of the religious life.  For example, the universal and univocal application of an absolute value could deprive the world of other great and necessary benefits (i.e., the propogation of human life itself).  What is more, the power of priesthood in the wrong hands could lead to greater evils.  In this sense, the pursuit of sanctification in the secular state of life (a good in its own right) can be just as pleasing to God as another who follows the religious life.  Yet we must always keep in mind that the religious state, in itself, and in the absolute sense, is a greater perfection than the secular state of life, in itself.       

Various Applications

This basic metaphysical framework applies anytime we need to distinguish between the “thesis” or ideal considered in the absolute sense (abstract order of speculative ideas) and the “hypothesis” or relative best application to particular circumstances (contingent, factual and practical order).

 

This can apply in various contexts.  For example, the absolute ideal liturgy of the greatest perfection is the heavenly liturgy.  On the other hand, in the practical order here below, the various liturgical rites are each good insofar as they enable us to "enter-into" that divine heavenly liturgy.  From a relative point of view some rites may be considered relatively “better” insofar as they are better suited or adapted to particular circumstances.  In the area of government, the absolute ideal is the Divine government.  In the practical order, and from a relative point of view, some governmental forms may be preferable to others according to circumstances of time and place.  It is one thing to consider the "ideal" (in itself) in the abstract order of speculative ideas and it is quite another thing to consider the "relative point of view" or that best application to the manifold requirements within the contingent order of facts.  In other words, the practical and factual order involves the prudential consideration of not just one [absolute value] considered in itself and in the abstract.  Rather, prudential judgments, hic et nunc, often involve the application of various principles considered and weighed together and at the same time.  Pope Leo XIII attempted to give greater precision to this distinction in the context of governmental forms (addressing the political controversy among French Catholics).   

By giving one's self up to abstractions, one could at length conclude which is the best of these forms, considered in themselves; and in all truth it may be affirmed that each of them is good, provided it lead straight to its end -- that is to say, to the common good for which social authority is constituted; and finally, it may be added that, from a relative point of view, such and such a form of government may be preferable because of being better adapted to the character and customs of such or such a nation... 

In descending from the domain of abstractions to that of facts, we must beware of denying the principles just established: they remain fixed. However, becoming incarnated in facts, they are clothed with a contingent character, determined by the center in which their application is produced. Otherwise said, if every political form is good by itself and may be applied to the government of nations, the fact still remains that political power is not found in all nations under the same form; each has its own. This form springs from a combination of historical or national, though always human, circumstances which, in a nation, give rise to its traditional and even fundamental laws, and by these is determined the particular form of government, the basis of transmission of supreme power.” (Cf. Pope Leo XIII, AU MILIEU DES SOLLICITUDES, 1892)

          

Pope Leo XIII continues by affirming that it is only the constitution of the Church that remains immutable: "And, far from wishing to transform her essential constitution, she has not the power even to relinquish the conditions of true liberty and sovereign independence with which Providence has endowed her in the general interest of souls... But, in regard to purely human societies, it is an oft-repeated historical fact that time, that great transformer of all things here below, operates great changes in their political institutions. On some occasions it limits itself to modifying something in the form of the established government; or, again, it will go so far as to substitute other forms for the primitive ones-forms totally different, even as regards the mode of transmitting sovereign power."  The Pope then seems to allude to the thesis-hypothesis distinction in the context of political and governmental forms.  Specifically, he identifies the "hypothesis" within the order wherein we reason (i.e., the practical prudential order).  At the same time, however, there are essential principles that remain immutable within any given hypothesis.  "And how are these political changes of which We speak produced?  They sometimes follow in the wake of violent crises, too often of a bloody character, in the midst of which preexisting governments totally disappear; then anarchy holds sway, and soon public order is shaken to its very foundations and finally overthrown. From that time onward a social need obtrudes itself upon the nation; it must provide for itself without delay.  Is it not its privilege -- or, better still, its duty -- to defend itself against a state of affairs troubling it so deeply, and to re-establish public peace in the tranquillity of order? Now, this social need justifies the creation and the existence of new governments, whatever form they take; since, in the hypothesis wherein we reason, these new governments are a requisite to public order, all public order being impossible without a government. Thence it follows that, in similar junctures, all the novelty is limited to the political form of civil power, or to its mode of transmission; it in no wise affects the power considered in itself. This continues to be immutable and worthy of respect, as, considered in its nature, it is constituted to provide for the common good, the supreme end which gives human society its origin. To put it otherwise, in all hypotheses, civil power, considered as such, is from God, always from God: 'For there is no power but from God.'" 

Dupanloup’s “Thesis”

Dupanloup is generally regarded as one of the first to employ the terms “thesis” and “hypothesis” to differentiate the absolute ideal from the relative.²  Furthermore, in his “intervention” he applied these concepts and terms in the context of religious freedom and relations between Church and State.  The modern error in this context had to do with absolutizing false principles (i.e., unlimited freedom or license and a false anti-Catholic conception of the separation of Church and State) and imposing these on the Church and on society. 

“There are, however, those who, going far beyond these principles, aim to make unlimited freedom of worship the universal, absolute, and obligatory ideal of all nations; who would impose upon all, even the Pope and the Church, an anarchy of intellects, and the multiplication of sects, as the most perfect state of society, as the real religious and social optimism.”

Mgr. Dupanloup proceeds to describe the true ideal in this context considered in the absolute sense: The perfect unity of hearts and minds.  Division can never displace the absolute goal of perfect unity and chaos can never displace the absolute goal of the perfection of order.³

No, no; The Pope is of a different opinion.  For him and for the Church there is another ideal; and it is needless to ask them to transform relative necessities into absolute truths, or to elevate facts that are to be regretted, and unhappy, though tolerated divisions, into dogmatic principles.

No; the ideal of the Pope and the Church is not anarchy – it is the harmony of minds; it is not the division, it is the unity of souls.  The ideal of the Pope and of the Church is found in the admirable words of Jesus Christ: “MAY THEY BE ONE!  UNUM SINT!  One single flock!  One only Pastor – UNUM OVILE!  UNUS PASTOR.”  The unity of minds in the truth, and the unity of hearts by love – this is the ideal of the Pope and the Church.⁴

Dupanloup's Essential Immutable Principle

Another important aspect in connection with the thesis-hypothesis distinction has to do with the universal immutable principles essential for Church-State relations.  Mgr. Dupanloup speaks clearly on what the Church has always considered fundamental and essential in any relationship with the temporal power: "She insists upon one thing alone -- to fulfill her mission, and to live in peace with all the governments in the world."⁵ This general principle, however, implicitly contains within it other essentials that can be distinguished.  Jacques Maritain would later divide these into three inter-related immutable principles guiding Church-State relations: (1) The full freedom of the Church; (2) The primacy of spiritual ends over temporal ends; (3) The mutual cooperation between the spiritual and temporal powers. (Cf. Maritain, Man and the State, CUA Press,1951,1998, p. 156) 

The full freedom of the Church to fulfill her mission, however, has nothing to do with a false sense of "separation" between the Church and the State.  Mgr. Dupanloup defines the meaning and sense of Peidmont's deceptive slogan for "A Free Church in a Free State" as follows: "All the property of the Church confiscated.  The religious orders suppressed.  The nuns turned into the streets.  The Bishops in prison.  The clergy subjected to the conscription.  The Bishoprics vacant.  The concordats with the Holy See violated.  The ecclesiastical immunities stipulated by treaty, abolished...Finally, the law of '51, by which it was pretended to found a state theology -- to subject the diocesan schools of theology to the inspection of the state -- to oblige the pupils of the seminaries to follow the programmes of the state...The omnipotence of the State over the Church.  The incompatibility of the temporal and spiritual powers...Such has been the free Church in the free State."  

Dupanloup's "Hypothesis"

Mgr Dupanloup does not go into any great detail on the "hypothesis" (practical and prudential application) or how the perfect should be analogically realized within the circumstances of France in the middle of the 19th century.  What seems clear, however, is that he did not oppose in principle the political and social forms of the day: "All governments are comparative and imperfect...all these varied political forms are left to the free choice of her children...Be of whatever political form you please, of any country, or social regime that you will, Catholic unity remains open to you."  In terms of the concrete social forms for France in his day, Mgr. Dupanoup comments as follows: "For myself, I have a horror of violent revolutions, and the studies I have made of them moved my soul to its utmost depths; yet, and I profess it openly, I am of those who have confidence in the civil and political liberties of my country, and who hope for their peaceful progress within it."⁶

Pitfalls to Avoid

Within the thesis-hypothesis distinction it was the "hypothesis" that often generated intense theological discussion that sometimes resulted in confused or mistaken ideas in various contexts or applications.  In other words, the thesis-hypothesis framework (if not properly understood) was open to abuse.  In some cases the concept of analogy is forgotten and the attempt is made to apply universal principles in a univocal manner (a univocal or “ideal” way of applying principles leading to rigid ideological models).  Maritain indicates that such a notion is “self-contradictory, since any application or realization is existential and takes place in time, therefore is relative to some given set of historical conditions.”⁷ (Cf. Maritain, Man and the State, p. 155)  According to this mistaken view, circumstances that prevent the univocal and “ideal application” of principles are regarded as a temporary and practical toleration of evil.  In this sense, the relative best – a good in its own right – should never be considered as the enemy of absolute perfection (e.g., the married or secular state in life is good in its own right and not considered the enemy of a more perfect state).  Another mistake is to elevate some existential form or historical realization into an absolute.  Mgr. Dupanloup puts it another way: "...that which might be admissible in hypothesis will often be false in thesis."  Finally, there is the equivocal conception (relativism) where the relative is completely severed from the absolute and the universal principles linking these two orders have been lost or forgotten.  In this case, where there are no absolutes or immutable principles – everything becomes relative and shifting with the winds.⁸   

Development in Continuity

As indicated above, development and clarifications were already apparent in the Pontificate of Pope Leo XIII.  While not specifically employing the joint use of the thesis-hypothesis terminology (see above where he had in fact used the "hypothesis" terminology in the sense given by Mgr. Dupanloup), Pope Leo XIII seems to have given greater force to the concepts and principles involved in the distinction itself.

While Pope Leo XIII did not himself employ the thesis-hypothesis terminology, he does seem to have accepted the distinction.  In Immortale Dei he expresses himself as follows: "No one has any legitimate ground for accusing the Church of being the enemy of either just tolerance or healthy and justifiable liberty.  While the Church considers that it is not right to put the various forms of worship on the same footing as the true religion, it does not follow that she condemns heads of States who, with a view to acheiving good or preventing evil, in practice allow these various creeds each to have their own place in the State.  It is indeed the custom of the Church to take the greatest care to ensure that no one shall be forced to embrace the Catholic faith againt his will, for, as St. Augustine wisely observes, a man can believe only of his own free will."  The remarkable thing about this usage of the thesis-hypothesis distinction is that the Pope's criterion for applying it is not whether Catholics are in such a strong position in the State as to ba able to oppress non-Catholics.  On the contrary, while affirming that the ideal is religious unity, he explicitly allows that a system of pluralism may have to be adopted by a State so as to ensure freedom of faith and avoidance of coercion. (Cf. Jeremiah Newman, Studies in Political Morality, Scepter, 1963, pp. 276-277)

Therefore, a "unity" imposed by force is no unity at all and has nothing to do with the Catholic ideal properly understood.  On the contrary, such a forced "unity" only leads to other evils.⁹  It is in this sense that Pope Pius XII would later state that "repression of religious liberty does not exist as a general principle, i.e., as a thesis". (ibid; Address to Catholic Jurists, October 6, 1953)  The following, taken from Van Noort, throws additional light on the thesis-hypothesis distinction and its proper interpretation:

Even though the establishment of juridical relations between Church and State is the Catholic ideal, the Catholic “thesis,” it is no necessary corollary, it seems to us, that any other arrangement is necessarily evil (per se malum).  The dichotomy proposed: “either you have the ideal, or you have something per se evil” surely seems a false one.  There are many gradations between ideal and evil: there is ideal (best), better, good, and only then, evil.  The dichotomy is a false presentation of our position, or at least an overly rigid representation of it by some Catholic theologians.  Because the Church affirms virginity to marriage, it does not mean she despises the latter, but rather venerates it highly.  Similarly, though the Church praises and wishes her members to seek the ideal Church-State relationship by all honorable means, the while respecting the consciences of non-Catholics in their midst, she by no means despises or considers evil other relationships called for by particular circumstances.  The Church has not just one principle to keep in mind – man’s obligation as a social being to make social profession of his religion – there are other Catholic principles: that individual persons are obliged to follow their consciences, even erroneous consciences; that no man may be constrained to accept Catholicism; and finally, that the State has the obligation to provide for the common welfare of all, not simply its Catholic citizens.¹⁰  Where, then, the ideal is unrealizable without injury to other principles, the Church is content with something good, though less good. (Cf. Van Noort, Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, Newman Press, 1957, pp. 382-383)

Van Noort then goes on to quote Pope Pius XII who refers to a "normal" form of relations between Church and State while also noting new "evolving" circumstances (i.e., coexistence resulting from progressive globalization) that require the Church to be adaptable to the requirements of time and place.

The Church does not hide the fact that in principle she considers such collaboration [i.e., between Church and State in a Catholic nation] normal and that she regards the unity of the people in the true religion and the unanimity of action between herself and the state as an ideal.

But she also knows that for some time events have been evolving in a rather different direction, that is to say towards the multiplicity of religious beliefs and conceptions of life within the same national community, where Catholics are more or less a strong minority.  It may be interesting and surprising for the historian to encounter in the United States of America one example, among others, of the way in which the Church succeeds in flourishing in the most disparate situations.

The Church knows that her mission, although by its nature and its goals it belongs to the religious and moral domain, situated in the beyond and eternity, nevertheless penetrates to the very heart of human history.  Always and everywhere, by unceasingly adapting herself to the circumstances of time and place, she seeks to model person, individuals and, as far as possible, all individuals according to the laws of Christ, thus attaining the moral basis for social life.  The object of the Church is man, naturally good, imbued, ennobled and strengthened by the truth and grace of Christ. (ibid; Pope Pius XII, Address to Historians)

Commenting on the above Papal address, Jeremiah Newman notes that adaptations in the concrete order are made with a view to preserving the absolute principles themselves: "In so far as she may seem intransigent it is because she attaches practical importance to the social rights of evangelical truth.  She is also, of course, realistic, and is ready to allow adaptations of this principle in the interests of what is possible to acheive in the concrete.  But this itself is only further proof of her struggle for the principle; it is the principle itself which demands such application on the grounds that a partial good is better than none.  The Church does not share the view that anything which falls short the her ideal must therefore be repudiated in all circumstances.  On the contrary she is ready to accept a wide variety of social forms in which the ideal can be reflected to a greater or lesser degree.  One must not think, said Pope Pius XII, 'that the Church assumes a rigid and permanent form at any given moment and ceases to develop.  On the contrary, the Church is always leaning attentively over mankind, listening to the pulse of humanity'. (Jeremiah Newman, op. cit; pp. 278-279)

Key Take Away Points

So what are we to take away from all of this?  We can summarize by defining the “thesis” as the absolute ideal of Catholic unity.¹¹  While undergoing a certain development the continuity of the absolute Catholic ideal (the perfection of Christian unity) proposed by Mgr. Dupanloup as the "thesis" has remained constant.  In fact, such an ideal is not limited to certain Catholic countries or even certain continents.  The Catechism states that the "Father willed to call the whole of humanity together into his Son's Church.  The Church is the place where humanity must rediscover its unity and salvation." (CCC 845)  More recently, Pope Benedict XVI reminds us in Caritas In Veritatis that the ultimate goal of Christian unity is one that encomapasses the entire human family:  “Christians long for the entire human family to call upon God as “Our Father!” In union with the only-begotten Son, may all people learn to pray to the Father and to ask him, in the words that Jesus himself taught us, for the grace to glorify him by living according to his will, to receive the daily bread that we need, to be understanding and generous towards our debtors, not to be tempted beyond our limits, and to be delivered from evil.” (cf. Mt 6:9-13)  

The “hypothesis”, on the other hand, should not be understood as some sort of compromise with the lesser of evils that is tolerated with great hesitation only because Catholics find themselves too weak to enforce or artificially impose the “ideal”.  On the contrary, the “hypothesis” is a good in its own right that approaches the absolute ideal to a greater or lesser degree.¹²  Furthermore, from a relative point of view, the “hypothesis” is that best or optimal solution in the factual order (hic et nunc) since it takes into account and satisfies – not only one absolute principle considered in the abstract  – but all absolute and essential universal principles taken together.  What all of this means is that we should think of the various legitimate and suitable adaptations to existential forms (hypothesis) in terms of degrees of the absolute (e.g., degrees of unity) and that the specific degree reflected in a social form (e.g., specific forms given to realize the necessary mutual cooperation between Church and State) will be determined by the nature and composition of a given society.   

 Concluded in Part III

notes

¹ Cf. AAS, Vl (1914), 383­86, 4th Thomistic Thesis; Ens, quod denominatur ab esse, non univoce de Deo ac de creaturis dicitur, nec tamen prorsus aequivoce, sed analogice, analogia tum attributionis tum proportionalitis.
 

² Dr. John Rao notes the following: "Taparelli began using a thesis-hypothesis distinction as early as 1850, taking it from a book by Mgr. Parisis (1795-1866) of Langres entitled Cas de conscience (A Case of Conscience)." (Cf. Rao, Theology of the Mystical Body, Ch. 4)

³ Vermeersch gives additional insights into this notion: "We may compare the thesis to an ideal, the perfect realization of which is not possible in  this world...And even where complete realization cannot be obtained, it is a great blessing to come near it, and to possess in the ideal that we cherish and the reality that we accept with resignation an end of our efforts, and a rule by which we may measure our social progress". (Cf. Vermeersch, Tolerance, Benziger, 1913, pp. 252-253) 

⁴ The essence of the Catholic ideal or "thesis", therefore, is a unity that has is basis in charity and truth. 

⁵ Dr. Rao quotes Taparelli who makes the same point as follows: “And, truth to say, one cannot artificially enforce a unity that does not exist.  In such circumstances, the Church might ask for only one thing: freedom to preach, to speak, to publish, and to teach---the same freedom that would be granted to all other groups that did not manifestly violate the dictates of reason. ‘This is the protection she demands from the governments of non-Catholic peoples’, Taparelli wrote in 1850; ‘she does not ask for violent actions to promote her; she asks no benefit to suborn others; she is strong enough with her own light and efforts’” (Rao, Op. cit.)

⁶ Those who opposed these views would label Mgr. Dupanloup as a "liberal Catholic", however, at the time this was commonly used in the sense of a political category and therefore should not be confused with the error of "theological liberalism", properly speaking. 

⁷ As a result of the increasing confusion, Maritain avoided using the thesis-hypothesis terminology altogether -- simply affirming its legitimate use when properly understood.  Also, he seems to have simply replaced the classical "hypothesis" term with the equivalent notion of what he calls a "concrete historical ideal."  Similarly, the equivalent notion of the "thesis" he described as a civilization where the ideal of fraternal love is the dynamic principle. (Cf. Maritain, Integral Humanism)  Later, Pope Paul VI would speak about a "civilization of love."  In any case, the confusion in terminology is certainly evident by the following from Fr. John Courtney Murray commenting on the religious situation in the United States: "Are we to suppose that 30 Million Catholics must live perpetually in a state of hypothesis?" (Cf. Cavenaugh, Blackwell Companion to Political Theology, p. 158),  It is evident that the terms "thesis" and "hypothesis" eventually had little to do with the classical formulation -- as the distinction between the "absolute" and the "relative" orders.     

⁸ What is critical is to keep in view the absolute and relative orders at the same time.  Distortions come into play when one looses the proper perspective of analogy linking together these two orders and adopting a narrow or one-sided view of the thesis-hypothesis.   

⁹ Dr. Rao, in his analysis of Taparelli's work on the thesis-hypothesis distinction, makes a similar observation as follows: “A Catholic who is truly free will seek the transformation of society through his use of religion, education, speech, and the press. He will seek the suppression of falsehood as well.  But a Catholic could use his freedom justly only when he used it in accordance with the demands of equity and charity.  Equity and charity required him to modify the active use of his freedom according to circumstances of time and place. Again, if men lived as human natures, then abstract truth could be applied abstractly, and the same strategy be employed everywhere and at every moment.  But the world is populated by creatures of flesh and blood, whose different problems require consideration lest a narrowly conceived “thesis” regarding how freedom is to be used and justice to be achieved lead, in practice, to disaster; to violation of the well-being of the citizenry as a whole…” (Op. cit.)

¹⁰ Van Noort here rejects any notion of a narrow or one-sided conception of the thesis-hypothesis distinction insofar as the hypothesis must always be a "good" in itself (even if it falls short of absolute perfection in every respect) that satisfies all essential and immutable principles. 

¹¹ In a social context this ideal of unity has come to be known as solidarity: "What we nowadays call the principle of solidarity...is frequently stated by Pope Leo XIII, who uses the term 'friendship'...Pope Pius XI refers to it with the equally meaningful term 'social charity.'  Pope Paul VI, expanding the concept to cover the many modern aspects of the social question, speaks of a 'civilization of love'" (Cf. Pope John Paul II, CA, 10).  Pope Benedict XVI is more explicit in linking solidarity to the ideal of Catholic unity: "The theme of development can be identified with the inclusion-in-relation of all individuals and peoples within the one community of the human family, built in solidarity on the basis of the fundamental values of justice and peace. This perspective is illuminated in a striking way by the relationship between the Persons of the Trinity within the one divine Substance. The Trinity is absolute unity insofar as the three divine Persons are pure relationality. The reciprocal transparency among the divine Persons is total and the bond between each of them complete, since they constitute a unique and absolute unity. God desires to incorporate us into this reality of communion as well: 'that they may be one even as we are one' (Jn 17:22). (Cf. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Vertitate, 54)  

¹² Bishop Ketteler's approach to the "unity of Germany" reflect these same principles in light of the proper conception of the thesis-hypothesis distinction.  (Cf. Ketteler, Freedom, Authority and the Church, Ch. 33)

The Intervention of Mgr. Dupanloup (Part I)

Introduction

The Papal Encyclical Quanta Cura (1864) and the accompanying “Syllabus” (a list of modern errors compiled and formulated by the Vatican from various Papal Allocutions, Encyclicals and Apostolic Letters given during the Pontificate of Pope Pius IX) caused great uproar in many countries including France.  Much of the tension and confusion was stirred up and spread by journalists that were ill-equipped to present the true meaning or sense of the Papal act.  In the face of unrelenting attacks against the Church and the Papacy, Mgr. Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, intervened in 1865 with his work, “The Convention of the 15^th September and The Encyclical of the 8^th December”, that set out to defend Pope Pius IX while dispelling the confusion running rampant an all sides.  In response to his intervention, the Bishop of Orleans received 630 letters of praise and commendation from Catholic Bishops all over the world including Mgr. Pecci of Perugia (future Pope Leo XIII), Mgr. Ketteler of Mainz, Mgr. Chigi (Apostolic Nuncio, Paris), Cardinal Caterini and finally, on February 4, 1865, from Pope Pius IX himself (Cf. F. Lagrange, Life of Monseigneur Dupanloup, 1885, pp. 261-265).  On the other hand, not everyone was pleased by Mgr. Dupanloup and his intervention.  Those who would use the Encyclical and the Syllabus as a kind of political device in pursuit of regime change in favor of the royalist cause in France would label Mgr. Dupanloup’s work the “anti-Syllabus”.   

We will tackle this in three parts by taking a look at various aspects of this intervention that shed much needed light on both Quanta Cura and the Syllabus.  Part I begins by reviewing some “rules of interpretation” that Mgr. Dupanloup calls to our attention.  Part II provides an analysis of the origin and development of the thesis-hypothesis distinction.  Finally, Part III provides an explanation and conclusions on the topic of religious freedom.        

 

The Contradictory and The Contrary

Bishop Dupanloup identifies some false interpretations of the Encyclical and responds by outlining true principles and rules of interpretation.  He begins with an important clarification insofar as a given proposition only affirms the contradictory while not necessarily intending to affirm the contrary position.    

Is the rigorous consequences of a condemned proposition well known in the world?  Or rather, to show the manner in which they have exaggerated the Pontifical condemnations, are not most of those who have written on the Encyclical absolutely ignorant of it?  I shall doubtless astonish them, by recalling to their minds elementary principles, not only in theology, but in logic.  For example:

It is an elementary rule of interpretation, that the condemnation of a proposition rejected as false, erroneous, and even heretical, does not necessarily imply the affirmation of its contrary, which often might be another error; but only of its contradictory.

The contradictory proposition is that which simply excludes the condemned proposition.  The contrary is that which goes beyond this simple exclusion.

Well, of this common rule they seem to have been entirely ignorant, in the inconceivable interpretation they have given us of the Encyclical and the Syllabus, during the last three weeks past.

The Pope condemns this proposition: “It is permitted to refuse obedience to legitimate princes.” (Prop. 63.)

They affect to conclude from this, that, according to the Pope, the refusal of obedience is never permitted, and that submission to the will of princes is always obligatory.  This is to go at a single leap to the last extreme of the contrary, and, through the Vicar of Christ, to consecrate the most brutal despotism, and servile obedience to all the caprices of princes.  It is the extinction of the noblest of liberties – the holy liberty of the soul.  And yet they make the Pope affirm it! 

The Universal and the Conditional

The Bishop proceeds to a second basic rule of interpretation.  We must be attentive to those propositions that condemn a universal position.  Such a proposition does not exclude every qualification dictated by circumstances or facts.

There is another rule of interpretation, not less elementary, viz: that it must be seen whether the condemned proposition be universal and absolute; for then it may often happen that such a proposition is censured only because of its universality and its too absolute sense.

Example: “The principle called non-intervention must be proclaimed and observed.” (Prop. 62.)

In condemning this proposition, did the Pope intend to say that intervention should be maintained, right or wrong, without discernment, always?

[…]Neither intervention, nor non-intervention can be an absolute rule.  The Pope means simply that non-intervention should not be made a universal principle, that is necessary to be observed, like an axiom of international right…Intervention, like non-intervention, belongs to discipline – to discipline, either good or bad, just or unjust, wise or imprudent, according to the case or circumstances.  

The Scope

In his third basic rule of interpretation, Mgr. Dupanloup points out the necessity to consider each and every term with attention to determine the scope and limit of the condemnation.

Another rule of interpretation, and of good sense, requires that all the terms of a condemned proposition should be studied and weighed with attention, to understand upon what the condemnation does or does not touch…Thus:

The Pope condemns this proposition: “The Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile and accommodate himself to modern civilization.”

Therefore, they conclude, the Papacy declares itself the irreconcilable enemy of modern civilization.

All that constitutes modern civilization is, according to the journals hostile to the Church, condemned by the Pope.  This interpretation is simply an absurdity.  The words demanding attention here are, to reconcile and accommodate himself.

In that which our adversaries designate under the name, so vaguely complex, of modern civilization, there is good, indifferent, and also much that is bad.  With whatever is good or indifferent in modern civilization, the Pope has no need to reconcile himself.  To say so would be an impertinence and an insult, as if one said to an honorable man, “Reconcile yourself with justice.”

With what is wrong, the Pope neither can nor ought to reconcile or accommodate himself.  To pretend to such a thing would be an outrage.  Here, then, is the sense (which is very simple) of the condemnations directed against the 80^th proposition, to which I shall return.

It is also the same in this very proposition, No. 80, regarding other words, equally vague and complex, viz: progress and liberalism.  Whatever may be good in these words and things, the Pope does not regret.  What is indifferent is also so to him.  What is wrong he reproves…

The Absolute and the Relative

Mgr. Dupanloup then makes a critical distinction between the absolute and the relative.  The former he called the “thesis” while the latter he termed the “hypothesis”.  This basic framework would serve as the basis for ongoing theological discussion and debate on the Church in her relations with modern states.  Catholic theologians would develop this model in different directions according to various philosophies.  We will have more to say about this later.  For now, it is sufficient to note this key distinction and that the relative view (hypothesis) may be considered admissible insofar as it is a legitimate application of immutable principles to concrete circumstances.  On the other hand, a relative good should never be raised to the level of the good considered in the absolute sense (thesis).

There are yet other rules.  In the interpretation of condemned propositions, it is necessary to remark all the terms, all the slight shades of expression; for the vice of a proposition is often found in a shade, in a word, which alone forms the error.  The absolute propositions must be distinguished, as well as the relative propositions; for that which might be admissible in hypothesis will often be false in thesis.  There are also equivocal or dangerous propositions, which can be condemned only because of the equivocation itself, and from the bad sense to which they may be applied, although they may also have a good sense.       

Context is Key

The last rule of interpretation noted by Mgr. Dupanloup draws our attention to the importance of understanding the proposition in the sense that it was given by the Pope.  For example, in the case of the Syllabus, it should be understood according to the sense given in the original Papal Allocution cited and never completely removed from its proper context.  It is in this sense that Cardinal Newman considers that “the value of the Syllabus…lies in its references.”  To get a better sense of this, Newman cites Prop. 77 of the Syllabus and explains as follows: “When we turn to the Allocution, which is the ground of its being put into the Syllabus, what do we find there?  First, that the Pope was speaking, not of States universally, but of one particular State, Spain, definitely Spain; secondly, he was not speaking of the proposition in questions directly, or dogmatically, or separately, but was protesting against the breach in many ways of the Concordat on the part of the Spanish government.”  Then, commenting on the true sense of the proposition, Newman states that “the Pope does merely not think it expedient for every state from this time forth to tolerate every sort of religion on its territory, and to disestablish the Church at once…for this is all that he denies.  As in the instance of the foregoing section, he does but deny a universal…”  (Cf. Newman, Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, 1875) 

Finally, there are propositions (and the Syllabus includes several) which are condemned only in the sense given by their authors, and not in the absolute sense of the words when separated from the context, etc.  

A Principal Mistake

Mgr. Dupanloup then proceeds to enumerate several “principal mistakes” in regards to the sense that many have incorrectly attributed to the Papal act.  One such mistake involves the matter of religious freedom.

I ask to be permitted to produce some other examples of propositions, of which the condemnation has been strangely understood, because all the rules of interpretation have been misconceived or forgotten, or rather because the translators have read, with an inconceivable levity, the theological formularies, edited in the brief and learned terms of the schools, somewhat as they are accustomed to read newspapers and romances.

To confine myself to the principal mistakes, there is in the Encyclical a proposition relative to the freedom of worship.  This proposition has been interpreted in such a manner that the half of France, at this moment, imagines the Pope has really condemned the constitutions of nearly all the states of Europe, who admit the free exercise of worship; and that, consequently, it will not be permitted henceforth to take the oath for the maintenance of the constitution of our country.

Here is the proposition, whose absolute and excessive character is plain enough: “The highest social perfection and civil progress imperiously exact that human society should be constituted and governed without taking any more account of religion than if it had no existence, or at least without acknowledging any difference between true religion and false.” (Encycl.)

Would any one seriously ask us to subscribe to so exorbitant a doctrine?  If the Pope brands it, how call that logic, in the name of which they would conclude that he condemns the political constitution which admits of tolerance and civil liberty to dissenting forms of worship?  But I shall return to this point; it is too serious to be left without the full expressions of my thoughts.

 Continued in Part II

The Irish Constitution of 1937

The Irish Constitution of 1937 provides an interesting case study both in terms of the relations between church and state as well as the more general question of religious freedom.  The Constitution is considered “secular” inasmuch as it does not establish or endow any state religion.  The Constitution recognizes the “public worship” due to Almighty God and the respect and honor due to religion.  The Constitution also recognizes the special status of the Catholic Church as the “guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority” of the body politic.  This special status, therefore, is not one mechanically imposed on the body politic by the political authorities in the sense of a state absolutism.  On the contrary, the special status of the Church is duly “recognized” by the state in virtue of the Faith professed by the vast majority of its citizens.  At the same time, however, the state recognizes other churches and denominations already firmly established as of the time of the Constitution.        

Article 44. 1.

i)  The State acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God.  It shall hold His Name in reverence and shall respect and honor religion.

ii)  The State recognized the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens.

iii)  The State also recognizes the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, the Methodist Church in Ireland, the Religious Society of Friends in Ireland, as well as the Jewish Congregations and the other religious denominations existing in Ireland at the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution.

The Constitution also provides for religious freedom (private and public) subject to the requirements of public order and morality.  Furthermore, the Constitution guarantees against any type of discrimination based on religious profession and guarantees the rightful autonomy to the Church and other religious communities.

Article 44. 2.

i)    Freedom of conscience, and the free profession and practice of religion are, subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen.

ii)   The State guarantees not to endow any religion.

iii)  The State shall not impose any disabilities or make any discrimination on the ground or religious profession, belief or status.

iv)  Legislation providing State aid for schools shall not discriminate between schools under the management of different religious denominations, nor be such as to affect prejudicially the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending religious instruction at that school.

v)  Every religious denomination shall have the right to manage its own affairs, own, acquire, and administer property, moveable and immoveable, and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes.

vi)  The property of any religious denomination or any educational institution shall not be diverted save for necessary works of public utility and on payment of compensation.

Does such a Constitution conform to Catholic principles?  Can a Catholic even give praise to such a Constitution given that it does not conform to the historical “ideal” in terms of an exclusive relationship between the Catholic Church and the Catholic State?  Indeed, Eamon de Valera sought approval of the new Constitution from Pope Pius XI.  While the Pope was sympathetic he stopped short of giving an official positive endorsement insofar as it did not measure up to the historical “ideal”.  In the end, Pius XI simply stated: “I do not approve, neither do I not disapprove; we shall maintain silence."  (Stephen Collins, Political Correspondent, Irish Times)  This “silence”, however, was soon broken by Pope Pius XII when he declared:

“Your constitution is intended to be an instrument of prudence, justice and charity at the service of a community which has never, through its long Christian history, had any doubt about the internal, as well as the temporal implications, of that common good which it professes to seek through the conjoined prayer, toil and oftentimes heroic sacrifice of its children.  Grounded on the bedrock of the natural law, those fundamental human prerogatives which your Constitution undertakes to assure to every citizen, within the limits of order and morality, could find no ampler, no safer guarantee against the godless forces of subversion, the spirit of faction and violence, than mutual trust between the authorities of church and state, independent of each other, in its own sphere, but as it were allied for the common welfare in accordance with the principles of Catholic faith and doctrine…” (Cf. Bruce Francis Biever, “Religion, Culture, and Values”, Ayer Publishing, 1976, p. 295)

How do we explain this change in position from one Pope to the next?  Does this signify a substantial change or “rupture” in terms of immutable principles or merely an accidental change in connection with the “question of fact” – the prudential judgement relative to concrete circumstances in the order of facts, hic et nunc?  To what extent can the ideal in the abstract order of speculative ideas – as it was historically realized to a greater or lesser degree in Catholic nations during the Middle Ages – now find its legitimate application in a context where there is lacking a true unity of Faith among the body politic?  In the Pontificate of Pope Pius XII, we begin to sense a new “historical ideal” (i.e., hypothesis) emerging relative to the circumstances in the modern era – a context characterized by mixed populations in practically every corner of the world largely resulting from a progressive globalization.  This affirmation of “fundamental human prerogatives” guaranteed for each citizen provides context for the Pope’s subsequent affirmation of fundamental human rights: “…the right to maintain and develop corporal, intellectual, and moral life, specifically the right to religious formation and education; the right to worship God in public and in private...” (Pius XII, Radio Message of December 24, 1942).