Opuscula

Can the Magisterium Teach Heresy?

2012-01-23T15:59:00.000-08:00

In a recent Open Letter to Si Si No No, Fr. Giovanni Cavalcoli, O.P. challenges the SSPX to take a clear and logically consistent position relative to the indefectibility of the Church and the infallibility of the Magisterium on matters of faith:

Is the Church’s Magisterium, in matters of faith, infallible or fallible? You have to choose. It is here that we will see if you are truly Catholic or crypto-Protestants, or, despite your intentions to the contrary – crypto-Modernists. But at least the Modernists are coherent: as a principal, they have a relativist and evolutionist gnoseology. How can you, Thomists, who claim the existence of an immutable and definite truth and also see the Church as teacher of the truth, end up alongside the Protestants and Modernists by saying that the Church can err de facto in the doctrine of the truth?

The Magisterium is not only infallible when it proclaims or defines a dogma, but also when it simply teaches a truth of the faith or close to the faith, without declaring the need to define it. It is enough that is about matters of the faith, as in the case of the new conciliar doctrines. It is this teaching that is found in the [Motu Proprio] Ad tuendam fidem, which you most certainly know. Besides, when you negate infallibility, certainly with this you do not identify sic et simpliciter, the fallible with the actually false. And yet you do not exclude the possibility of error, you do not deny that in the future, that which is taught today will become false or show itself to be false.

Now this contrasts with the Divine mission of teaching the Gospel which was entrusted to the Church by Christ. Therefore, denying the infallibility of the Magisterium is against the faith and so it is heresy. The moment you accuse, even in a veiled way, the Council of having fallen into heresy, you do not realize that you have fallen in it yourselves.

THE CATECHISM OF ST. PIUS X
Q. Can the Church err in what she proposes for our belief?
A. No, the Church cannot err in what she proposes for our belief, since according to the promise of Jesus Christ she is unfailingly assisted by the Holy Ghost.

UPDATE: The Response from Si Si No No

The response given by the editors of Si Si No No confirms the SSPX position that the Second Vatican Council represents a substantial rupture in faith. According to the authors, the doctrine of the Magisterium can be multiple or different regarding even the "substance" of the faith:

The Church as subject is always one; She is and will always be “pillar and sustainer of the Truth ”, even if the object or doctrine taught by Her may be multiple regarding “the way” and the “substance”. Now the Second Vatican Council is “pastoral”.... So the doctrine of Vatican II is different regarding “the way” of the other XX Councils preceding it and in some cases it even deviates from “the substance”.

According to the authors, this deviation or rupture was made possible insofar as the Second Vatican Council did not intend to "define and bind belief" and, therefore, the criteria for an infallible divine assistance was not satisfied at the council. Rather, the type of divine assistance operative at the Second Vatican Council was only of a fallible kind and therefore subject to err -- not only in practical-prudential matters -- but also with respect to the substance of the faith.

The SSPX Response

2012-01-13T15:07:00.000-08:00

UPDATED

In early December of last year, the SSPX submitted its response to the Holy See concerning the doctrinal preamble. While the exact contents of the response and the doctrinal preamble remain secret, DICI has revealed that "one of the components that make up this response is the cogently argued study by Fr. Jean-Michel Gleize that appeared in Le Courrier de Rome (no. 350, décembre 2011)."

The study affirms at the outset the following "incontestable principles" with respect to the teaching office or Magisterium of the Church:

In the first part of his study, the Spanish prelate recapitulates the fundamental notions recalled by Pius XII in Humani Generis: the fact that an act of the Church’s Teaching Authority [magisterium] is not guaranteed by the charism of infallibililty proper to solemn definitions does not mean that it can be considered “fallible” in the sense that it conveys “provisional teaching” or even “authorized opinions.” In general, that is, when it does not give solemn and infallible definitions, the Church’s Teaching Authority is always assisted by God, and this assistance is necessary to assure the indefectible transmission of the deposit of faith. In this sense, the merely ordinary teaching authority also benefits from a certain charism of truth.¹ The infallibility of the Church’s Teaching Authority [magisterium] must be understood analogously, that is, as admitting of varying degrees.²

Likewise, then, the assent due to truths proposed by the Teaching Authority [magisterium] may also be understood as admitting of varying degrees. Infallible solemn definitions ordinarily set formally or virtually revealed truths, which require an assent of divine faith. Other non-defined teachings require religious inner assent, which implies, over and above the assent to the truth properly so-called, a certain element of obedience toward the magisterial authority. Finally, acts of the magisterium may contain elements that, being extraneous to a particular teaching, do not command as such any assent.

The author then laments that this criteria should be applied to Vatican II: "These general reminders would not present any difficulty had Msgr. Ocariz not applied them to the teachings of Vatican II." Indeed, the author proceeds to highlight four teachings of Vatican II that are considered to be irreconcilable with Tradition and the previous Magisterium where the contradictions in question constitute a rupture or break with respect to the unity of the teaching subject or Magisterium as well as with the unity of the object or doctrine (emphasis in original):

The fact of Vatican II: new teachings contrary to Tradition
On at least four points, the teachings of the Second Vatican Council are obviously in logical contradiction to the pronouncements of the previous traditional Magisterium, so that it is impossible to interpret them in keeping with the other teachings already contained in the earlier documents of the Church’s Magisterium. Vatican II has thus broken the unity of the Magisterium, to the same extent to which it has broken the unity of its object.

These four points are as follows. The doctrine on religious liberty, as it is expressed in no. 2 of the Declaration Dignitatis humanae, contradicts the teachings of Gregory XVI in Mirari vos and of Pius IX in Quanta cura as well as those of Pope Leo XIII in Immortale Dei and those of Pope Pius XI in Quas primas. The doctrine on the Church, as it is expressed in no. 8 of the Constitution Lumen gentium, contradicts the teachings of Pope Pius XII in Mystici corporis and Humani generis. The doctrine on ecumenism, as it is expressed in no. 8 of Lumen gentium and no. 3 of the Decree Unitatis redintegratio, contradicts the teachings of Pope Pius IX in propositions 16 and 17 of the Syllabus, those of Leo XIII in Satis cognitum, and those of Pope Pius XI in Mortalium animos. The doctrine on collegiality, as it is expressed in no. 22 of the Constitution Lumen gentium, including no. 3 of the Nota praevia [Explanatory Note], contradicts the teachings of the First Vatican Council on the uniqueness of the subject of supreme power in the Church, in the Constitution Pastor aeternus. (…)

Therefore, according to the author, those holding the teaching office have the possibility to propose defective teachings that must ultimately be considered as non-Magisterial. Put another way, Magisterial acts are those true teachings proposed by those holding the teaching office. On the contrary, those defective teachings that depart from truth are not Magisterial acts, properly speaking. We are given to understand by this that a true and legitimate Pope can nevertheless exercise or promulgate an illegitimate and anti-Magisterial act concerning matters of faith.

The same word “magisterium” is used both to designate the person who exercises the power of the magisterium [the teaching office or authority], (the pope or the bishops), and the act of the magisterium (an infallible definition or a simply authentic teaching). The person is the subject of a power or of a function which is by definition ordered to its object. For example, every man is endowed with a reasoning mind [speculative intelligence] ordered by nature to grasp first principles.⁵⁰ This function either absolutely is or is not. On the other hand, the exercise of the magisterium is the employment of a function: even if most of the time this usage is correct, it always remains possible that the titular of a function may exercise the act defectively, which amounts to failing to accomplish the act, since a defective act is defined as a privation. For example, intellectual error or falsehood is defined as the privation of the relationship that should exist between the mind and reality.

We admit without challenge that Vatican II represented the magisterium of the Church in the sense in which the power of the bishops who were gathered during this council cum Petro et sub Petro was and still is the power to teach the universal Church. But we object that the intention of this Council was to meet the demands of a self-styled pastoral magisterium, the new intention of which is clearly foreign to the ends of the divinely instituted magisterium. It contradicted on at least the four points named above objective fundamental ideas of the constant magisterium clearly defined. It thus appears that this magisterium was marked by a grave deficiency in its very act. The Angelic Doctor said: “When anyone endowed with an art produces bad workmanship, this is not the work of that art; in fact it is contrary to the art.”⁵¹ Similarly, due allowance being made, when a council produces bad teaching, it is not the work of the magisterium; in fact, it is contrary to the magisterium, that is to say, against Tradition.

The study does not attempt to reconcile this conclusion with the "incontestable principles" given at the outset including that "...the Church’s Teaching Authority is always assisted by God, and this assistance is necessary to assure the indefectible transmission of the deposit of faith. In this sense, the merely ordinary teaching authority also benefits from a certain charism of truth." In addition, the study does not attempt to resolve the problem over who has the competence and authority to judge whether a particular "act" of a Pope or a Council is true or defective concerning matters of faith.

It is also noteworthy that three of the four rejected doctrines (above) are taken directly from the Dogmatic Constitution, Lumen Gentium promulgated by Pope Paul VI in the following manner:

"Each and all these items which are set forth in this dogmatic Constitution have met with the approval of the Council Fathers. And We by the apostolic power given Us by Christ together with the Venerable Fathers in the Holy Spirit, approve, decree and establish it and command that what has thus been decided in the Council be promulgated for the glory of God."

Given in Rome at St. Peter's on November 21, 1964.

Finally, we can observe by the study a decisive turn from previous statements seemingly affirming the will to interpret Vatican II teachings in the light of Tradition:

“Far from wanting to stop Tradition in 1962, we wish to consider the Second Vatican Council and post-conciliar teaching in the light of this Tradition which St. Vincent of Lérins defined as ‘what has been believed at all times, everywhere and by all’ (Commonitorium), without rupture and in a perfectly homogenous development. Thus we will be able to contribute efficaciously to the evangelization requested by the Savior (see Matthew 28; 19-20)."

Bishop Fellay, DICI, Press Release, March 12, 2009

UPDATE: Andrea Tornielli reports that Bishop Fellay subsequently delivered a "second response" to the Holy See concerning the doctrinal preamble. This second "concise" response is said to comply with the expected format enabling the process to take a step forward.

The true response of the superior of the Fraternity of Saint Pius X, Bernard Fellay, formulated according to the requests of the Holy See, arrived at the Vatican just last week. The first reply, received by the Vatican on 21 December, was not considered adequate by Vatican authorities, who urged the head of the Lefebvrians to redraft it, considering the first delivery as more of a “documentation” than a reply. Thus Bishop Fellay has prepared a second text, more concise than the doctrinal preamble that the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith sent him last September. This second text is now being carefully examined by consultants from the Ecclesia Dei Commission - who follow the Lefebrvian dossier - and this could take time.

...Fellay’s second response - which accepts some parts of the doctrinal preamble while questioning others - needs time to be examined...

Recall that in the doctrinal preamble proposed by the Ecclesia Dei Commission (headed by Cardinal William Levada and led by Monsignor Guido Pozzo), the Lefebvrians were asked to subscribe to the profession of faith – that which is considered essential to being Catholic. The profession requires three different levels of approval and distinguishes between revealed truths, dogmatic statements, and ordinary magisterium. About the latter, it says that the Catholic is called to ensure a “religious submission of will and intellect” to the teachings that the Pope and the college of bishops “offer when they exercise their authentic Magisterium,” even if they are not proclaimed in a dogmatic way, as is the case with most of the documents of the magisterium...

The fact that the new and more appropriate response - which was considered in the sacred palazzos to be a “step forward” - needs to be carefully studied and considered, meaning that it is neither a definitive “yes” or “no” to the final text of the preamble. But it welcomes some parts of the Vatican text, while expressing reservations about others, and above all, it calls for further clarifications and additions. In fact, the Lefebvrians do not intend to give their assent to the texts of the Council regarding collegiality, ecumenism, interreligious dialogue, and religious freedom, because they believe these to be inconsistent with tradition. Indeed, the concept of tradition - “Traditio” - and its value, represents the crux of the debate that has characterized the talks between the Society and the Holy See. The Lefebvrians criticize some of the Council’s provisions, considering them to be at odds with the tradition of the Church.

On Adhesion to the Second Vatican Council

2011-12-08T17:39:00.000-08:00

As the drama in the dialogue between Rome and the SSPX continues to unfold, a very relevant essay on the nature of adhesion to the Magisterium of the Second Vatican Council was published in the December 2, 2011 edition of L'Osservatore Romano penned by Msgr. Fernando Ocáriz.

This essay addresses several important aspects concerning the nature and levels of assent owed to the Magisterium in general and the various teachings of the Second Vatican Council in particular. Some of the key points raised in the essay are among the following:

1. The pastoral motivation behind the Second Vatican Council does not imply that it was void of doctrinal content.

2. The fact that the Second Vatican Council did not solemnly define dogmas explicitly invoking the charism of infallibility does not imply that its doctrinal "teaching is therefore to be considered "fallible" - in the sense that what is proposed is somehow a “provisional doctrine” or just an “authoritative opinion”. Every authentic expression of the Magisterium must be received for what it truly is: a teaching given by Pastors who, in the apostolic succession, speak with the “charism of truth” (Dei Verbum, n. 8), “endowed with the authority of Christ” (Lumen Gentium, n. 25), “and by the light of the Holy Spirit” (ibid.)."

3. "Those affirmations of the Second Vatican Council that recall truths of the faith naturally require the assent of theological faith, not because they were taught by this Council but because they have already been taught infallibly as such by the Church, either by a solemn judgement or by the ordinary and universal Magisterium. So also a full and definitive assent is required for the other doctrines set forth by the Second Vatican Council which have already been proposed by a previous definitive act of the Magisterium."

4. "The Council’s other doctrinal teachings require of the faithful a degree of assent called 'religious submission of will and intellect'. Precisely because it is “religious” assent, such assent is not based purely on rational motives. This kind of adherence does not take the form of an act of faith. Rather, it is an act of obedience that is not merely disciplinary, but is well-rooted in our confidence in the divine assistance given to the Magisterium, and therefore 'within the logic of faith and under the impulse of obedience to the faith'" (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction Donum Veritatis, 24 May 1990, n. 23).

5. If the Magisterium has the "charism of truth" when it proposes Catholic doctrine - it does not not imply that every utterance or passage is doctrinal and requiring the assent of the faithful. The non-doctrinal elements included in Magisterial texts are contingent and ultimately fallible. "Documents of the Magisterium may contain elements that are not exactly doctrinal — as is the case in the documents of the Second Vatican Council — elements whose nature is more or less circumstantial (descriptions of the state of a society, suggestions, exhortations, etc.). Such matters are received with respect and gratitude, but do not require an intellectual assent in the strictest sense (cf. Instruction Donum Veritatis, nn. 24-31)".

6. Where there exist "difficulties in understanding the continuity of certain Conciliar Teachings with the tradition, the Catholic attitude, having taken into account the unity of the Magisterium, is to seek a unitive interpretation in which the texts of the Second Vatican Council and the preceding Magisterial documents illuminate each other. Not only should the Second Vatican Council be interpreted in the light of previous Magisterial documents, but also some of these earlier magisterial documents can be understood better in the light of the Second Vatican Council."

7. The Second Vatican Council proposed some innovative doctrines. "These are innovations in the sense that they explain new aspects which have not previously been formulated by the Magisterium, but which do not doctrinally contradict previous Magisterial documents. This is so even though, in certain cases — for example, concerning religious freedom — these innovations imply very different consequences at the level of historical decisions concerning juridical and political applications of the teaching, especially given the changes in historical and social conditions."

8. "An authentic interpretation of Conciliar texts can only be made by the Magisterium of the Church herself."

9. "Nevertheless, there remains space for legitimate theological freedom to explain in one way or in another how certain formulations present in the Conciliar texts do not contradict the Tradition and, therefore, to explain the correct meaning of some expressions contained in those passages."

10. "An assessment of the teaching of these Popes and the corresponding assent of the Episcopate to that teaching should transform a possible situation of difficulty into a serene and joyful acceptance of the Magisterium, the authentic interpreter of the doctrine of the faith. This must be possible and is to be hoped for, even if aspects that are not entirely understood remain. In any case, there remains legitimate room for theological freedom and for further opportune in-depth study."

The Patriot

2011-07-04T10:19:00.000-07:00

CHARLESTON: ASSEMBLY HALL

Two dozen ANGRY, YELLING, MEN OF PROPERTY. Among them are ROBINSON, HAMILL and JOHNSON, who are Patriots. Opposed to them are SIMMS, WITHINGTON and BALDRIDGE who are Loyalists. As Martin makes his way to his seat, the SPEAKER OF THE ASSEMBLY POUNDS HIS GAVEL.

SPEAKER
ORDER! ORDER!

Slowly, the room quiets down.

SPEAKER
Our first order of business...

SIMMS
And our last if we vote a levy...

The ROOM ERUPTS.

SPEAKER
ORDER! ORDER! Mr. Simms, you do not have the floor.

The ROOM SETTLES DOWN.

SPEAKER
Our first order of business is an address by Colonel Harry Lee of the Continental Army.

An imposing figure makes his way to the front of the assembly, COLONEL HARRY LEE, about Martin's age and cut from the same cloth -- strong, weathered, with a powerful bearing. Lee sees Martin and offers a familiar nod, which Martin returns, stone-faced. At the dais Lee pauses, then speaks simply.

LEE
You all know why I am here. I am not an orator and I will not try to convince you of the worthiness of our cause. I am a soldier and we are at war and with the declaration of independence we all expect from Philadelphia, it will soon be a formal state of war. In preparation for that, eight of the thirteen colonies have levied money in support of a Continental Army. I ask South Carolina to be the ninth.

In the balcony, Gabriel nods in agreement. Simms rises.

SIMMS
Colonel Lee, Massachusetts may be at war, along with New Hampshire and Rhode Island and Virginia, but South Carolina is not at war.

LEE
Massachusetts and New Hampshire are not as far from South Carolina as you might think and the war they're fighting is not for independence of one or two colonies. It's for the independence of one nation.

WITHINGTON
And what nation is that?

Robinson, one of the Patriots, stands up.

ROBINSON
An American nation. Colonel Lee, with your permission?

Lee nods.

ROBINSON
Those of us who call ourselves Patriots are not seeking to give birth to an American nation, but to protect one that already exists. It was born a hundred-and-seventy years ago at Jamestown and has grown stronger and more mature with every generation reared and with every crop sown and harvested. We are one nation and our rights as citizens of that nation are threatened by a tyrant three thousand miles away.

LEE
Were I an orator, those are the exact words I would have spoken.

Laughter. Martin rises.

MARTIN
Mister Robinson, tell me, why should I trade one tyrant, three thousand miles away, for three thousand tyrants, one mile away?

Laughter from the Loyalists. Surprise from Lee and the Patriots. In the gallery, Gabriel winces.

ROBINSON
Sir?

MARTIN
An elected legislature can trample a man's rights just as easily as a King can.

LEE
Captain Martin, I understood you to be a Patriot.

MARTIN
If you mean by a Patriot, am I angry at the Townsend Acts and the Stamp Act? Then I'm a Patriot. And what of the Navigation Act? Should I be permitted to sell my rice to the French traders on Martinique? Yes, and it's an intrusion into my affairs that I can't... legally.

Laughter.

MARTIN
And what of the greedy, self-serving bastards who sit as Magistrates on the Admiralty Court and have fined nearly every man in this room. Should they be boxed about the ears and thrown onto the first ship back to England? I'll do it myself.

(beat)

And do I believe that the American colonies should stand as a separate, independent nation, free from the reins of King and Parliament? I do, and if that makes a Patriot, then I'm a Patriot.

Martin grows more serious.

MARTIN
But if you're asking whether I'm willing to go to war with England, the answer is, no. I've been to war and I have no desire to do so again.

The room is quiet, the Assemblymen having been thrown off- balance. Gabriel is disappointed by his father's speech.

ROBINSON
This from the same Captain Benjamin Martin whose anger was so famous during the Wilderness Campaign?

Martin glares at Robinson, then smiles.

MARTIN
I was intemperate in my youth. My departed wife, God bless her soul, dampened that intemperance with the mantle of responsibility.

Robinson looks derisively at Martin.

ROBINSON
Temperance can be a convenient disguise for fear.

Martin bristles but before he can answer, Lee steps in.

LEE
Mister Robinson, I fought with Captain Martin in the French and Indian War, including the Wilderness Campaign. We served as scouts under Washington. There's not a man in this room, or anywhere, for that matter, to whom I would more willingly trust my life.

ROBINSON
I stand corrected.

LEE
But, damn it, Benjamin! You live in a cave if you think we'll get independence without war...

MARTIN
Wasn't it a Union Jack we fought under?

LEE
A long time ago...

MARTIN
Thirteen years...

LEE
That's a damn long time...

The Speaker POUNDS HIS GAVEL again.

SPEAKER
Gentlemen! Please! This is not a tavern!

Martin and Lee ignore the speaker.

MARTIN
You were an Englishman then...

LEE
I was an American, I just didn't know it yet...

The Assemblymen and even the Speaker turn their heads in simultaneous anticipation of each rejoinder.

MARTIN
We don't have to go to war to gain independence...

LEE
Balderdash!

MARTIN
There are a thousand avenues, other than war, at our disposal...

Martin speaks slowly and firmly.

MARTIN
We do not have to go to war to gain independence.

Lee says nothing for a moment, then he speaks more seriously, quietly, grimly.

LEE
Benjamin, I was at Bunker Hill. It was as bad as anything you and I saw on the frontier. Worse than the slaughter at the Ashuelot River. The British advanced three times and we killed over seven hundred of them at point blank range. If your principles dictate independence, then war is the only way. It has come to that.

Martin is silent for a long moment. He softens and grows unsteady, speaking far more honestly than he ever wanted to.

MARTIN
I have seven children. My wife is dead. Who's to care for them if I go to war?

Lee is stunned by Martin's honesty and his show of weakness. At first Lee has no answer, then:

LEE
Wars are not fought only by childless men. A man must weigh his personal responsibilities against his principles.

MARTIN
That's what I'm doing. I will not fight and because I won't, I will not cast a vote that will send others to fight in my stead.

LEE
And your principles?

MARTIN
I'm a parent, I don't have the luxury of principles.

The other Assemblymen, both Patriots and Loyalists, stare at him, appalled. Martin, feeling weak, sits down. Lee looks at his friend with more sympathy than disappointment. In the gallery Gabriel turns and walks out.

Radaelli: "No Rupture, But Also No Continuity"

2011-06-17T09:45:00.000-07:00

Sandro Magister hosts a new contribution by Enrico Radaelli to the ongoing rupture vs. continuity debate. Seemingly unconvinced by the Holy Father's proposal of a hermeneutic of reform in continuity with Tradition, and in sharp contrast to the arguments proposed by Fr. Cavalcoli, Radaelli argues that the Church currently finds itself in a state where there is neither rupture nor continuity.

According to Radaelli, formal rupture is theoretically impossible -- being limited to the first and second degrees of (infallible) doctrine. On the other hand, Radaelli considers that the third degree of doctrine is ultimately and in the final analysis "not at all obligatorily binding for the obedience of the faithful." According to Radaelli, this third degree of doctrine is subject to errors that can even contradict dogmatic truth or irreformable doctrines of the first and second degrees (i.e., authentic magisterial teachings of the third degree can be heretical). On one hand, Radaelli denies that third degree doctrines touch upon the "dogmatic field". On the other hand, Radaelli considers that third degree doctrines can nevertheless contradict dogma or doctrines within the "dogmatic field" representing a "false continuity with dogma". While this does not constitute "formal rupture" it nevertheless can reflect a disparity with Tradition and a loss or disconnect with dogmatic truth. So, we are left with a situation where there is no formal rupture, nor formal continuity -- so long as the errors and contradictions persist within the third degree of doctrine. According to Radaelli, the only way out is to "purify" the doctrines of the third degree by raising them to the "supernatural level" and bringing them into contact with the "dogmatic fire". The author proposes that the concilar doctrines be purified by the "white hot fire" on the occasion of the "fiftieth anniversary of the council of discord".

UPDATE:
Fr. Cavalcoli has responded to Radaelli in a postscript where he further clarifies some of the confused ideas regarding doctrines of the third degree. The Dominican theologian states that the third level of doctrine often contains a mixture of both doctrinal elements as well as pastoral provisions. The doctrinal elements can "do no wrong" whereas pastoral provisions are subject to change according to circumstances or can even be imprudent, misguided or wrong in isolated cases. It is only this later aspect that represents the fallible "straw" of the third degree -- and the process of separating the pure doctrine from the "straw" of pastoral provisions and other contingencies is precisely what is involved in order to raise doctrines from the third to the second or first degree. Indeed, history has shown this to be a painstaking process that can even take centuries to sort out. It is by virtue of the doctrinal content (even if these are newly developed points in continuity with the old) that religious submission of intellect and will is due to doctrines of the third degree.

Giovanni Cavalcoli: The Infallibility Of Vatican II

2011-06-12T09:11:00.000-07:00

The ongoing debates between various theological experts (hosted by Sandro Magister) has produced a number of interesting exchanges and clarifications. For example, in one postcript, Fr. Giovanni Cavolcoli clarifies his position relative to the doctrinal authority of Vatican II.

All agree that there are three basic "degrees" of Catholic teaching. The first and second degrees are infallible and definitive. The third degree, however, while demanding religious assent is nevertheless reformable. At the same time, however, it would be false to assume that this "reformability" implies the possibility of a contradiction between the various levels or degrees of doctrine. So we are left with something of a parodox: if third degree doctrines can't contradict doctrines of the first and second degree then in what sense can these be fallible? Fr. Cavalcoli resolves the problem by distinguishing between (a) the dogmatic order and (b) practical-pastoral directives. The supreme magisterium can never defect with respect to the former (a) -- even if it is subject to err at times in the later (b). The reason is that doctrines of the third degree can treat dogmatic elements that are proposed in a manner that is nevertheless comingled with non-dogmatic and contingent aspects:

"The third degree also admits the fallibility of opinions and doctrines of a pastoral, moral or legal character." (Adapted from Google Translation)

Therefore, the hermeneutic of reform in continuity presupposes that the development of newer points of doctrine (third degree doctrines) must be perfectly compatible and analogically homogeneous with previously declared doctrines of the first and second degrees. At the same time, however, third degree doctrines are not irreformable and "definitive" insofar as they contain contingent aspects related to the pastoral-prudential order. The proper understanding of these distinctions is the key to the hermeneutic of reform in continuity and protects us from the dangers of rupture theology.

Basile Valuet On Hermeneutic Of Reform

2011-05-29T09:13:00.000-07:00

Sandro Magister brings us another important contribution by Benedictine theologian Basile Valuet to the ongoing debate concerning the nature and interpretation of the "hermeneutic of reform" proposed by Pope Benedict XVI. As we have seen previously, the philosopher Martin Rhonheimer considers that Vatican II had "corrected" previous teaching relative to the nature and function of the state in relation to the Church and its duties towards religious truth. Furthermore, Rhonheimer considers the logic behind the "due limits" taught by DH to correspond to a conception of a civil order that has a secular character in the sense of being "neutral" towards the diverisity of religious traditions. This is precisely where Rhonheimer identifies the "discontinuity" introduced by vatican II -- even if not at the level of a dogmatic rupture. According to Rhonheimer, the previous Magisterium seemed to demand the "confessional" Church-state model (where the state acts as a department or "secular arm" of the Church) whereas Vatican II seemed to propose the secular model of the state where the spiritual and temporal powers are each considered mutually autonomous.

Basile Valuet rejects this conclusion and indicates that Vatican II leaves open the possibility for a variety of governmental forms -- including a confessional state. The Benedictine theologian also stresses that the errors of liberalism, condemned in the 19th century, remain condemned today and are perfectly compatible with DH and the "hermeneutic of reform" proposed by Pope Benedict XVI:

"According to Benedict XVI, Pius IX was taking aim at the "radical liberalism" of the 19th century, but not at other forms of the organization of society, rising from a further evolution of liberalism. The discontinuity between Vatican II and Pius IX stems from the fact that RF is not the "freedom of conscience" condemned in the 19th century: it did not have either the same foundation, or the same object, or the same limitations, or the same goal. So it will always remain true that the liberalism condemned by Pius IX was condemnable (R. does not see this), but it will not always remain true that the theories or the states of law that we have before us are the ones that Pius IX condemned (R. grasps this perfectly)."

The principles of RF are universal whereas the application can vary accrording to the circumstances of time and place. In other words, there is no universal or "one size fits all" juridical formula to implement RF in every possible circumstance or social context.  The development or "novelty" introduced by Vatican II was to formulate the principles governing RF in a more general way -- taking into account changing circumstances and the wide diversity of legitimate social and governmental forms in the modern era:

"If a change of situation cannot change the natural law, it can nevertheless make a principle of the natural law (let's call it P1: it is not contrary to the natural law that the state should repress religious error), valid in a previous situation of ius gentium (in which RF is not yet recognized in reciprocal form), no longer apply in the same way in a new situation of ius gentium (in which RF is mutually recognized), and make another principle be applied now (P2: the modern state does not have penal competency, not even delegated, in religious matters). In this way, if one wishes to have a truth that is valid in every situation, one is obligated to formulate a principle P3, more general, which combines P1 and P2, and which DH has made an effort to formulate: it is contrary to the natural law that the state - in any age - should repress religious error, unless, in the circumstances considered, it disturbs the just, objective public order."

A Minor Dispute On Discontinuity

2011-05-19T16:15:00.000-07:00

The "hermeneutic of reform" proposed by Pope Benedict XVI presupposes a certain degree of real discontinuity. But what exactly is the nature and extent of the discontinuity introduced by Vatican II? This is an aspect of the question that Sandro Magister has uncovered recently in a minor dispute between Massimo Introvigne and Martin Rhonheimer. Specifically, is the discontinuity merely a result of a "new" application of immutable principles in light of changed circumstances? This seems to be the interpretation given by Massimo Introvigne. Martin Rhonheimer, on the other hand, takes the discontinuity to another level. In addition to the discontinuity arising from a new application of immutable principles, there is the basic recognition that Vatican II in fact "corrected certain historical decisions" with respect to the "relationship between the Church and the modern state". Martin Rhonheimer then draws the conclusion that Vatican II has made a correction "with respect to past conceptions of the state" in itself. In any case, both writers agree that the discontinuity does not reach the level of a dogmatic rupture.

It seems to me that there is another way to understand this. There is also the distinct possibility of prudential errors in connection with specific historical decisions. To "give a new definition to the relationship between the Church and the modern state" does not necessarily entail a redefinition of the nature of the state or political society in itself. It merely sets out a new "relationship" in light of changed circumstances (application). At the same time, this does not exclude the possibility of prudential errors with respect to the historical decisions themselves. For example, it does not serve the common good to cling to a status quo "out of season" or when circumstances dictate a needed reform. In this sense, it is possible to "correct certain historical decisions" from changed circumstances, prudential errors or some combination of these. Finally, I think it is important to recall that the 19th century Popes indeed defended a certain (confessional) conception of the state. On the other hand, it is not clear that this was proposed as an absolute. In other words, the circumstances must be ripe (including a religiously united body politic) for the legitimacy of such a confessional model. Therefore, to defend the existence of a confessional state in principle is not the same as demanding it at all times and in every place. Bishop Dupanloup of Orleans (1865) explains how to properly understand the Syllabus of Pope Pius IX on this question:

Would this same Catholic tradition teach, that if, in the course of ages there had been, or that there are yet, certain regions of the world where the law of the Church has become the civil law, in consequence of the unity of faith, and the agreement of the will among the citizens, where the State has constituted the Bishop protector of the holy canons – does it say that there the Church and the State have acted without right? For this is the meaning of the 77th proposition...But circumstances having changed, and the public law also, do we learn from this that Catholics would fail in their duty to God and the Church by accepting sincerely, and in all simplicity of thought, the constitution of their country, and the civil freedom of worship which it authorizes? Or, if we speak of liberty, when we are weak, is it only to refuse it to others when we shall be strong? (Cf. Dupanloup).

Religous Freedom: Principles and Application

2011-05-05T16:34:00.000-07:00

In his recent address to the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, the Holy Father affirmed the "anthropological foundation" to religious freedom that was "renewed" with Vatican II. Rooted in the natural law this right is universal and immutable. At the same time, however, the Pope recognized that "every state has a sovereign right to promulgate its own legislation and will express different attitudes to religion in law." What this means is that immutable principles may vary in application depending upon the circumstances or social context (Cf. CCC 2109). Mary Ann Glendon, President of the Pontifical Academy for Social Sciences, put it another way by indicating that there can be no "one size fits all" model or juridical formulation for religious freedom:

"Given the wide diversity of human societies, there cannot be one model of religious freedom that suits all countries. Nor can one country's approach to religious liberty serve as a model for another if by "model" one means something that can simply be copied and transplanted. Each nation’s system is the product of its own distinctive history and circumstances...To accept that there are no universal models is not to deny that religious freedom is a universal right. Rather, it is to recognize that there must be room for a degree of pluralism in modes of bringing religious freedom and other fundamental human rights to life under diverse cultural circumstances...That was the approach taken by the Second Vatican Council which affirmed in Dignitatis Humanae that there could be several valid ways to implement that right."

This corresponds to the fact that the exercise of a natural right is never considererd ulimited and unqualified. Under various circumstances the exercise of a right can be justly moderated by law (in view of the common good) without doing violence to the fundamental right of the human person. The practical implication is that the "due limits" to religious freedom will vary as determined by prudence according to the particular circumstances and social context (CCC 2109).

Fr. Giovanni Cavalcoli On Rupture Theology

2011-05-05T10:37:00.000-07:00

Sandro Magister once again presents us with a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate on the question of continuity vs. rupture with respect to Vatican II. The latest contribution is by Fr. Giovanni Cavolcoli O.P. and it addresses two critical distinctions that I have previously explored here and here. Let's take a brief look at these.

The first point deals with the distinction between analogy and univocality. If one applies a univocal conception to theological and pastoral questions then every kind of development or reform will appear as a substantial rupture. On the other hand, the classical conception of analogy is proper to all vital phenomena - including the knowledge of metaphysical and spiritual realities (Cf. Thomistic theses IV, XX). This distinction highlights the contrast between Aristotle and Descartes.

The second point deals with the distinction between matters of Faith (per se) and practical-pastoral dispositions. Often times both elements are comingled and it is necessary to properly distinguish one from the other. With respect to matters of Faith, and in consequence of the promise of Our Lord, "we can suppose a priori that the Council cannot teach us something that is false or contrary to what the Church taught before." Therefore, in the field of dogma, there is never a question of rupture but only (organic) development in continuity. With respect to practical-pastoral directives, there can and ought to be discontinuity periodically as a consequence of legitimate reform. It is important to note the possibility of error in this field (practical prudential order). While changed circumstances may dictate reform it could also happen that reform is undertaken to correct mistaken practical-prudential decisions of the past.

Rhonheimer On Religious Freedom

2011-04-28T12:48:00.000-07:00

Sandro Magister has presented a recent contribution by Fr. Martin Rhonheimer to the debate on the question of continuity vs. rupture with respect to Vatican II and the doctrine on religious freedom in particular. The article makes the observation that the “hermeneutic of reform” involves the interplay of both continuity (in essential and immutable principles) and discontinuity (in accidentals that are historical and transitory in nature). The trick is to properly distinguish the one from the other. This is why Pope Benedict has observed that the fundamental continuity in immutable principles is a fact that is “easy to miss at a first glance.” For example, the condemned errors of relativism and indifferentism remain equally condemned today. Furthermore, religious license or the unlimited and unqualified concept of “religious freedom” and “freedom of conscience” also remain equally condemned. The concept of “due limits” to religious freedom applies yesterday, today and always – even if these are not univocally applied in every given circumstance or social context. Fr. Rhonheimer points out that the fundamental moral norms rooted in natural law have remained constant before and after Vatican II. In a certain sense, it may appear as if there was a kind of shift in the primacy of truth in contradistinction to the primacy of the person. The reality is that these are linked as one is never preserved at the expense of the other. If the continuity of immutable principles remains solid then where does the discontinuity come into play?

The discontinuity fundamentally lies in a differentiated prudential and juridical application in light of circumstances and in view of the common good. Of course, this is a familiar theme that I have previously explored here and here. For example, the 19th century Popes were concerned with preserving the religious and Catholic character of states as had existed for centuries. Therefore, those propositions were condemned that would deny in principle the very right of existence of a confessional state. In fact, Dignitatis Hamanae reaffirms the essence of this principle: that special civil recognition can be given to one religious community in view of the circumstances or social context (Cf. DH, 6). It is important to recognize, however, that such a state of affairs has always presupposed the existence of a fundamental religious unity among the body politic (Cf. Ketteler). The prudential decisions of public policy are largely dependent upon a question of fact: to what extent does religious unity exist among the body politic? The same question of fact has been given a decisively different answer with Dignitatis Humanae. For centuries the Popes had presupposed a basic religious unity within “Catholic” states. This recognized “fact” supported a fundamental orientation with respect to the juridical application of immutable natural law principles. With Vatican II, however, the “fact” of globalization and religious pluralism became recognized as the predominant social characteristic. The formal recognition of this new social context supports a different fundamental orientation with respect to the juridical application of immutable natural law principles. Therefore, the “due limits” inherent in religious freedom must be prudentially applied in an analogical manner according to the requirements of a given social context (CCC #2109). What this means is that the “due limits” will be applied differently in the context of a confessional state than in the context of a pluralistic secular state that is lacking true religious unity among the body politic. The Catholic confessional state, for example, will not permit the spread of heresy insofar as it militates against public order and the common good in a social context that is constituted on the very basis of unity in faith. The secular state, on the other hand, constituted on the basis of affinities of nature, will not permit those religious practices that are in latent violation of the natural moral law. Nevertheless, this shift highlighted another discontinuity with respect to the social doctrine on the duties of the (Catholic) state towards the Faith and the Church. The traditional view often presupposed an "ideal" governmental form that considered the civil authority as "secular arm" to the spiritual authority. This model considered the faithful and the citizen as equivalent terms and it implied the use of coercion by civil authorities in order to protect the Faith from the spread of heresy and to advance the interests of the Church. Vatican II has effectively given a new application to the immutable principles in light of modern circumstances. The civil authorities still have the same duties towards religious truth. These duties, however, are now fulfilled by the Christian faithful (including political authorities) in an organic manner and without direct recourse to coercive measures. The use of coercion remains legitimate, however, should a particular religious practice go beyond the "due-limits" established by law in view of the common good (CCC 2109).

In summary, we must affirm the continuity in immutable principles while also recognizing the discontinuities that are merely transient and resulting from accidents of history. For example, the social teachings of the Magisterium will often combine elements of both – and it will often become clear only with the passage time which elements are truly immutable (Cf. Donum Veritatis). In addition, we must strive never to over-simplify, distort or exaggerate magisterial teaching according to our own theories or preconceived notions. Of course, the teachings of Pope Pius IX in Quanta Cura and the Syllabus are not immune to similar distortions and exaggerations as was evident at the time (Cf. Dupanloup).

Doctrinal Note on The Participation of Catholics in Political Life
"The teaching on freedom of conscience and on religious freedom does not therefore contradict the condemnation of indifferentism and religious relativism by Catholic doctrine;[30] on the contrary, it is fully in accord with it."

[30] Cf. Pius IX, Encyclical Letter Quanta cura: ASS 3 (1867), 162; Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Immortale Dei: ASS 18 (1885), 170–171; Pius XI, Encyclical Letter Quas primas: AAS 17 (1925), 604–605; Catechism of the Catholic Church, No. 2108; Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration Dominus Iesus, 22.

Bishop's Authority vs. False Collegiality

2011-02-22T13:39:00.001-08:00

Owing in large part to the para-conciliar ideology (hermeneutic of rupture), a false notion of collegiality has crept into the Church that seeks to apply secular political forms to the government of the Church. This false collegiality calls for a progressive vision of "democracy" in the Church at all levels. The concept of the "people of God" was often misinterpreted as "we the People" or understood "in accordance with a merely sociological or political concept." (Cf. Pope Benedict XVI, Address at the Lateran, May 26, 2009) At the highest level, this erroneous view of collegiality seeks to undermine the legitimate authority and primacy of the Pope. This error was already denounced at the time of the Second Vatican Council (Cf. LG, Nota explicativa praevia). Extending to other levels, this false notion of collegiality also seeks to diminish the authority and role of the individual Bishop over his particular Church. In an analogous manner, the office and legitimate authority of the parish rector or pastor is often undermined when "parish councils" operate based on similar mis-guided notions and false ideologies. Within this false ideological vision, the authority of the Bishop in his "See" is exchanged for a "Seat" within his respective Bishop's conference. Pope Benedict reminds Bishops of their individual responsibility within their own particular Church.

Starting afresh from Christ in every area of missionary activity; rediscovering in Jesus the love and salvation given to us by the Father through the Holy Spirit: this is the substance and lifeline of the episcopal mission which makes the Bishop the person primarily responsible for catechesis in his diocese. Indeed, it falls ultimately to him to direct catechesis, surrounding himself with competent and trustworthy co-workers...

Precisely because faith, life, and the celebration of the sacred liturgy—the source of faith and life—are inseparable, there is need for a more correct implementation of the liturgical principles as indicated by the Second Vatican Council, as well as those contained in the Directory for the Pastoral Ministry of Bishops (cf. 145-151), so as to restore to the liturgy its sacred character. It was with this end in view that my Venerable Predecessor on the Chair of Peter, John Paul II, wished "to appeal urgently that the liturgical norms for the celebration of the Eucharist be observed with great fidelity ... Liturgy is never anyone’s private property, be it of the celebrant or of the community in which the mysteries are celebrated" (Encyclical Letter Ecclesia de Eucharistia, 52). For Bishops, who are the "moderators of the Church’s liturgical life", the rediscovery and appreciation of obedience to liturgical norms is a form of witness to the one, universal Church, that presides in charity...

If we are to stay true to our solemn commitment as successors of the Apostles, we Pastors must be faithful servants of the word, eschewing any reductive or mistaken vision of the mission entrusted to us. It is not enough to look at reality solely from the viewpoint of personal faith; we must work with the Gospel in our hands and anchor ourselves in the authentic heritage of the Apostolic Tradition, free from any interpretations motivated by rationalistic ideologies.
Indeed, "within the particular Churches, it is the Bishop’s responsibility to guard and interpret the word of God and to make authoritative judgments as to what is or is not in conformity with it" (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian, 19). As the primary Teacher of faith and doctrine, the Bishop will rely on collaboration with the theologian, who, in order "to be faithful to his role of service to the truth, must take into account the proper mission of the Magisterium and collaborate with it" (ibid., 20). The duty to preserve the deposit of faith and safeguard its unity calls for strict vigilance so that the faith may be "preserved and handed down with fidelity and so that particular insights are clearly integrated into the one Gospel of Christ" (Directory for the Pastoral Ministry of Bishops, 126). This, therefore, is the enormous responsibility you have assumed as formators of your people, and especially of the priests and religious under your care. (Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Bishops of Brazil, May 11, 2007)

Full Communion vs. Partial Communion

2011-02-11T14:52:00.001-08:00

There is not a little confusion on the concept of full communion vs. partial communion with the Church. Specifically, what does it mean to be in partial or imperfect communion with the Church? Is this in fact possible? This question has some relation to the canonical status of the Society of St. Pius X (SSPX) and recently there has been some controversy on the question of whether or not the SSPX in fact enjoys "full communion" with the Church. For example, Pope Benedict XVI summarizes the situation from the perspective of the Holy See within the context of the remission of the excommunications and reorganization of the Ecclesia Dei Commission in view of the subsequent doctrinal discussions:

In the same spirit and with the same commitment to encouraging the resolution of all fractures and divisions in the Church and to healing a wound in the ecclesial fabric that was more and more painfully felt, I wished to remit the excommunication of the four Bishops illicitly ordained by Archbishop Lefebvre. With this decision I intended to remove an impediment that might have jeopardized the opening of a door to dialogue and thereby to invite the Bishops and the "Society of St Pius X" to rediscover the path to full communion with the Church. As I explained in my Letter to the Catholic Bishops of last 10 March, the remission of the excommunication was a measure taken in the context of ecclesiastical discipline to free the individuals from the burden of conscience constituted by the most serious of ecclesiastical penalties. However, the doctrinal questions obviously remain and until they are clarified the Society has no canonical status in the Church and its ministers cannot legitimately exercise any ministry. (Ecclesiae Unitatem)

Full Communion

Before taking up the question of partial communion, it seems worthwhile to take a brief look at the notion of full communion. Basically, those that are fully incorporated into the Church enjoy a threefold bond of unity with the Church: (1) unity of faith; (2) unity of sacraments; (3) unity of ecclesiastical government in communion with the successor of St. Peter.

What are these bonds of unity? Above all, charity "binds everything together in perfect harmony."But the unity of the pilgrim Church is also assured by visible bonds of communion:
- profession of one faith received from the Apostles;
- common celebration of divine worship, especially of the sacraments;
- apostolic succession through the sacrament of Holy Orders, maintaining the fraternal concord of God's family. (CCC, 815)

Fully incorporated into the society of the Church are those who, possessing the Spirit of Christ, accept all the means of salvation given to the Church together with her entire organization, and who - by the bonds constituted by the profession of faith, the sacraments, ecclesiastical government, and communion - are joined in the visible structure of the Church of Christ, who rules her through the Supreme Pontiff and the bishops. Even though incorporated into the Church, one who does not however persevere in charity is not saved. He remains indeed in the bosom of the Church, but 'in body' not 'in heart.' (CCC, 837)

The Human Family

If all three of these bonds are missing then there is a complete lack of communion. On the other hand, if there are only partial defects while other elements or bonds of unity remain in tact then the communion with the Church is considered more-or-less imperfect (not full). What this implies is that the question of communion (or lack thereof) is not always answered with a binary (all-or-nothing) solution (e.g., analogous to being half-pregnant). Rather, this implies the possibility of degrees of communion with the Church. Therefore, a more fitting analogy would be the various degrees of family relationships. For example, brothers have a closer family bond than first cousins. First cousins have a closer family bond than second cousins, etc. Ultimately, there is a certain bond that extends across the entire human family. What we are dealing with here has to do with variations of degree rather than a simple yes-no problem.

The Family of God

How does one become a member of the family of God or the Church? He does so by entering through the "door" of baptism. Therefore, all of the baptized are related to one another within the family of God. Just as the wayward son still retains a relationship with his kinsmen, even those Christians that belong to dissident sects retain a certain union with the Church: "Validly baptized Protestants are still by virtue of baptism in a certain union with the Church" (Cf. Ketteler). In one sense it is possible to say that heretics, schismatics and the excommunicated are "separated" from the Church and "excluded from her pale." At the same time, however, this is not understood as an absolute separation. Even those responsible for the personal sin of separation still belong in a certain way to the Church and remain "subject to the jurisdiction of the Church" in a manner analogous to how "deserters belong to the army from which they have deserted" (Cf. Catechism of the Council of Trent, art. ix). To put it another way, the prodigal son remains a "brother" to his kinsmen in spite of his "separated" status. Therefore, baptism creates a bond that can never be completely severed.

Baptism makes us members of the Body of Christ: "Therefore . . . we are members one of another." Baptism incorporates us into the Church. From the baptismal fonts is born the one People of God of the New Covenant, which transcends all the natural or human limits of nations, cultures, races, and sexes: "For by one Spirit we were all baptized into one body." (CCC, 1267)
Baptism constitutes the foundation of communion among all Christians, including those who are not yet in full communion with the Catholic Church: "For men who believe in Christ and have been properly baptized are put in some, though imperfect, communion with the Catholic Church. Justified by faith in Baptism, [they] are incorporated into Christ; they therefore have a right to be called Christians, and with good reason are accepted as brothers by the children of the Catholic Church." "Baptism therefore constitutes the sacramental bond of unity existing among all who through it are reborn." (CCC, 1271)

Elementa Sanctificationis et Veritatis

What is true for wayward individuals is also true for dissident groups. Dissident groups retain a certain union with the Catholic Church insofar as they retain Catholic elements of sanctification and truth. These Catholic element may subsists -- in an imperfect and partially debased state -- even outside the visible boundaries of the Catholic Church. Cardinal Journet explains this as follows:

Insofar as the dissident Churches carried away with them fragments of the true Church and still retain genuine Christian elements, something of her nature may still be found there, in a debased state; and therefore also something of her influence. The notes may then in a manner be present, no doubt attenuated and altered, even in the dissident Churches. Far from demonstrating the ineffectiveness of these notes to indicate the true Church, this imperfect presence attests the existence of remnants of the true Church in the very core of the sects that have left her. They enable us to recognize, under the debris, something of the splendor of the original design. Catholic apologists have often recognized the presence of signs of a Christian origin in the separated Churches. They have even proposed to call them "negative notes", that is to say notes accompanying the true Church but insufficient to reveal her. It is, I think, preferable to think of them as debased or mutilated notes. When compared with the notes in their state of perfection and integrity they witness at once to the presence of Christian elements in the dissident Churches and to the alteration they have undergone. One may say, for example, that the Oriental Churches, where the power of order has been validly transmitted, possess a partial and mutilated apostolicity. (Cf. Journet, The Church of the Word Incarnate, Sheed and Ward, 1955, pp. 531-532)

What this means, for example, is that the power of order can survive even the ruptures of schism and heresy. In this case the power of order may exist in a more-or-less debased state insofar as the power of jurisdiction is lacking (following a rupture with the Sovereign Ponfiff). In other words, those lacking this power of jurisdiction cannot legitimately exercise any ministry. Indeed, a certain union exists -- but not the perfection of union insofar as the power of order is exercised in an "uprooted state" or beyond its "proper and natural sphere." Cardinal Journet again explains as follows:

The hierarchy is indivisible. But it can, in certain regions, be broken by force so that fragments of it subsist in a mutilated state beyond the field of the Church. Thus, in lands overrun by schism or by heresy we may find not only the sacramental powers deriving from Baptism and Confirmation, but the hierarchical power of order. The violent disjunction of the power of order from the power of jurisdiction—which latter disappears of itself whenever there is a rupture with the Sovereign Pontiff—its persistence in the uprooted state to which it is then reduced, its transmission, valid but not licit, beyond its proper and natural sphere, is always the sign of a terrible spiritual catastrophe, a partial victory of the spirit of evil over the Church of Christ, which henceforth will move through history as though divided in herself, and become a scandal to the Gentiles. However, the Church is not in reality divided. She is indivisible like the hierarchy from which she is suspended. Peoples who have received her and belonged to her can fall away from her in consequence of schism and heresy; yet, despite failing her in this way, they can still carry away with them some of her treasures and certain relics of her royalty. What then remains of her among them may, at first glance, suggest a division; but to a wider knowledge and a deeper perception these scattered riches will themselves witness to her unicity. They are rays from one same original centre of life and activity. Those who are responsible before God for a schism or a heresy may carry away with them the valid succession of the sacrament of Holy Order. They do so in the darkness of a personal sin by which they partially rend the Church; and insofar as their own hearts are closed to the good influence of the sacraments they are like sick men taking to others medicines which they do not know how to use for their own benefit. But their followers in later times, who inherit a patrimony of schism or heresy from their birth, are not culpable on that account. They can grow in spiritual stature by remaining in good faith. The sanctifying influence of the sacraments, no longer finding the same obstacles in the will, can result in graces of a high order. What they still lack in order to be fully and openly of the Church is the divinely assisted orientation of the jurisdictional power. But, from this standpoint, the uninterrupted transmission of the valid exercise of the power of order within the dissident Churches is a moving witness to the depth of the salvific will of God. By thus continuing to dispense the graces of contact by way of His sacrifice and His sacraments, and thereby closely conforming to Christ many whose spiritual situation is in itself very precarious, He reveals an astonishing design: that of beginning, in a way, to form the Church outside the Church, to collect His "other sheep" as in a flock, and to draw them to the one fold by a strangely powerful ontological desire, a "virtual act" not far removed from ‘act achieved’. (Cf. Journet, The Church of the Word Incarnate, Sheed and Ward, 1955, pp. 504-505)

All of this helps us to avoid the pitfalls of one-sided positions. On one hand, we should not exaggerate the unity that exists between Catholic and non-Catholic Christians. On the other hand, we should not exaggerate the separation that exists between Catholic and non-Catholic Christians. A certain union does not mean full union nor does it mean a complete lack of union. Put another way, one may "affirm correctly that the Church of Christ is present and operative in the churches and ecclesial Communities not yet fully in communion with the Catholic Church, on account of the elements of sanctification and truth that are present in them. Nevertheless, the word “subsists” can only be attributed to the Catholic Church alone precisely because it refers to the mark of unity that we profess in the symbols of the faith (I believe... in the “one” Church); and this “one” Church subsists in the Catholic Church" (CDF, Responses to Some Questions Regarding Certain Aspects of the Doctrine on the Church). But if all of this is true regarding "partial communion" then why does it seem as though the Holy See sometimes puts heavy emphasis on the aspect of separation while in other cases it seems to put the emphasis on the aspect of unity? The answer seems to lie in the particular pastoral (prudential) approach depending on the circumstances. For example, if an individual or group is in the process of a growing separation from the Church then the aspect and consequences of separation will be stressed. On the other hand, if an individual or group is in the process of drawing closer to the Church then there appears to be a greater emphasis and appeal to those bonds of unity that link them to the Church. One could say that this pastoral approach is somewhat analogous to using a "carrot" or "stick" depending on the direction one is moving in relation to communion with the Church.

On Misinterpretations and Clarifications

2011-02-11T09:25:00.001-08:00

The recent speech given by Bishop Athanasius Schneider raises some interesting questions. The call for a new Syllabus of Errors necessarily involves doctrinal clarification and completion insofar as it contradicts specific erroneous opinions and interpretations of doctrine.

“There is need for a new Syllabus, this time directed not so much against errors coming from outside the Church, but against errors spread within the Church on the part of those who maintain a thesis of discontinuity and rupture with its doctrinal, liturgical, and pastoral application. Such a Syllabus would consist of two parts: a part marking errors and a positive part with propositions of doctrinal clarification, completion, and precision.”

In other words, the problem of doctrinal errors within the Church is not a result of a Magisterium teaching erroneous doctrine contrary to Faith and morals. Rather, the problem stems from those erroneous interpretations and applications of the authentic magisterium. But according to some writers the very need for “clarification” or “completion” of some previous magisterial text implies a defect in a given magisterial act. In other words, if the Vatican II documents can be interpreted in an erroneous manner or if they can be augmented by further "clarification" or "completion" then, according to these writers, they must be rejected as defective on the grounds that they are either “ambiguous” or “incomplete” or both.

This conclusion does not seem logical for several reasons. There is no such thing as a text (Divine, Magisterial or otherwise) that is completely immune to abuse or being taken out of its proper context. In other words, readers are often going to read into a document what they are pre-disposed to take away from it. This is simply a reality of human nature and sin. For example, we know from experience that the Bible is subject to many false interpretations. It can easily be abused and taken out of proper context. Yet the fact that the Bible can be understood falsely does not imply any defect in Sacred Scripture. Furthermore, the fact that the Magisterium must subsequently “complete” the doctrine contained in Sacred Scripture and Sacred Tradition by making more explicit what is only implicit does not imply that Divine Revelation is “incomplete” in some way. We can consider another example in the dogma “Outside the Church there is no salvation.” The fact that this dogma was subsequently "clarified" and “completed” -- in the sense of making more explicit what was already implicit -- during the Pontificate of Pius XII does not imply any defect in the dogma itself. It simply supports the fact that humans are capable of reading documents in a one-sided manner and applying mental filters based on what they are pre-disposed to understand. Furthermore, the subsequent “completion” does not imply an “incomplete” doctrine – even if it draws the truth out more explicitly. If we are going to be realistic about it then we should recognize that the role of the Magisterium in this process will continue until the end of time. In every case, the only authentic interpreter of the Magisterium is the Magisterium itself.

In the hermeneutical uproar of contrasting interpretations and in the confusion of pastoral and liturgical applications, the Council itself united with the Pope appears as the one authentic interpreter of the conciliar texts. One could make an analogy with the confused hermeneutical climate of the first centuries of the Church, provoked by arbitrary biblical and doctrinal interpretations on the part of heterodox groups. In his famous work De praescriptione haereticorum Tertullian was able to set against the heretics of various orientations the fact that only the Church is the legitimate owner of the faith, of the word of God, and of tradition. With that in the disputes on true interpretation, the Church can drive the heretics “a limine fori”. Only the Church can say, according to Tertullian: “Ego sum heres Apostolorum” (Praescr., 37, 3). Speaking analogically, only the supreme Magisterium of the Pope or of a future Ecumenical Council will be able to say: “Ego sum heres Concilii Vaticani II”. (Bishop Athanasius Schneider)

A New Syllabus of Errors?

2011-01-21T11:41:00.000-08:00

Catholics are becoming ever more aware of the post-conciliar confusion spread by various forces within the Church supporting a false theology of rupture in contrast to an authentic hermeneutic of continuity. Msgr. Pozzo (Secretary, Ecclesia Dei Commisssion) had recently given a conference that highlighted a number of specific errors with respect to the heremeneutic of rupture or what he also refers to as the para-Conciliar ideology. Msgr. Gherardini's recent book includes an appeal to the Pope to settle the post-concilar confusion in a definitive manner. Now we are beginning to see Bishops step forward that are calling for doctrinal clarification in the wake of all the confusion -- including the formal condemnation of errors with respect to the mis-interpretation or mis-application of the official texts of Vatican II. Bishop Athanasius Schneider has in fact called for the equivalent of a new Syllabus of errors.

What would such a "syllabus" look like? Which specific errors might it include? Would it be accompanied by a new Papal Encyclical (similar to Quanta Cura,1864)? Will it suffer the same risk of mis-interpretation and mis-application as the original Syllabus? The Syllabus of 1864 contained a list of modern errors compiled and formulated by the Vatican from various Papal Allocutions, Encyclicals and Apostolic Letters given during the Pontificate of Pope Pius IX. If a new Syllabus is to follow this pattern it will likely contain a listing of many erroneous (condemned) propositions taken from the Papal magisterium in recent years. Therefore, I think we could gather some hints of what it may contain by looking at the various statements and doctrinal notes of clarification already issued by the Holy See in recent years. The following points of doctrine (in no particular order) are certainly good candidates for such a syllabus:

1) Therefore, the theory of the limited, incomplete, or imperfect character of the revelation of Jesus Christ, which would be complementary to that found in other religions, is contrary to the Church's faith. Such a position would claim to be based on the notion that the truth about God cannot be grasped and manifested in its globality and completeness by any historical religion, neither by Christianity nor by Jesus Christ. (Dominus Iesus, 6)

2) To introduce any sort of separation between the Word and Jesus Christ is contrary to the Christian faith... Jesus is the Incarnate Word — a single and indivisible person... Christ is none other than Jesus of Nazareth; he is the Word of God made man for the salvation of all... In the process of discovering and appreciating the manifold gifts — especially the spiritual treasures — that God has bestowed on every people, we cannot separate those gifts from Jesus Christ, who is at the centre of God's plan of salvation. It is likewise contrary to the Catholic faith to introduce a separation between the salvific action of the Word as such and that of the Word made man. With the incarnation, all the salvific actions of the Word of God are always done in unity with the human nature that he has assumed for the salvation of all people. The one subject which operates in the two natures, human and divine, is the single person of the Word. Therefore, the theory which would attribute, after the incarnation as well, a salvific activity to the Logos as such in his divinity, exercised “in addition to” or “beyond” the humanity of Christ, is not compatible with the Catholic faith. (Dominus Iesus, 10)

3) There are also those who propose the hypothesis of an economy of the Holy Spirit with a more universal breadth than that of the Incarnate Word, crucified and risen. This position also is contrary to the Catholic faith, which, on the contrary, considers the salvific incarnation of the Word as a trinitarian event. (Dominus Iesus, 12)

4) Although participated forms of mediation of different kinds and degrees are not excluded, they acquire meaning and value only from Christ's own mediation, and they cannot be understood as parallel or complementary to his. Hence, those solutions that propose a salvific action of God beyond the unique mediation of Christ would be contrary to Christian and Catholic faith. (Dominus Iesus, 14)

5) Those theses are contrary to Catholic faith which "deny the unicity of the relationship which Christ and the Church have with the kingdom of God." (Dominus Iesus, 19)

6) It is "contrary to the faith to consider the Church as one way of salvation alongside those constituted by the other religions, seen as complementary to the Church or substantially equivalent to her, even if these are said to be converging with the Church toward the eschatological kingdom of God." (Dominus Iesus, 21)

7) The interpretation of those who would derive from the formula subsistit in the thesis that the one Church of Christ could subsist also in non-Catholic Churches and ecclesial communities is therefore contrary to the authentic meaning of Lumen gentium. (Dominus Iesus, note 56)

8) With the coming of the Saviour Jesus Christ, God has willed that the Church founded by him be the instrument for the salvation of all humanity (cf. Acts 17:30-31). This truth of faith does not lessen the sincere respect which the Church has for the religions of the world, but at the same time, it rules out, in a radical way, that mentality of indifferentism “characterized by a religious relativism which leads to the belief that ‘one religion is as good as another'”. If it is true that the followers of other religions can receive divine grace, it is also certain that objectively speaking they are in a gravely deficient situation in comparison with those who, in the Church, have the fullness of the means of salvation. (Dominus Iesus, 22)

9) Inter-religious dialogue, therefore, as part of her evangelizing mission, is just one of the actions of the Church in her mission ad gentes. Equality, which is a presupposition of inter-religious dialogue, refers to the equal personal dignity of the parties in dialogue, not to doctrinal content, nor even less to the position of Jesus Christ — who is God himself made man — in relation to the founders of the other religions. Indeed, the Church, guided by charity and respect for freedom, must be primarily committed to proclaiming to all people the truth definitively revealed by the Lord, and to announcing the necessity of conversion to Jesus Christ and of adherence to the Church through Baptism and the other sacraments, in order to participate fully in communion with God, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Thus, the certainty of the universal salvific will of God does not diminish, but rather increases the duty and urgency of the proclamation of salvation and of conversion to the Lord Jesus Christ.
(Dominus Iesus, 22)

10) In accordance with Catholic doctrine, it must be held that «whatever the Spirit brings about in human hearts and in the history of peoples, in cultures and religions, serves as a preparation for the Gospel (cf. Dogmatic Constitution Lumen gentium, 16)». It is therefore legitimate to maintain that the Holy Spirit accomplishes salvation in non-Christians also through those elements of truth and goodness present in the various religions; however, to hold that these religions, considered as such, are ways of salvation, has no foundation in Catholic theology, also because they contain omissions, insufficiencies and errors regarding fundamental truths about God, man and the world. Furthermore, the fact that the elements of truth and goodness present in the various world religions may prepare peoples and cultures to receive the salvific event of Jesus Christ does not imply that the sacred texts of these religions can be considered as complementary to the Old Testament, which is the immediate preparation for the Christ event. (CDF, Notification on book by Father Jacques Dupuis, 8)

11) The search for Christian unity has not a few obstacles before it. In the first place, to be rejected is an erroneous view of ecumenism, which induces to a certain doctrinal indifference that attempts to level, in an a-critical Ireneism, all "opinions" in a sort of ecclesiological relativism. (Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Brazilian Episcopal Conference, September 10, 2010)

12) Union with the Catholic Church is the goal of ecumenism—one could put, “we phrase it that way”. Yet the very process of working towards union works a change in churches and ecclesial communities that engage one another in dialogue, in actual instances of entering into communion do indeed transform the Catholic Church by way of enrichment. Let me add right away that when I say enrichment I am referring not to any addition of essential elements of sanctification and truth to the Catholic Church. Christ has endowed her with all the essential elements. I am referring to the addition of modes of expression of these essential elements, modes which enhance everyone’s appreciation of the inexhaustible treasures bestowed on the Church by her divine founder. (Cardinal Levada, Address given at Queen's University in Kingston, March 6, 2010)

13) Basic decisions, therefore, continue to be well-grounded, whereas the way they are applied to new contexts can change. Thus, for example, if religious freedom were to be considered an expression of the human inability to discover the truth and thus become a canonization of relativism, then this social and historical necessity is raised inappropriately to the metaphysical level and thus stripped of its true meaning. Consequently, it cannot be accepted by those who believe that the human person is capable of knowing the truth about God and, on the basis of the inner dignity of the truth, is bound to this knowledge. It is quite different, on the other hand, to perceive religious freedom as a need that derives from human coexistence, or indeed, as an intrinsic consequence of the truth that cannot be externally imposed but that the person must adopt only through the process of conviction. (Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Roman Curia, December 22, 2005)

14) In this regard, it is helpful to recall a truth which today is often not perceived or formulated correctly in public opinion: the right to freedom of conscience and, in a special way, to religious freedom, taught in the Declaration Dignitatis humanae of the Second Vatican Council, is based on the ontological dignity of the human person and not on a non-existent equality among religions or cultural systems of human creation.Reflecting on this question, Paul VI taught that «in no way does the Council base this right to religious freedom on the fact that all religions and all teachings, including those that are erroneous, would have more or less equal value; it is based rather on the dignity of the human person, which demands that he not be subjected to external limitations which tend to constrain the conscience in its search for the true religion or in adhering to it». The teaching on freedom of conscience and on religious freedom does not therefore contradict the condemnation of indifferentism and religious relativism by Catholic doctrine; on the contrary, it is fully in accord with it. (CDF, Doctrinal Note on some questions regarding Participation in Political Life)

15) In fact, in the proper sense, sister Churches are exclusively particular Churches (or groupings of particular Churches; for example, the Patriarchates or Metropolitan provinces) among themselves. It must always be clear, when the expression sister Churches is used in this proper sense, that the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Universal Church is not sister but mother of all the particular Churches. One may also speak of sister Churches, in a proper sense, in reference to particular Catholic and non-catholic Churches; thus the particular Church of Rome can also be called the sister of all other particular Churches. However, as recalled above, one cannot properly say that the Catholic Church is the sister of a particular Church or group of Churches. This is not merely a question of terminology, but above all of respecting a basic truth of the Catholic faith: that of the unicity of the Church of Jesus Christ. In fact, there is but a single Church, and therefore the plural term Churches can refer only to particular Churches. Consequently, one should avoid, as a source of misunderstanding and theological confusion, the use of formulations such as «our two Churches,» which, if applied to the Catholic Church and the totality of Orthodox Churches (or a single Orthodox Church), imply a plurality not merely on the level of particular Churches, but also on the level of the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church confessed in the Creed, whose real existence is thus obscured. Finally, it must also be borne in mind that the expression sister Churches in the proper sense, as attested by the common Tradition of East and West, may only be used for those ecclesial communities that have preserved a valid Episcopate and Eucharist. (CDF, Note on the expression "Sister Churches", June 30, 2000)

16) Contrary to many unfounded interpretations, therefore, the change from “est” to “subsistit” does not signify that the Catholic Church has ceased to regard herself as the one true Church of Christ. Rather it simply signifies a greater openness to the ecumenical desire to recognise truly ecclesial characteristics and dimensions in the Christian communities not in full communion with the Catholic Church, on account of the “plura elementa sanctificationis et veritatis” present in them. Consequently, although there is only one Church which “subsists” in one unique historical subject there are true ecclesial realities which exist beyond its visible boundaries. (CDF, Commentary on the Document: Responses to some Questions Regarding Certain Aspects of the Doctrine of the Church)

17) It should be made clear that the word "participation" does not refer to mere external activity during the celebration. In fact, the active participation called for by the Council must be understood in more substantial terms, on the basis of a greater awareness of the mystery being celebrated and its relationship to daily life…The beauty and the harmony of the liturgy find eloquent expression in the order by which everyone is called to participate actively. This entails an acknowledgment of the distinct hierarchical roles involved in the celebration. It is helpful to recall that active participation is not per se equivalent to the exercise of a specific ministry. The active participation of the laity does not benefit from the confusion arising from an inability to distinguish, within the Church's communion, the different functions proper to each one. There is a particular need for clarity with regard to the specific functions of the priest. He alone, and no other, as the tradition of the Church attests, presides over the entire eucharistic celebration, from the initial greeting to the final blessing. In virtue of his reception of Holy Orders, he represents Jesus Christ, the head of the Church, and, in a specific way, also the Church herself. (Pope Benedict XVI, Sacramentum Caritatis)

(To be continued...)

True Humanity

2011-01-06T13:28:00.000-08:00

With some encouragement I decided to take action on an idea that has been in the back of my mind for some time. I created a new blog called True Humanity that will attempt to address many of the themes covered in this blog -- but in a very different (and hopefully complimentary) manner. True Humanity will explore perennial questions of philosophy -- but through the eyes of popular culture (music, film, literature, etc.). Check out the opening post here that explains the purpose of the new blog. True Humanity will certainly not appeal to everyone but it may be of some interest to those who have little desire to read through some of the more dense material typically found here.

Starlight

2010-12-08T21:19:00.001-08:00

Slash - Starlight (feat. Myles Kennedy)

The Sources of Morality

2010-11-26T09:22:00.001-08:00

Why is it that the secular media so often misunderstands Papal statements regarding basic questions of morality? Furthermore, why does it often seem as if Catholics themselves are pitted against each other on various moral questions? For example, consider the recent controversy over comments made by Pope Benedict XVI regarding the question of condom usage in exceptional circumstances.¹ Certainly there can be a variety of reasons²for such disconnects, however, much of the confusion and controversy can be resolved by having recourse to the classical distinctions on the sources of morality. The Church teaches that there are three basic components that together define whether a particular action is morally good or morally evil.

The morality of human acts depends on:

- the object chosen;

- the end in view or the intention;

- the circumstances of the action.

The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the "sources," or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts. (CCC 1750)

These three sources of morality need to be considered together in order to distinguish good acts from evil acts. The goodness of all three together are required for the human act to be good. On the other hand, a defect in any one of the three elements can alone qualify the human act as evil.³

A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting "in order to be seen by men").

The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil. (CCC 1755)

Moral Object
The moral object defines the “what” of a given human act and is morally specified by the "proximate end of a deliberate decision."⁴ Therefore, the “object” here is not understood in the material sense (e.g., a gun or a condom). Neither is the "object" understood as a generic "act" exclusively in the physical sense (e.g., the physical act of shooting a gun at a person). Rather, the “object” of morality is the interior “object of the will-act, that act which the will chooses to perform, and this is nothing else but the act itself which is deliberately willed." (Cf. Fagothey, Right and Reason, TAN, p. 146)

The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience. (CCC 1751)

Moral objects, therefore, are specific acts that are deliberately willed (i.e., moral objects are expressed by verbs rather than nouns). Many moral objects (interior will-acts) are either “good” or “evil” by their very nature. For example, intrinsically good objects include such things as prayer, charity, etc. On the other hand, there are intrinsically evil acts such as lying, cheating, stealing, fornication, contraception and murder. Such concrete actions are “always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil” (CCC 1755).⁵ Furthermore, such actions can never be justified by appealing to a “good intention” or other “circumstances” (CCC 1756). Finally, there are morally indifferent actions such as walking, sitting, running, etc. The morality of such acts will ultimately be derived from the other two sources of morality: the intention and circumstances (Cf. Fagothey).

It is important to properly identify the moral object in a given human act. Confusion on this point will inevitably lead to misunderstandings. For example, in the context of the recent controversy (mentioned above), the Pope was not referring to the intrinsically evil act of contraception (an act rendering procreation impossible within the context of the conjugal act) (CCC 2370).⁶ Rather, the Holy Father was commenting on prophylaxis (a preventative act against the spread of infection). This is the moral object (will-act) that the Pope was addressing.

Intention
The intention defines the ultimate “why” of a given human act. It is sometimes referred to as a motive, (remote) end, purpose or goal of a given action.

In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an action. The end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the action. The intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity. It aims at the good anticipated from the action undertaken. Intention is not limited to directing individual actions, but can guide several actions toward one and the same purpose; it can orient one's whole life toward its ultimate end. For example, a service done with the end of helping one's neighbor can at the same time be inspired by the love of God as the ultimate end of all our actions. One and the same action can also be inspired by several intentions, such as performing a service in order to obtain a favor or to boast about it. (CCC 1752)

A good intention, however, does not justify an intrinsically evil act. Therefore, the end does not justify the means.

A good intention (for example, that of helping one's neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation. On the other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving). (CCC 1753)

For example, in the recent controversy, the Pope recognizes the “good intention” behind an act that seeks to protect the health of another.⁷ At the same time, he does not imply that this “good intention” can be used to justify another intrinsically evil act (fornication). Rather, he indicates that this “good intention” can be a first step towards a moralization of sexuality - the ultimate solution to HIV and related problems.

Circumstances
Moral circumstances answer those relevant questions that give further context and meaning to the human act: who? where? when? how? how often? by what means?, etc. The circumstances include all of the "accidentals" that further determine the morality of the act.

The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent's responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil. (CCC 1754)

The Pope’s recent comments presupposed a given context or set of circumstances. The Pope did not address the question of condom usage - as a prophylactic - within the context of the conjugal or marital act. On the contrary, the setting of the “act” falls within the wider context of an intrinsically evil act (fornication). These circumstances make it clear that the “act” in question (however good and well intentioned) does not justify the act of fornication (an intrinsically evil act). Suppose we consider the same “act” within the wider context of the conjugal act. Certainly, this raises other problems - such as the resulting impediment to procreation (intended or unintended). In this case, moral theologians will likely debate⁸ the application of the principle of double-effect: "The Church does not consider at all illicit the use of those therapeutic means necessary to cure bodily diseases, even if a foreseeable impediment to procreation should result there from--provided such impediment is not directly intended for any motive whatsoever." (Humanae Vitae)

Final Observations
These basic principles help us to better understand complex moral questions. For example, we can apply some of the principles above in order to distinguish various types of “condom usage.” In the first place, we know that a “condom” is a thing rather than an act or moral object. Therefore, the intent (both the proximate end as well as the remote or ultimate end) and circumstances become decisive in order to determine the morality of condom usage in this or that case. For example, condom usage as “contraception” is intrinsically evil since it “entails a disorder of the will.” Alternatively, a condom may be used in a morally indifferent manner - such as to carry water on a camping trip. Finally, a condom may be used as a prophylactic in order to prevent infection. Now, the moral status of this last type of “act” appears to be a debated question among theologians. The “object”, in itself, appears to be good, however, the question of morality must be determined by considering also the intention and the circumstances. Even when coupled with a “good intention” (e.g., protecting the health of another) the circumstances will become the decisive factor. Therefore, the act would appear to be evil (even if only a lesser evil) if carried out within the context of an intrinsically evil act (e.g., fornication).⁹ On the other hand, the act could be good if carried out within the context of another good act (e.g., conjugal act) - but only insofar as the principle of double-effect applies.

notes

¹On one hand, the Pope affirms the general rule that condoms are neither a practical nor a moral solution to the evil of HIV infection. On the other hand, the Pope does not rule out the possibility of exceptions (exceptional cases) to the general rule. In this sense, Pope Benedict XVI, affirms BOTH the general rule AND the possibility of exceptions to the general rule in extraordinary cases. An official note of clarification, issued by the Holy See Press Office, indicated that the comments of the Pope should not be interpreted as a "revolutionary change" to Church teaching. Rather, the comments should be understood as an informal and non-magisterial "contribution to help us clarify and more deeply understand a long-debated question."

²For example, many will instinctively either exaggerate or minimize the words of the Pope in accordance with their own particular ideology and what they are pre-disposed to hear from the mouth of the Pope.

³Fr. Finigan has noted the latin saying: "Bonum ex integra causa malum ex quocumque defecu." http://the-hermeneutic-of-continuity.blogspot.com/2010/11/bonum-ex-integra-causa-malum-ex.html

⁴In other words, the moral object entails "what" the acting person directly intends to do. The "intent" in this respect shapes the moral character of the act itself, however, it remains distinct from "intention", "motive" or "end" in the remote sense (the ultimate "why" behind the act). For example, the deliberate intent to directly kill an innocent person is a moral object distinct from the deliberate intent to kill in self defense. The moral distinction between these (even if they appear outwardly to be the same "act" in the physical sense) is not circumstancial and accidental but essential to the moral character of the will-act in itself. Furthermore, these moral objects are distinct from their ultimate "intention" or motive (e.g., to murder for purposes of revenge, etc.).
"In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person. The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behaviour. To the extent that it is in conformity with the order of reason, it is the cause of the goodness of the will; it perfects us morally, and disposes us to recognize our ultimate end in the perfect good, primordial love. By the object of a given moral act, then, one cannot mean a process or an event of the merely physical order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person." (VS, 78)

⁵A disordered interior will-act is one that does not conform to the objective order of reason. In this sense the moral object contains both a subjective and objective aspect. The subjective aspect involves the interior will-act (including its proximate end) of the acting person: "The will act becomes good or bad inasmuch as it embraces an object, not as the object is in itself, but as the object is presented by the intellect as good or bad" (Cf. Higgins, Man as Man: The Science and Art of Ethics, TAN, p. 135). The objective aspect relates to the objective norm of morality: the order of reason. Good acts involve a proper alignment or conformity between the subjective and objective aspects. The opposite is true for evil acts.

⁶"With regard to intrinsically evil acts, and in reference to contraceptive practices whereby the conjugal act is intentionally rendered infertile, Pope Paul VI teaches: 'Though it is true that sometimes it is lawful to tolerate a lesser moral evil in order to avoid a greater evil or in order to promote a greater good, it is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it (cf. Rom 3:8) — in other words, to intend directly something which of its very nature contradicts the moral order, and which must therefore be judged unworthy of man, even though the intention is to protect or promote the welfare of an individual, of a family or of society in general'". (Cf. Veritas Splendor, 80)

⁷Some acts can have multiple intentions. For example, one intention may be "proximate" and secondary while another is "remote" and primary. Additionally, one of the intentions may be good while the other is bad. Furthermore, the bad intention may be gravely evil (mortal sin) or only somewhat bad (venial sin). All of these factors influence the morality of the act. For example, the proximate intention may be good (protecting the health of another) while the remote intention is evil (protecting the health of another in order to sustain repeat business for prostitution).

⁸The recent comments by the Holy Father have re-ignited debates on analagous questions. Sandro Magister has done a good job of presenting both sides of the debate within the Catholic Church: http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/1346021?eng=y

⁹I am considering this specific act here together with the act of fornication as one complete act. It is possible, however, to consider these as two distinct will-acts that can be evaluated each on their own merits (prophylaxis vs. fornication). If considered in this manner - where the act of prophylaxis is considered abstractly and purely on its own merits - then one may conclude that this "will-act" has some basis (Cf. Fagothey, p. 152). It seems probable that the Pope had this distinct will-act in mind (considering the act of fornication as a separate and distinct will-act) when suggesting that the "act" (an act of "responsibility" as a first step towards a humanization of sexuality) may have some moral basis or justification. Considering the morality of the "act" apart from the evil of fornication seems to be suggested by the scenario given by the Pope. The Holy Father is considering the extraordinary circumstances of a prostitute -- where human sexuality is likened to a self-admininstered drug (e.g., circumstances analogous to drug addicts sharing clean needles in order to prevent infection). Under this set of circumstances the habitual nature of the sin can affect the voluntariness of an act (cf. ST i-ii, 10, 3). Therefore, the Pope, under these extraordinary set of circumstances, seems to view the positive "act" (i.e., an act capable of being ordered to the good) as one that is morally distinct from the intrinsically evil act of fornication. In this sense, intrinsically evil acts can never be acts of "responsibility" ordered to a greater humanization. On the contrary, intrinsically evil acts are always ordered towards de-humanization.

Bishop Ketteler: An Early Perspective on Ecumenism

2010-09-28T14:39:00.001-07:00

The following is an extract dealing with the theme of Christian unity or “Ecumenism” taken from the concluding chapter of "Freedom, Authority and the Church" (1862) by Bishop Wilhelm Emmanuel von Kettler. The highly esteemed 19th century Bishop of Mainz makes four fundamental points: (1) The tragic division within Christendom impedes the work of the Church and enables great evil to advance in the world. (2) All Christians of good will ought to join in a "common prayer" and "unanimous petition" for the reunion of the Christian confessions, according to some "universally accetable" plan. (3) For our part, Catholics should work to remove any obstacle to such unity by giving examples of saintly living and also by avoiding scandals and needless controversies among ourselves. (4) "Catholics may never conceal the truth that such a reunion can mean nothing else but a return to the Catholic Church." (Text taken from "The Social Teachings of Willhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler", University Press of America, 1981, Translation by Rupert J. Ederer. Emphasis and footnotes mine.)

That wisdom which exists at the throne of God, which dwells in Heaven at the very Godhead, that Holy Spirit from on high personally came down to man in the person of Christ our Lord. He Himself became the teacher of those who dwell here on earth so that they could mend their ways, and He sent the Holy Spirit so that man would continue to learn what is pleasing to God. Along with true wisdom, He also bestowed upon mankind the greatest benefits which could affect its sanctification, Divine Love and the highest possible unity. His entire exalted task is summed up in the words which he spoke to His Father on the night before He died: “It is not for them that I pray; I pray for those who are to find faith in me through their word; that they may all be one; that they too may be one in us, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in Thee…(John 17: 20-21). God in His mercy could confer no higher benefit on mankind. Therein is contained everything. God is the source of all truth, all love, and all happiness. However, mankind is enabled to share in these great benefits to the fullest extent only because Christ united man with God Himself.

This descent of Divine Wisdom and Love from Heaven has not enjoyed the triumphant success which it should have on earth among the human beings which they were to liberate and make happy. All too often men have rejected them; they loved darkness more than they loved the Light (John 3:19). They nailed Christ to the Cross, and the same spirit which inspired that foul deed has worked unceasingly ever since to attack and damage Christ’s Church. It prevented the Church from sharing her boundless treasures of God’s love and wisdom with mankind. It has sundered Christianity itself and severed members from the Body of Christ.

Hence, we see the tragic division of the Christian churches[1] in the East and in the West, which has so enormously impeded the Church in her appointed task down through the centuries.[2] Hence we have the unfortunate split of the Church in the West, which has for 300 years likewise eaten away at our own innards and wrought great havoc. Hence there are the countless divisions in Protestantism itself that were prevented from proliferating even further only when temporal authorities erected some kind of external obstructions. Hence, there is, finally, the newest enemy which has come into the world with deism and which has infiltrated Christendom and destroyed it from within. It began by rejecting supernatural revelation, i.e., by denying a relationship between God and man that goes beyond nature and unaided reason. Thereby Christ with His divine mission here on earth was stripped of its meaning. He was no longer the wisdom which dwells at the very throne of God and condescended to reach down to mankind. From that denial of supernatural revelation, the same spirit of the times proceeded to the denial of any supernatural order and finally to a denial of the very notion of a supernatural God. That is the spirit with which we now stand face to face. Serious souls like the Protestant Guizot have gone so far as to divide mankind into two camps. In the one are those who believe in a personal God, and in the other are those who deny God’s very existence.

This unhappy situation causes all the more concern to Christians over the division within Christendom. They are coming to recognize that the nameless horror whereby, 1800 years after Christ lived on this earth, fools are able to proclaim in the very midst of Christian society that there is no God, not only in their hearts but from the very roof tops and from academic chairs, was made possible only by the division within Christendom itself. Even Catholics ought to share in this deep suffering with all of their hearts and souls. What a pathetic contrast between what Christ wished when he prayed, “That they may all be one; that they too may be one in us, as thou, Father art in me, and I in Thee…,” and the condition in which Christianity now finds itself.

It is our obligation, so far as any of us is able, to do everything in our power to bring about the reunion of Christians.[3] A structure, no matter how great, is made of small stones, and no Catholic should shirk from his obligation to work for this reunion, no matter how little he feels he may be able to contribute.

The first duty is to pray for the reunion of the Christian confessions. May God show us ways and means to spread this unanimous petition among all Christian souls who yearn for Christian reunion, according to some universally acceptable plan.[4] It is a petition which carries with it the great promise of Christ who Himself guaranteed: “Believe me, you have only to make any request of the Father in my name, and he will grant it to you” (John 16:23). What great potency that prayer will have, therefore, if all of us unite with Christ as our High Priest, and join Him in that prayer which was his final and ultimate petition here on earth, “Ut omnes unum sint – that they may all be one; that they too may be one in us, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in Thee…” The whole idea has created much excitement in recent years. Pray that it will receive an ever warmer, more universal, more heartfelt acceptance. We appeal to all true Christian hearts who read these lines to become apostles and spread this word about the circles in which they move.[5] An attempt has been made recently by certain leading individuals toward the reunion of the separated brethren by personal meeting and dialogue.[6] As happy as we are about such efforts, we have to express misgivings as to whether it is in God’s plan to bless them with success.[7] What would please us most of all would be if men of all Christian confessions could address themselves to the problem of establishing a society for common prayer[8] among all of those who still believe that Christ was the incarnate Son of God.[9] We believe that God could not refuse to hear the common prayer, “Ut omnes unum sint – That all may be one.”

The second method of working for Christian reunion consists in our avoiding all controversies among ourselves and in trying to depict the great supernatural truths of Christianity by the way we live our lives. Nothing so hinders the world – to the extent that good will is present – from recognizing the Divine truth in the Catholic Church as when the sins of her children prevent this truth from becoming a living presence in the world. Practically all of the accusations that are made against the Church are based on misunderstanding; and the sources of such misunderstanding are, by and large, the imperfections and sins of the Church’s members.

It is not yet enough for us in our time to oppose the controversies and irregularities with untiring zeal. We have to strive to lead lives that reflect the highest Christian virtue and to present an example of the supernatural life that has been at all times the full blossoming of Christianity, to a world which has gone so far as to deny the existence of the supernatural. This has always been the great strength of Christianity, and therein lies its power to conquer the world. It is a rejection of the whole wonderful history of the Church to suppose that it is enough to just promote a condition of natural justice and to lead commonplace lives, avoiding the worst excesses, and that by such behavior we can overcome the spirit that is now dominant in the world. In every century, beginning with the age of bloody martyrdom and of the anchorites in the wilderness – whenever Christendom achieved notable triumphs – the performance of its saints was the deciding factor. Holy bishops and priests, monks and lay people overcame the world, and they were the ones who spread Christ’s kingdom. That is how it will always be.[10] We have to break away from the comfortable pattern of routine living and abandon ourselves to the ennobling grace of truly holy living if we really hope to achieve what our hearts crave for, the spread of Christ’s kingdom and the reunion of the Christian churches. The cultivation of such a holy life is, first of all, the responsibility of the religious orders, and that is the reason why we insist on the freedom to establish religious orders, because they ought to be seedbeds of sanctity. After the religious orders, the priesthood must be an instrument whereby the supernatural light must shine forth so that it may achieve the mission which Christ gave it. What a challenge faces us! Would that we might measure up to it. That will be accomplished best, it is my deep-seated conviction, if priests are again united in heart and mind.[11] That has always been the life-style prompted by the Holy Spirit in the Church for fostering the more perfect, supernatural, priestly life.

Whatever great zeal we may have for effecting a reunion of all Christian churches, we Catholics may never conceal the truth that such reunion can mean nothing else but a return to the Catholic Church.[12]

[1] A certain unity between the Catholic Church and dissident churches may subsist, however, in an imperfect state: “Insofar as the dissident Churches carried away with them fragments of the true Church and still retain genuine Christian elements, something of her nature may still be found there, in a debased state; and therefore also something of her influence. The notes may then in a manner be present, no doubt attenuated and altered, even in the dissident Churches. Far from demonstrating the ineffectiveness of these notes to indicate the true Church, this imperfect presence attests the existence of remnants of the true Church in the very core of the sects that have left her. They enable us to recognize, under the debris, something of the splendor of the original design. Catholic apologists have often recognized the presence of signs of a Christian origin in the separated Churches. They have even proposed to call them "negative notes", that is to say notes accompanying the true Church but insufficient to reveal her. It is, I think, preferable to think of them as debased or mutilated notes. When compared with the notes in their state of perfection and integrity they witness at once to the presence of Christian elements in the dissident Churches and to the alteration they have undergone. One may say, for example, that the Oriental Churches, where the power of order has been validly transmitted, possess a partial and mutilated apostolicity.” (Cf. Journet, The Church of the Word Incarnate, Sheed and Ward, 1955, pp. 531-532)

[2] This point largely anticipates the Vatican II Decree on Ecumenism (Cf. UR 1)

[3] Pope Benedict XVI gives an historical perspective on the movement for the reunion of Christians: “Men and women formed in the Word of God and in prayer have been artisans of reconciliation and unity in every historical period. It was the way of prayer that opened the path for the ecumenical movement as we know it today. Indeed, from the middle of the 18th century various movements of spiritual renewal came into being, eager to contribute through prayer to the promotion of Christian unity. Groups of Catholics, enlivened by outstanding religious figures, played an active role in such initiatives from the outset. Prayer for unity was also supported by my Venerable Predecessors, such as Pope Leo XIII, who in 1895 was already recommending the introduction of a Novena of Prayer for Christian unity. These endeavours, made in accordance with the possibilities of the Church of that time, intended to put into practice the prayer spoken by Jesus himself in the Upper Room "that they may all be one" (Jn 17: 21). There is thus no genuine ecumenism whose roots are not implanted in prayer.” (Pope Benedict XVI, Homily on the Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul, January 25, 2008)

[4] “When Father Paul Wattson conceived and implemented the octave of prayer - which is regarded as the beginning of the Week of Prayer for Christian Unity as it is currently celebrated - he saw unity as the return of the different churches to the Roman Catholic Church. This influenced his choice of dates for the octave, from 18 January, which was at that time in the Roman Catholic calendar the ‘Feast of the Chair of Peter’, up to 25 January, the Feast of the Conversion of Paul. After the Society of the Atonement had been corporately received into the Roman Catholic Church in 1909, Pope St Pius X gave the octave for unity his official blessing. In the mid-1930’s, Abbé Paul Couturier of Lyons, France, gave a new orientation to the church unity octave. By this time, the observance of the octave had started to spread throughout the Catholic Church and in a small number of Anglican communities sympathetic to reunion with the bishop of Rome; but this approach was rejected on theological grounds by many Christians outside the Roman Catholic Church. Abbé Paul maintained the dates of 18–25 January, but changed the terminology; the ‘Universal Week of Prayer for Christian Unity’ which he promoted was to pray for the unity of the church ‘as Christ wills it’.” (Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, Resources for the Week of Prayer for Christian Unity, 2008)

[5] This appeal to work for Christian unity anticipates the instruction on Ecumenism during the reign of Pius XII: “In order that so noble a work as the "union" of all Christians in one true faith and Church may daily grow into a more conspicuous part of the entire care of souls, and that the whole Catholic people may more earnestly implore this "union" from Almighty God, it will certainly be of assistance that in some appropriate way, for example through Pastoral Letters, the faithful be instructed regarding these questions and projects, the prescriptions of the Church in the matter, and the reasons on which they are based. All, especially priests and religious, should be exhorted and warmly encouraged to be zealous by their prayers and sacrifices to ripen and promote this work, and all should be reminded that nothing more effectively paves the way for the erring to find the truth and to embrace the Church than the faith of Catholics, when it is confirmed by the example of upright living.” (Cf. Instruction from the Holy Office on the Ecumenical Movement, 1949)

[6] Cf. UR 4, 9, 11

[7] There is nothing wrong with dialogue, in itself, for purposes of discovering truth or coming to a deeper understanding of others: “All the aforesaid conferences and meetings, public and non-public, large and small, which are called for the purpose of affording an opportunity for the Catholic and the non-Catholic party for the sake of discussion to treat of matters of faith and morals, each presenting on even terms the doctrine of his own faith, are subject to the prescriptions of the Church which were recalled to mind in the <Monitum, "Cum compertum>," of this Congregation under date of 5 June, 1948. Hence mixed congresses are not absolutely forbidden; but they are not to be held without the previous permission of the competent Ecclesiastical Authority. The <Monitum>, however, does not apply to catechetical instructions, even when given to many together, nor to conferences in which Catholic doctrine is explained to non-Catholics who are prospective converts: even though the opportunity is afforded for the non-Catholics to explain also the doctrine of their church so that they may understand clearly and thoroughly in what respect it agrees with the Catholic doctrine and in what it differs therefrom.” (Cf. Instruction from the Holy Office on the Ecumenical Movement, 1949) On the other hand, taken to an extreme, this can lead to an attitude that Christian unity can be achieved merely by our own human efforts: “The Council moreover professes its awareness that human powers and capacities cannot achieve this holy objective-the reconciling of all Christians in the unity of the one and only Church of Christ. It is because of this that the Council rests all its hope on the prayer of Christ for the Church, on our Father's love for us, and on the power of the Holy Spirit” (Cf. UR 24).

[8] In this sense, prayer in common includes the possibility of joint-prayer: “Although in all these meetings and conferences any communication whatsoever in worship must be avoided, yet the recitation in common of the Lord's Prayer or of some prayer approved by the Catholic Church, is not forbidden for opening or closing the said meetings.” (Cf. Instruction from the Holy Office on the Ecumenical Movement, 1949)

[9] Later such a “society of common prayer” would be formed according to a “universally acceptable plan” for the reunion of Christians: “In the 1930s, the Octave of Prayer underwent important adaptations subsequent to the impulse given to it in particular by Fr Paul Couturier of Lyons, another great champion of spiritual ecumenism. His invitation "to pray for the unity of the Church as Christ wills it and in accordance with the means he wills" enables Christians of all traditions to join in one prayer for unity.” (Pope Benedict XVI, Homily on the Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul, January 25, 2008)

[10] In this sense, we are not talking about a “fad” or something extrinsic to the Church and her divine mission.

[11] Original note from Ketteler: “See: Lettre de Monseigneur l’Eveque d’Orleans au sujet de la vie et des opuscules d’Holzhauser par l’Abbe Gaduel. Orleans, 1861 pp. I-XXII.”

The implication here is that the priestly power of order can survive even the ruptures of schism and heresy: “The hierarchy is indivisible. But it can, in certain regions, be broken by force so that fragments of it subsist in a mutilated state beyond the field of the Church. Thus, in lands overrun by schism or by heresy we may find not only the sacramental powers deriving from Baptism and Confirmation, but the hierarchical power of order. The violent disjunction of the power of order from the power of jurisdiction—which latter disappears of itself whenever there is a rupture with the Sovereign Pontiff—its persistence in the uprooted state to which it is then reduced, its transmission, valid but not licit, beyond its proper and natural sphere, is always the sign of a terrible spiritual catastrophe, a partial victory of the spirit of evil over the Church of Christ, which henceforth will move through history as though divided in herself, and become a scandal to the Gentiles. However, the Church is not in reality divided. She is indivisible like the hierarchy from which she is suspended. Peoples who have received her and belonged to her can fall away from her in consequence of schism and heresy; yet, despite failing her in this way, they can still carry away with them some of her treasures and certain relics of her royalty. What then remains of her among them may, at first glance, suggest a division; but to a wider knowledge and a deeper perception these scattered riches will themselves witness to her unicity. They are rays from one same original centre of life and activity. Those who are responsible before God for a schism or a heresy may carry away with them the valid succession of the sacrament of Holy Order. They do so in the darkness of a personal sin by which they partially rend the Church; and insofar as their own hearts are closed to the good influence of the sacraments they are like sick men taking to others medicines which they do not know how to use for their own benefit. But their followers in later times, who inherit a patrimony of schism or heresy from their birth, are not culpable on that account. They can grow in spiritual stature by remaining in good faith. The sanctifying influence of the sacraments, no longer finding the same obstacles in the will, can result in graces of a high order.[1048] What they still lack in order to be fully and openly of the Church is the divinely assisted orientation of the jurisdictional power. But, from this standpoint, the uninterrupted transmission of the valid exercise of the power of order within the dissident Churches is a moving witness to the depth of the salvific will of God. By thus continuing to dispense the graces of contact by way of His sacrifice and His sacraments, and thereby closely conforming to Christ many whose spiritual situation is in itself very precarious, He reveals an astonishing design: that of beginning, in a way, to form the Church outside the Church, to collect His "other sheep" as in a flock, and to draw them to the one fold by a strangely powerful ontological desire, a "virtual act" not far removed from ‘act achieved’.” (Cf. Journet, The Church of the Word Incarnate, Sheed and Ward, 1955, pp. 504-505)

[12] Such an ecumenism of “return” essentially entails unity of Faith, Sacraments and Government in communion with the successor of Peter. This “ultimate goal” of Ecumenism as the “restoration of full ecclesial communion” has been stressed recently by Pope Benedict XVI on the occasion of his visit to the United Kingdom: "...The other matter I touched upon in February with the Bishops of England and Wales, when I asked you to be generous in implementing the Apostolic Constitution Anglicanorum Coetibus. This should be seen as a prophetic gesture that can contribute positively to the developing relations between Anglicans and Catholics. It helps us to set our sights on the ultimate goal of all ecumenical activity: the restoration of full ecclesial communion in the context of which the mutual exchange of gifts from our respective spiritual patrimonies serves as an enrichment to us all. Let us continue to pray and work unceasingly in order to hasten the joyful day when that goal can be accomplished." (Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Bishops of England and Wales, September 19, 2010)

Msgr. Gherardini on Vatican II, Continuity and Rupture

2010-08-15T10:54:00.001-07:00

The Ecumenical Vatican Council II: A Much Needed Discussion¹ by Msgr. Brunero Gherardini offers many insights into Vatican II and the post-conciliar era. Specifically, Msgr. Gherardini attempts to analyze key aspects of the Council in order to investigate whether there is substantial continuity or rupture from the previous magisterium. Those looking for definitive and clear-cut answers may be somewhat disappointed in the book as the author does not pretend to provide any solid conclusions to the questions he raises. While the author investigates various themes of the Council and offers his reasoning and opinions – he ultimately defers to the Holy Father by making a humble appeal to settle the question in a definitive manner.² Throughout the work there is a consistent message in favor of a theological hermeneutic of continuity and against a theology of rupture. In some places, however, one can detect the opening to the possibility of some type of discontinuity or rupture. Consequently, this work is likely to be selectively used by advocates of each of the two opposing sides – depending upon their own particular “hermeneutic” – as further “proof” of their own position. Indeed, the author seems to presuppose the necessity of continuity -- while at the same time leaving the door open to the possibility of of some type of rupture.

Continuity or Rupture?
The author’s preface seems to presuppose continuity (ruling out any discontinuity in essentials) with any authentic Ecumenical Council -- including Vatican II.

A Christian, and even more so a priest, and more still a theologian, cannot consider an Ecumenical Council by the same standard as any other historical event. A Council, in fact, is removed from overlapping and interlacing with the social-political events and transcends them all by virtue of its remote origin and its supernatural life-breath: the Holy Spirit promotes it and guides it.

At the same time, there always remains the risk that some will abuse their free-will and resist the Holy Spirit.

This does not mean that the Holy Spirit may not encounter formal or material resistance from the free-willed men who give life to the conciliar event. It is from this possibility that there arises the great risk which casts itself upon the background of the Council – this holds for every Council as such – namely, the possibility that it may even fail in some way.

If an “Ecumenical Council” should deviate from Faith and Morals then it cannot be an authentic Ecumenical Council at all.

Someone has even gone further and has asked if an Ecumenical Council can fall into error in Faith and Morals. The opinions are at variance, but only the possibility of perverse human freedom prevailing against the action of the Holy Spirit should univocally be agreed upon. It is my opinion that this might be able to be verified, but in the very moment it is verified, the Ecumenical Council ceases to be such.

Error in Faith and Morals is formally excluded as a possibility in an authentic Ecumenical Council. At the same time, however, this essential protection from defecting in faith and morals does not eliminate every possible risk.

At any rate, even if error in matters of Faith and Morals must be formally excluded as a possibility in an authentic Council, no one on principle can exclude the possibility of some formulations which are less than pleasing and even not completely in line with those of venerable ecclesiastical Tradition. This is verified when new roads are attempted, enchanted by the siren of novelty and progress. (pp. 28-29)

All of this corresponds very well to the sentiments of Bishop Mario Oliveri expressed in his letter to the author. First, the notion of discontinuity or rupture in the life of the Church is flatly rejected.

Your publication clearly demonstrates that there cannot be other than continuity in the Church – and this clarity of thought is customary for you by virtue of your intellectual acumen and likewise your very extensive experience as a Teacher. The mere thought that there could be “revolution, radical change, substantial mutation” on the level of truth and the supernatural life of the Church already deviates from sound theological reasoning because, as noted earlier, it deviates as well from sound philosophical reasoning. It not only disturbs the faith, but reason as well.

At the same time, we must distinguish between substance and accidents. There can be no question of substantial rupture – even if there can be discontinuity in accidentals.

The discussion is necessarily about continuity in substantialibus, and not in accidentalius; it is about continuity with all that which in sua material the Church has always believed, professed, taught, and lived in its true reality through the centuries…Your treatise, dear Professor, enables one to engage in a profound analysis of Vatican II and its teaching, as formulated in its Documents, in such a manner as to lead one to understand that even in those places where the language could lead one to think of a discontinuity with the theological content that is found in “the entire doctrinal heritage of the Church,” even there the content can only be said to be nove, and not nova. And therefore a language of discontinuity in no way can alter the “doctrinal heritage of the Church,” but rather such language must be interpreted in a manner that one cannot say nova with respect to the Church’s Tradition.

And yet the Bishop (in agreement with the author) seems to leave an opening to the possibility of real or substantial rupture, however, the expression of things “nova” with respect to sacred Tradition can only derive from sources considered less than authentic and ultimately non-magisterial.

However, given the nature of the Council and the diversity in the nature of its Documents, I think one might be able to hold that if it were to emerge from a Catholic, theological hermeneutic that some passages, or some statements or assertions of the Council, not only say things which are nove, but also say things which are nova with respect to the perennial Tradition of the Church, one would not be presented with a homogenous development of the Magisterium: in such a case there would be a teaching which is not unchangeable, and certainly not infallible…(pp. 8-12)

The author seems to consider the possibility of error in Faith and Morals only in so far as the expression is less than an authentic act of the Magisterium. But was Vatican II, in spite of its merely "pastoral" character, a true Ecumenical Council and an authentic act of the Magisterium? Msgr. Gherardini gives an affirmative reply.

Above all, it must be said – and in a clear and resounding way – that the Council was not a secret meeting like those which had already occasionally taken place, but which lacked form and especially substance; rather, this was a true and proper Ecumenical Council, with all of the approval of authenticity and conciliar validity. (p. 39)³

In the final analysis, and notwithstanding all of the critical analysis that can be applied to any Ecumenical Council (including Vatican II), there can be no question of a substantial rupture with sacred Tradition.⁴ In fact, Msgr. Gherardini goes so far as to say that "anyone who insists on proposing this [hermeneutic of rupture] in good faith would be, even without being aware of it, materially placing himself outside of the Church. This was and continues to be the very attitude not only of the sedevacantists, and other opponents of the Council, but even the large number of the Council's enthusiasts for whom the celebration of Vatican II seemed to have deleted even the memory of the other Councils" (pp. 100-101). The author clearly rejects the possibility of "rupture", however, neither does he embrace the "hermeneutic of continuity" as proposed by Pope Benedict XVI.⁵ One is left wondering what other viable option remains.

notes

¹English translation by the Fransiscans of the Immaculate (Casa Mariana Editrice, Italy).

²Not satisfied with the December 2005 Address to the Roman Curia on the "herneneutic of continuity" (cf. AAS 98, 2006, 44-45), Msgr. Gherardini appeals for an "authoritative" declaration by the Holy Father (presumably in a form considered more "authoritative" than the 2005 Papal Address as well as the conciliar documents themselves) - "not with declamation, but demonstration..." (p. 297) The author proposes the formation of special congresses and publications to undertake the necessary "scientific analysis" of the Council: "In this way it will be possible to know if, in what sense, and up to what point Vatican II, and especially the post-conciliar era, might be able to be interpreted along the lines of an indisputable, albeit developing, continuity, or to know if there may be elements foreign to or even hindering this continuity." (p. 300)

³These considerations suggest the following syllogism where the conclusion follows from two undisputed premises - each affirmed by the author:

Major Premise: All authentic Ecumenical Councils enjoy divine assistance and protection from error in Faith and morals.

Minor Premise: The Second Vatican Council was an authentic Ecumenical Council.

Conclusion: The Second Vatican Council enjoyed divine assistance and protection from error in Faith and morals.

⁴Indeed, this theme is repeated throughout the work. For example, in one place Msgr. Gherardini makes the customary affirmation: "A Council, as I have repeatedly pointed out, is the undeniable guarantee of true Catholic doctrine, the supreme pinnacle of the authentic and solemn Magisterium of the Church." This affirmation, however, is typically followed by pointing out some particular deficiency or apparent discontinuity: "...Yet, in DH we are given the impression that the ecclesiastical Magisterium has reduced itself to the level of an ethical State, a State which does not hesitate to make itself the foundation of morality over and above even the natural law." (p. 213)

⁵Indeed, Pope Benedict XVI noted that true reform involves both continuity and discontinuity -- but at different levels (i.e., by properly distinguishing the immutable from the contingent).

The Paradoxes of Freedom

2010-07-05T09:48:00.001-07:00

Msgr. Charles Pope has a very interesting article on The Paradoxes of True Freedom. The following paradoxes are analyzed in the article:

1. The first paradox of freedom is that true freedom is experienced only in relation to what is good and true.

2. The second paradox of freedom is that, since we are contingent and limited beings, we can only experience freedom within parameters and by limiting our freedom to a certain extent.

3. The Third paradox of freedom is that my freedom today often exists due to prior constraint.

4. The Fourth and religious paradox of freedom is that we are only free by becoming slaves and servants of God.

Please visit Msgr. Pope’s blog for the full analysis...

On Rights, Error and the Erring

2010-04-20T16:22:00.001-07:00

Editor, The Remnant:

I appreciate Fr. Laisney taking the time to refute a position (mine) that apparently perpetuates “one of the errors of Vatican II” (Cf. The Remnant, March 31, 2010), however, I must say that his arguments seem to raise more questions than they attempt to resolve. Specifically, I would like to defend myself against the charge that I am somehow promoting a so-called “right to teach error”, however, in order to adequately do so it will be necessary to take a closer look at some key concepts.

Ignorance and Error

While Fr. Laisney accepts the possibility of invincible ignorance in religious matters – he appears to deny the possibility of invincible error – considering all religious conviction comingled with error as ultimately voluntary and culpable: “Yes, there can be invincible ignorance, i.e. it is possible to ignore without sin; but there cannot without sin be ignorance that claims to know…one cannot be certain of error without sin.” Yet it remains unclear how Fr. Laisney defines and differentiates one from the other. (Presumably we are to understand by this that one can hypothetically live in ignorance of the Catholic Faith – or at least important aspects of Catholic Faith – without ever thinking or acting in any way contrary to the Catholic Faith.) On this point Fr. Laisney apparently departs from the teaching of Saint Thomas, the moral theologians and Archbishop Lefebvre who all recognize the existence of “invincible error” or “honest error” with respect to religious conviction and conscience (Cf. S.T., i-ii, 19, 5-6; Prummer, n. 139; Lefebvre, Religious Liberty Questioned, p. 10).

Therefore, one can be in a state of honest error in religious matters – practically certain of its truth – even after performing the necessary due diligence in pursuit of truth and the formation of conscience. Yet honest error with respect to religious truth does not imply error that is contrary to reason and natural law insofar as he is bound to know what God has written on his heart.¹ In other words, involuntary and honest religious error includes any material conflict or discrepancy between (a) religious conviction in accordance with reason and natural law and (b) revealed religious truth beyond the grasp of unaided natural reason (Cf. Ketteler who cites Suarez on this material “conflict” between (a) reason and natural law and (b) positive divine law; Tract. de Fide Disp. 18 Sect. III, n. 4, 7, 9, 10.). But this apparent conflict between natural law and positive divine law does not add up to a formal conflict or contradiction within the eternal law. In this sense, it is possible to act in formal conformity (analogical conformity) with the divine will even if there is lacking a material conformity (univocal conformity) resulting from involuntary ignorance (Cf. S.T. i-ii, 19, 10). This is consistent with the distinction of moral theologians between formal sin and material sin (Cf. Prummer, n. 159).

Binding Conscience

The fundamental denial of honest error in connection with religious conviction naturally leads to the denial of the binding character of a certain but honestly erroneous conscience: “…there can be no obligation to teach objective error…one ought to learn the truth first!” Of course, this objection is founded on the notion that religious error is always voluntary and culpable. Again, Fr. Laisney departs from the same writers (mentioned above) who all affirm the binding character or moral obligation – under pain of sin – to obey the dictates of an honestly erroneous conscience. Archbishop Lefebvre says it very plainly: “To act against one’s honestly erroneous conscience is to sin” (Lefebvre, p. 10).

Corresponding Right

After denying the existence and binding character of honest religious error Fr. Laisney has no need to consider any corresponding and complimentary moral right to fulfill the moral duty associated with an honestly erroneous conscience: “Mr. Gurries pretends again…that ‘all men have the duty and corresponding natural right to educate their children according to their religious convictions.’” However, once we correctly recognize the binding character of an honestly erroneous conscience we must also take into account the principle that moral law confers the corresponding right to fulfill a moral duty: “We cannot be obliged to keep the moral law and at the same time be deprived of the means necessary to this end. This obligation requires that we have the power both to do the things necessary for keeping the moral law ourselves and to restrain others from interfering with our observance of the moral law. No one can be obliged to the impossible; hence, if it is a fact that we are obliged, we must be empowered to fulfill our obligation…If I have a duty, I have also a right to fulfill that duty and do all the things necessary for its fulfillment; otherwise it could not be a genuine duty” (Cf. Fr. Fagothey, S.J., Right and Reason, TAN, 1959, 2000, p. 239, 254). In this context, Archbishop Lefebvre affirms the very principle that I am criticized for affirming: “To the natural duty of educating their children corresponds the right of the parents to raise their children according to their own religious conviction” (Lefebvre, p. 12). Indeed, Archbishop Lefebvre affirms that this “subjective right is inalienable” because it is “based on a corresponding duty to be fulfilled…on the transcendental relation between faculty (e.g., the will) and its object (e.g., to worship God or to educate one’s children). That relation and that duty remain no matter what happens” (Cf. Lefebvre, p. 13). Again, Fr. Laisney avoids this necessary and logical conclusion by simply denying altogether the existence and binding character of an honestly erroneous conscience.

Positive and Negative

As discussed above, duties and rights are correlative and complementary. This means that positive rights give rise to negative duties – or the duty to honor the right of the other: “If I have a right, everyone else has the duty to respect my right; thus the term of a right becomes the subject of a duty” (Cf. Fagothey).² According to this principle, if there is no authentic positive right then one concludes that there can be no corresponding negative right (i.e., the right to immunity from religious coercion): “We cannot, in the absence of a positive right, proclaim the existence of a negative right…in any realm whatsoever…without, by the same token, falling victim of a sophism” (Lefebvre, p. 18). As we have seen, Fr. Laisney clearly does not concede any positive right that directly or indirectly involves religious error insofar as he ultimately considers it to be voluntary and culpable. Having denied the existence of a positive right in this context – one concludes that there can be no correlative and complementary duty for others to respect the right. Therefore, Fr. Laisney does not feel compelled to recognize any “negative right” to immunity from coercion in connection with an erroneous conscience: “When I write that the parents in error do not have the right to teach error to their children – even if they are of ‘good faith’ – I do not mean that they should be punished: it is then a prudential decision of those in authority to decide what to do.” According to Fr. Laisney this prudential decision could lead either to the practical toleration or restriction of parental rights in the religious education of their children.

Subjective and Objective

But now we seem to be confronted with a serious problem – an apparent contradiction between the subjective and objective aspects of morality. As we have seen, we must recognize the corresponding right to fulfill an authentic moral duty. On the other hand, we must recognize, following Pius XII, that objectively speaking “error has no rights”. The subjective and objective aspects of morality here seem to be in irreconcilable conflict.

One solution to the problem seeks to create an absolute separation between the subjective and objective aspects of morality – giving rise to a particular conception of “objective rights” in contradistinction to “subjective rights”.³ In this way we can seemingly recognize the “subjective duty” and corresponding inalienable “subjective right” to fulfill a duty – while denying the subject the “objective right” to fulfill his duty when it involves some objective error or evil. “So, the solution is very simple: the objective right is alienable and the subjective right is inalienable…Consequently, man looses all his objective natural rights when they are applied to error” (Cf. Lefebvre, pp. 13-14).

It seems to me that this particular solution presents other difficulties. First, it risks undermining the fundamental unity of the moral order in both its subjective and objective aspects (Cf. Fagothey, p. 113) by creating a hopeless contradiction – where the acting subject simultaneously has the duty to do X under pain of sin and the duty not to do X under pain of sin. In fact, the moral law cannot both command and forbid the same thing! Second, it does not seem to take sufficient account of a metaphysical reality – that duties and rights are fundamentally rooted in acting subjects. In other words, duties and rights ultimately inhere in persons rather than abstract categories. Third, many objects of natural right are inalienable (e.g., the right to life) and are not automatically cancelled merely because there is some admixture of error or evil on the part of the acting subject. Fourth, it does not appear coherent with the recognized fact that a natural right is not cancelled simply because it indirectly involves objective religious error with respect to revealed truth. For example, one “cannot take children from the Islamic education of their parents against their will without, at the same time, depriving the parents of their natural objective right of educating their children” (Cf. Lefebvre, p. 15). Fifth, it risks diminishing due respect for the dignity of the erring person since it considers there to be “no dignity outside of truth…if he adheres to error or evil he loses his dignity…even if not necessarily a formal sin…” (Lefebvre, pp. 20-21). In this sense, the notion that “error has no rights” risks becoming “erring persons have no rights.” Finally, it creates the risk of diminishing the sphere of personal responsibility paving the way for authoritarianism and tyranny.

The better approach to resolve this dilemma, it seems to me, is to properly identify the object and foundation of a given right in contradistinction to any indirect admixture of error or evil that may possibly be involved in the exercise of a right by an acting subject. The moral law confers rights that have their object and foundation only in that which is good in itself. At the same time rights with a good object and founded upon a good intention may involve the possibility of error and evil. But in order to understand this better we will need to take a closer look at the nature of evil.

Evil and Tolerance

We can get a better sense of this by looking at the principle of tolerance in connection with the doctrine on the permission of evil. This is not a question about the toleration of pure evil. Rather, we tolerate acts with an admixture of error or evil for the sake of (a) a greater good that should not be forfeit or (b) the avoidance of greater evils. Bishop Ketteler comments on this Thomistic principle (ST. ii-ii, 10, 11) as follows:

The greater benefits which St. Thomas had in mind here are not hard to determine. God would have to deprive a man of his liberty which is the highest endowment that man has, if He were to deny a man every possibility of abusing that liberty. Applying that principle to temporal governments, St. Thomas concluded that they too must tolerate certain evils, and he stated finally: "Even though the non-believers sin because of their religious practices, these must nevertheless be tolerated, either because of the good that they still have in them, or because of the greater evil that would result."

In this sense, the principle of tolerance is closely linked to the doctrine on the permission of evil - God wills to permit evil – for the sake of some greater benefit. In this sense St. Thomas says: “God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good” (ST. I, 19, 9).

Evils of Nature and Sin

As we have seen, not all error is formally sinful – but can be an innocent and honest error. The possibility of error, however, is unfortunately part of the human condition and equivalent to the evil of nature. How are we to understand God’s permission or “tolerance” relative to evils of nature?

The evil of nature is permitted in the sense that it is in itself inseparably connected with a good which is intended and directly willed by God. It is tolerated and accepted by God, willed but not intended – it is in spite of, not because of, the element of nothingness which it irremediably contains that a created being is willed and intended by God – and it can be said of the evil of nature that it is willed indirectly and by accident. (Cf. Journet, The Meaning of Evil, G. Chapman, 1963, p.147)

What this means is that God tolerates (inseparably connected) error or evil – for the sake of a good which He intends and directly wills. The “good” intended and directly willed by God is precisely the object and foundation of a right – in spite of the admixture of error or evil that He permits or tolerates. That is why the erring person does not lose all his rights – in spite of his error. Furthermore, all of this helps to clarify the fact that right and tolerance are not contradicted but often peacefully coexist.⁴

On the other hand, not all error is innocent but often is culpable and sinful. This is the evil of sin that “is permitted, tolerated and suffered in a completely different sense from the evil of nature; it is permitted as a rebellion, an offence, which God cannot will in any way…which he could certainly suppress by force and eradicate completely, but which also, he can, if he decides to respect even the resistance of our wills⁵, allow to happen and bear fruit indirectly in other things.” (ibid.)

Conclusion

In conclusion I would like to once again affirm the principles at the heart of this debate. In the first place is the principle that error has no rights and therefore no true right can have an object or foundation that is in itself erroneous or evil. Secondly, we may recall that the exercise of authentic rights often are “inseparably connected” with honest error. The honest error does not automatically cancel a right since it is inseparably connected with a good intended and directly willed by God. Therefore, to deny such a right is to frustrate the will of God.⁶ In this sense, we ought to tolerate the “inseparably connected” error to the extent that God wills to tolerate it – for the sake of the good that He directly wills. Finally, based on all of this, we must distinguish between (a) the so-called “right to teach error” and (b) “…the right of the parents to raise their children according to their own religious conviction.” I am accused by Fr. Laisney of promoting (a) when in reality I am only affirming (b).

notes

¹In this respect there can be no honest error contrary to synderesis or anemnesis -- because man-as-man is always bound to know it in his heart.

²This distinction does not amount to a separation. In this sense, both positive and negative aspects are complimentary. Indeed, Bishop de Smedt had identified both the positive and negative aspects of the right to religious freedom in his first relatio: "Positively, religious liberty is the right of the human person to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience. Negatively, it is immunity from all external force in his personal relations with God, which the conscience of man vindicates to itself." (Cf. Bishop de Smedt, Relatio on Religious Freedom, November 19, 1963)

³It is possible to distinguish -- but not separate -- the "subjective" and "objective" aspects of morality: "Christian moral tradition has always maintained the distinction -- not the separation much less the contra-position -- between the objective order and subjective guilt" (Cf. CDF Doctrinal Note, February 16, 1989, no. 3). In this sense, the root error behind "situation ethics" is to diminish the objective aspect of morality while the opposite reactionary error diminishes the subjective aspect by means of the depersonalization of morality (Cf. Dietrich von Hildebrand, Morality and Situation Ethics, Franciscan Herald Press, 1966, p. 90).

Fr. Fagothey distinguishes three senses of the term "right" as (1) moral power, (2) an object of right and (3) law:
1. Right is defined as moral power over what is one's own, or more expressly, moral power to do, hold or exact something. To do here is to be taken both affirmatively and negatively; it means either to perform or omit some action, for one may have a right to keep silent as well as to speak. To hold means to own, keep, or use something, and includes metaphorical meanings, such as to hold an office or a job. To exact means to demand that someone else perform or omit some action; thus a teacher exacts attention and silence from his pupils. Right as thus defined is right in the primary sense.
2. By a figure of speech we transfer the word right from the person who has the right and apply it to the thing over which he has the right. We say: "I will get my rights," meaning some object rightfully his. If a man were deprived of his right in the sense of moral power, he would have no right to the thing at all and could not legitimately claim it; what we mean is that he is deprived of some object to which he retains a right.
3. Right is founded on law. Right puts an obligation on others to respect the right. Since all obligation comes from law, and ultimately from the natural and eternal law, all right comes from law. Because of this fact, law itself is sometimes called right, a usage common in other languages, but infrequent in English. Since all right comes from law, rights are natural or positive, divine or human, ecclesiastical or civil, according to the kind of law which confers the right. (Cf. Fagothey, op. cit., p. 240)

Other writers similarly distinguish between "subjective" and "objective" rights where the former is understood as moral power and the latter referring to the object. For example, "'mine' and 'his' appertain to us and are made sacred to us by a subjective element called a right. By metonomy, 'mine' and 'his,' as the objects of rights, are also called rights or, better, objective rights. Thus, a man has a right to life, to a watch, to a walk in the public park. Life, a watch, a walk in the park are called rights because they are objects of subjective rights." We can define subjective right as "a legitimate and inviolable power whereby one vindicates something for himself as his own. It is a power or capacity in virtue of which a person can do something...Right vindicates something for a man as his own by setting up a bond of legitimacy and immunity between a man and some object in virtue of which this object falls under his exclusive control...Hence it is a capacity not merely of doing or not doing, of having or holding something, but also of exacting from others. What may be done, omitted, held, or exacted because of right constitutes an objective right." (Cf. Fr. Thomas J. Higgins, S.J., Man as Man: The Science and Art of Ethics, TAN Publishers, 1958, 1992, pp. 224-225)

⁴In other words, "right" and "tolerance" each have a distinct object. The object of the right is the good whereas the object of tolerance is the error that is inseparably connected. At the same time, not every kind of evil ought to be tolerated -- and this corresponds to the "due limits" inherent in religous freedom.

⁵“Christianity accords to man his full right of self-determination and recognizes in this right his fullest dignity and nobility. In fact, Christianity by its doctrine of eternal damnation recognizes the ultimate consequence of this right, because this teaching implies that God will even permit men to eternally contradict Him rather than violate man's sacred right to self-determination." (Cf. Ketteler, Sermon on "The Christian Concept of Human Freedom", December 17, 1848)

⁶This is consistent with the principle that man's rights are ultimately rooted in God's rights.

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW: Dr. Rupert J. Ederer

2010-03-22T20:59:00.001-07:00

Dr. Rupert J. Ederer is Professor Emeritus of Buffalo State College (State University of New York). In addition to being a premier Catholic economist¹ in the U.S. he is perhaps the greatest living authority on the great minds that helped to pioneer and develop Catholic social teaching since the 19^th century. The English speaking world is in debt to Dr. Ederer for providing scholarly translations of the great German classics in Catholic social teaching. Dr. Ederer is also the author of “Economics as if God Mattered” that provides scholarly insights into the vast array of Papal social teachings. Now in his 87^th year², Dr. Ederer has graciously agreed to an interview. The questions and answers to follow will survey aspects of his background, education and major works. In addition, Dr. Ederer will give his own perspective and insights into some of the complexities and controversies involved in various competing “schools” of thought. Finally, Dr. Ederer will offer some thoughts on Caritas in Veritate, the latest social encyclical of Pope Benedict XVI, as well as some suggestions to young people interested in Catholic social teaching and the social sciences.

1) Dr. Ederer, what can you tell us about your early years?

I was born in Munich, Germany in September 1923. That was two months before the Putsch when the Nazis tried to take over Bavaria about a mile from where we lived. It was also in the midst of the great inflation which wiped out the savings of millions of Germans. After my Dad returned from WWI, the Marxists under Kurt Eisner took over Bavaria and ran it for a short time. My folks always voted for the Volkspartei (Catholic) in the frequent elections under the Weimar Republic. The famous Jesuit Rupert Mayer, now Blessed, was chaplain of the Men's Marian Sodality to which my father belonged. He was instrumental in keeping many, including my folks, on the right track politically. (They named me for him, and many years later my wife and I were present for his beatification in Munich). By 1926 they had enough and emigrated to the U. S. Imagine immigrants from Munich landing in the midst of Prohibition! And soon afterwards – the Great Depression.

2) How did you come to be interested in Catholic social teaching and the social sciences?

Perhaps it is because I was born into such social tumult which my parents often told their children about, that I became interested in social order! Also, in those days Father Charles Coughlin was on the radio each Sunday at our house, and I was strangely fascinated by his oratory. But it was an enthusiastic teacher (a priest) who first aroused my interest in the Church's social teachings in my first year of college in a minor seminary. We were far too immature to understand much about them, but he provided the spark which later ignited in the major seminary. There I read what I could find, and my interest increased.

3) What inspired you to study and translate the works of Bishop von Ketteler and Fr. Heinrich Pesch?

During my second year of theology, when I decided that I was not called to be a priest, I came across an article in a periodical - The Catholic Mind - a Jesuit publication - about the influence of Bishop von Ketteler and the Jesuit Heinrich Pesch had on the social teachings of the Catholic Church. That was during World War II at about the time I decided to leave the seminary, after which I was promptly drafted for service in WW II. German stock was at a very low level at the time. As a German-American I was impressed by that other dimension where German social thought played a prominent role in the development of my Church's social teachings. The Catholic Mind article also indicated where scholars familiar with Pesch's work held positions in various Catholic universities in the U. S. I resolved to seek out one of these to do graduate studies there after my term in the army. St. Louis University offered me a graduate assistantship, and I began studies in economics under the brilliant Jesuit Bernard Dempsey who, I learned later, was trying to get Pesch's work translated into English. I was not the right person for that since I was then a newcomer to economics. The spark caught on years later after I got my PhD and began college teaching. I came to understand what my mentor, Father Dempsey, wrote later in a chapter in his book - The Functional Economy - on "The Biography of An Unsatisfactory Science."

My dissatisfaction with standard economics that I was expected to teach, along with my German language skill, eventually led me to translate – over a quarter of a century and well into retirement – the works of Ketteler and Pesch. It is part payment to the country which was willing to take in the Ederer family as refugees from what was to become one of the worst periods in Germany's history. German culture had also some better by-products than Nazism.

4) Why is Bishop Ketteler of Mainz often referred to as the "pioneer" of Catholic social teaching in the modern era?

One of Ketteler's biographers (Lenhart) indicated that Leo XIII referred to him as "Our great Predecessor." On another occasion before a papal audience group from Mainz, Ketteler's diocese, the same pope remarked about their bishop, "It is from him that We have learned." This is clear not only in Rerum Novarum, but also in other works like the Pope's encyclicals on marriage and the family, on Liberty, etc. Rerum Novarum is of course, the pioneer papal encyclical on the economic order.

More recently, Pope Benedict XVI in his encyclical Deus Caritas Est referred to "Bishop Ketteler of Mainz" as one of the "pioneers" of Catholic social teachings (27).³

5) What was Fr. Pecsh's contribution to Catholic social teaching – and why do many regard his major work as a "summa economica"?

An Jesuit understudy of Pesch, Oswald von Nell-Breuning, is widely acclaimed to be "the main writer" of Quadragesimo Anno for Pius XI. Whether or not that is a fact, several main features of that encyclical are clearly from Pesch's thought. They include the principle of subsidiarity which occurs in various sections of the Lehrbuch, as well as the principle of solidarity which Pope John Paul II identifies in Centesimus Annus (10) as the social charity which Pius XI included along with social justice in Quadragesimo Anno as the principles for restoring social order (88). The principle of vocational/functional groups for keeping order - short of having to rely on the State - is pure Pesch (Q.A. 81-87), as is the just wage principle (Q.A. 63-75).

Pope Pius XII had as his main advisor on social teaching the Jesuit Gustav Gundlach, also an understudy of Pesch. The expression solidarity – in the relevant sense – first appeared in papal social teachings in the various writings, addresses, encyclicals of Pius XII. In fact his first and very important encyclical Summi Pontificatus (although it is not usually listed as a "social" encyclical) has the Spanish title: Solidaridad Humana Y Estado Totalitario.

Finally, Pope John Paul II is not known as "the Pope of Solidarity" solely because of his support of the Polish labor union. He devoted a large segment of his second social encyclical to explaining what he then referred to as "undoubtedly a Christian virtue" (40). That is pure Pesch.

As for the summa economica designation, I don't know who used that first. I know that Prof. Franz Mueller (St. Thomas U. in St. Paul) did, among others.⁴ Reasons? First, the Lehrbuch in 5 volumes and some 3900 pages offered an extended systematic presentation of the science as St. Thomas did of theology. It was exhaustive – covering aspects of economics as no one else has before or since; and most important Pesch did so according to the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy that was a standard part of Jesuit training in the late 19th - early 20th century.

6) Fr. Pesch's Solaristic System of Human Work is criticized by some as "centralized planning" or "interventionist". How would you respond to Pesch's critics?

"Centralized planning" is the stuff of which socialist states are made. For the governance of economic life Pesch cited the individual with a conscience in conformity with the virtues of social justice and social charity (solidarity) as the first level of control in economic life. At the next level he presented the notion of occupational organizations (also acting in conformity with those virtues) as presented in Quadragesimo Anno (82-87). These would relieve much need for the state to regulate economic activity. Finally the State as the ultimate protector of the common good is still present and necessary to foster and safeguard that good. For example, could anyone imagine what would have happened during WW II if the U. S. government in Washington had not enforced price and wage controls, rationing of certain items, along with high taxes to successfully conduct that war?

7) Fr. Pesch died a few years before Keynes wrote his "General Theory". What would have been Pesch's assessment of this work?

Pesch died in 1926, and the General Theory by Keynes appeared in 1936. It is difficult to say what Pesch would have said about it. Keynes' Essay, "The End of Laissez Faire" published in 1926 is another matter. Although he characterized capitalism if "wisely managed" as "better than any alternative system yet in sight," he cited the need to work out a better system. Then surprise of surprises! "I believe that in many cases the ideal size for the unit of control and organization lies somewhere between the individual and the modern state…I propose a return, it may be said, toward medieval conceptions of separate autonomies..."!!!⁵ That is precisely what Pesch offered with his occupational organizations – a key element of his solidaristic system.⁶

8) In your view, what are the primary merits and pitfalls associated with Distributism?

Their main merit is their good intention, and we all know where good intentions often lead. Distributism is never once mentioned in the social teachings of the Church. There are figures of speech like the great Polish Pope's "common work bench" in Laborem Exercens? But, remember that the man was also a poet. To pick on such incidentals and in the process to distract attention from the important just wage doctrine which has been stated and developed from Rerum Novarum until now again in Caritas in Veritate, is unacceptable. That doctrine from the beginning has involved a wage which will make possible "a certain moderate ownership." (Q.A. 63) Although we have a long way to go, with many setbacks along the way, there are far more workers who earn such a wage now than there were before Rerum Novarum first stated the principle. Many countries, for example, also have family allowances, (and even universal health care!) unheard of before 1891 or 1931 when Leo XIII and Pius XI proposed them. Distributism fails to explain how the massive redistribution of ownership into modest parcels is to take place. By revolution, or perhaps following some doomsday episode? How are the principles of subsidiarity and distributive justice to be observed in the process?⁷

9) What is your view of the Austrian school of economics and related organizations such as the Ludwig von Mises Institute?

The much vaunted “Austrian School" - by which is usually meant Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek - two agnostic positivists - involves mainly an attempt to restore the "Free Market Economy of the Victorian era."⁸ It is opposed to the Church's social teachings, and Pope Paul VI and John Paul II cited that opposition referring to the new attempt at revival as "neo-liberalism" (Octagesima Adveniens 35-36; Ecclesia in America 56).⁹ Mises is old stuff, and Pesch already dealt with his free market advocacy as "neo-Manchesterism." (Lehrbuch V,bk 1, p.v).¹⁰ The movement was advanced by American Presidents, both Democratic (Carter and Clinton), and Republican (Reagan and Bush I and II).

10) What is your impression of the Acton Institute? Is it aligned with the tradition of von Ketteler and Pesch or some other school of philosophy and economics?

The Acton Institute is more of the same. It is a "think tank" headed by a Catholic priest, well financed by business interests which fit perfectly the papal designation -- neo-liberalism -- therefore another advocate of free markets.¹¹ It is my understanding that there are Calvinist roots, but I cannot substantiate this.

11) How would you distinguish between the concepts of "solidarism" and "personalism"?

Solidarism is the ideology underlying Heinrich Pesch's outline for an economic system. Its underlying philosophy is personalistic in that it emphasizes man, the human person, not merely “labor” - the factor of production - as both the driving force behind, and as the reason for which economic activity takes place. No other economic textbook anywhere in the world begins as Pesch's Lehrbuch does: "Man as Lord of the World According to God's Ordinance." (Vol. I, Bk.1, # 1) He uses the German word Mensch which translates best as human person. The English "man" is inadequate for the translation of Mensch.¹²

12) What are your impressions of Caritas in Veritate, the recent social encyclical of Pope Benedict XVI?

I have an article coming out, and also a new chapter to a forth-coming revised edition of my book - Economics as if God Matters. Stay tuned. I am proud of my fellow Bavarian Pope Benedict XVI. God is good!

13) Can solidarity be sustained within a "dictatorship of relativism" or in a climate of militant secularism?

No.

14) Is there a natural tension between solidarity and subsidiarity and how can this be managed or balanced?

No. If you mean by solidarity - social charity, which along with social justice according to the Catholic Church's approach to reconstructing the social order are the twin virtues in that process. Subsidiarity has always been included in that schema as its leading principle of organization.

15) Does the phenomenon of globalization present an opportunity or a threat?

Yes. It does present an opportunity for the application of the principle of solidarity - again, social charity. Without that, it could simply lead to more exploitation on a grander scale, i.e. worldwide.

16) In order to balance an "exclusively binary model of market-plus-State" Pope Benedict XVI suggests new "economic forms based on solidarity" and speaks of the need for "forms of economic activity marked by quotas of gratuitousness and communion". Can you shed some light on this and what the Holy Father calls the "logic of the unconditional gift"? (CV, 39)

I deal with this also in the forthcoming book, but in the meantime also in a forthcoming article in Culture Wars that covers the same ground. In Centesimus Annus, Pope John Paul II pointed out how successive popes since Leo XIII have offered different names for the principle of solidarity (10). In my opinion, Pope Benedict too is presenting a new word for it - gratuitousness. What people at various levels of society contribute to the common good of those societies appears to me to reflect what Pope Benedict is talking about here. That can range from the efforts of a volunteer fireman in a small town, to the efforts of a Peace Corps volunteer in some poor developing nation, or a foreign aid program to which all tax payers in a rich nation contribute in some degree.

17) In addition to the spirit and logic of gift, Pope Benedict XVI also mentions the need for "forms of redistribution". Some have been critical of Caritas in Veritate on the basis that this notion runs counter to justice and sound principles of economics. Are such criticisms well founded?

No. They are founded in the stingy, myopic viewpoint that reflects the stodgy free market (really free-for-all) economy which has now once again collapsed with ruin for many, specifically also the wealthy countries.

18) Does the social teaching of Pope Benedict XVI reflect any influence from the works of Bishop Ketteler or Fr. Pesch?

Since it builds on and continues the social teachings of Leo XIII ( Ketteler) and Pius XI and John Paul II (Pesch), the answer is, Yes.

19) What advice would you give to young people interested in Catholic social teaching and the social sciences?

I wish that I could direct them to some Catholic colleges or universities where there is a solid program of Catholic social teachings. Unfortunately we have not yet fully recovered from the tumult following Vatican II. Young university age and older people should study - not read, and above all not speed-read papal social teachings. Some of them, like Caritas in Veritate, are not always easy reading. They require study and thought.

20) Finally, is there any other message that you would like to leave us with?

Pray and do not give up hope. Popes since Pius XII have predicted a new springtime for the Church and for our world. Where I live, even springtime can bring some unpleasant weather. But the signs are already present. As the late great Pope John Paul II always told us: "Do not be afraid."

Thank You and God Bless!

notes

¹"Dr. Rupert J. Ederer, perhaps America's premier Catholic economist and recipient of the Society of Catholic Social Scientists' Pope Pius XI Award for contributions to the building up of a true Catholic social science, has devoted much of his retirement from college teaching to translating and writing about the massive works of the great -- but regrettably unsung and ignored -- Catholic economist and economic system builder, Fr. Heinrich Pesch, S.J. In many respects, and equally unfortunately, Ederer is unsung and a voice in the wilderness as was his intellectual mentor." (Stephen M. Krason, Professor of Political Science; Taken from the Preface of "Liberalism, Socialism and Christian Social Order," Book 4, The Edwin Mellen Press, 2001, p. vii)

²Dr. Ederer was born on September 25, 1923.

³Bishop Ketteler's major works were translated into English by Dr. Ederer and published in 1981 by University Press of America as "The Social Teachings of Wilhelm Emmanuel Von Ketteler". Unfortunately, this volume remains out of print and difficult to find. Therefore, I have been working on a project to publish a new edition of Ketteler's 1862 classic "Freedom, Authority and the Church" based on Dr. Ederer's translation.

⁴Prof. Franz Mueller was an early disciple of Fr. Pesch as noted by Michael Novak in the introduction to one of Mueller's works: "An immmigrant to the United States, from Germany, Professor Mueller had come in his earliest days under the influence of one of the greatest philosophers of economics in Catholic history, the esteemed Jesuit, Heinrich Pesch (1854-1926)...He became part of an active circle of German scholars whose formative influence on papal social thought has been immense and unrivaled...Professor Mueller took part in the famous 'Koenigswinter Study Circle,' two of whose members were summoned to Rome to help draft Quadragessimo Anno. Then in 1934, he was fired from his post at the University of Cologne by the Nazis. After a year in Britain he accepted a professorship in the United States, where he has dwelt ever since." (Cf. The Church and the Social Question, AEI, 1984, pp. 9-10) Prof. Edward J. O'Boyle notes that Dr. Ederer was "greatly influenced and supported by Mueller." (Lehrbuch, Vol. 1, Bk 1., p. xvi)

⁵On the topic of usury, Keynes remarked as follows: "I was brought up to believe that the attitude of the Medieval Church to the rate of interest was inherently absurd, and that the subtle discussions aimed at distinguishing the return on money-loans from the return to active investment were merely jesuitical attempts to find a practical escape from a foolish theory. But I now read these discussions as an honest intellectual effort to keep separate what the classical theory has inextricably confused together, namely, the rate of interest and the marginal efficiency of capital. For it now seems clear that the disquisitions of the schoolmen were directed towards the elucidation of a formula which should allow the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital to be high, whilst using rule and custom and the moral law to keep down the rate of interest." (Keynes, op. cit.) Of course, Fr. Pesch had already addressed all of this in detail in the Lehrbuch (Cf. Vol. 5, Bk 2).

⁶Dr. Ederer does give credit to Keynes for helping to save capitalism from itself during a time of economic crisis, however, he is not a Keynesian economist. Rather, Dr. Ederer identifies himself as a "solararist economist."

⁷Dr. Ederer indicates that the solution to problems of distributive justice in our time is to be found in the consistent application of the just wage principle. On the other hand, the answer to modern economic problems is not to be found, according to Dr. Ederer, in a simple restoration of the "cottage form" of economy nor in the ideological rejection (more or less) of various areas of human development and legitimate progress (Cf. Caritas in Veritate, 14).

⁸Dr. Ederer provides a more detailed analysis of the Austrian school of economics in his critical review of "The Church and the Market" by Thomas E. Woods. (http://www.culturewars.com/2005/Ederer.html)

At the heart of the debate is the question whether economics is a positive value-free science (such as chemistry, astronomy or mathematics) or a practical social science ultimately dependent upon the laws of morality. According to Dr. Ederer, the answer lies in the "ancient and classical Scholastic distinction between the actus humanus and the actus hominis."

⁹"More and more, in many countries of America, a system known as “neoliberalism” prevails; based on a purely economic conception of man, this system considers profit and the law of the market as its only parameters, to the detriment of the dignity of and the respect due to individuals and peoples. At times this system has become the ideological justification for certain attitudes and behavior in the social and political spheres leading to the neglect of the weaker members of society. Indeed, the poor are becoming ever more numerous, victims of specific policies and structures which are often unjust." (Pope John Paul II, Ecclesia in America, 56)

¹⁰For example, Pesch remarks: "Mises is on the wrong track when he attributes the terrible conditions in English factory regions where Manchesterianism prevailed, not to that phenomenon, but to other circumstances. The historical development of industry among the various nations, and also a proper understanding of human nature pass judgment on individualistic freedom." (Cf. Pesch, op. cit.)

¹¹The notion of "free markets" is here taken in the unrestricted sense. Dr. Ederer provides additional perspective on this point in an earlier commentary to Volume II of Pesch's Lehrbuch: "For Pesch, the essence of capitalism lay in the metaphysical perversion, where 'capital', a material factor of production and an instrumental cause of national wealth, assumed primacy over man, the worker, who stands at the center in the solidaristic system of human work. Thus, in historical capitalism, those who owned capital and their administrators took charge of the system and operated it in their own exclusive profit-making interests. Since economists in our time prefer in increasing numbers to juxtapose the 'market economy' to socialism, it is worth noting that Pesch allowed that the market economy does not rule out the possibility of providing for peoples' wants in an orderly manner. In other words, rid of the 'capitalistic spirit', that ontological perversions of right order in economic life, a market economy could be established which is in reasonable harmony with right order. Perhaps significantly, the notion of a 'socially guided market economy' as proposed by the German economist Arthur Spienthoff (d. 1957) is mentioned by Pesch in this section. The contemporary German economy, a quarter of a century after Pesch died, began to be identified as the 'social market economy'. (Cf. Rupert Ederer, Heinrich Pesch on Solidarist Economics, University Press of America, 1998, pp. 104-105)

¹²"However, man alone is always and everywhere the lord over natural energy and the world of material goods; and he is never to be placed on the same level as these, even though he may be the most humble worker, and even if the physical effectiveness of the machine may far surpass him in the volume of its material output. He is never merely an object or a tool, but always and everywhere the subject and goal of the economy and of economic activity -- in continuous subordination to the law of Him who rules the world which He created not by some derivative right, but by an original, full, sovereign right." (Pesch, Lehrbuch, Vol. 1, Bk. 1, p. 18) This "teleological" and personalistic approach that places the human person at the center of social and economic life -- as its subject and goal -- was subsequently articulated in Papal teaching: "If, then, on this feast day which commemorates both the benignity of the Incarnate Word and the dignity of man (both in its personal and social aspects), We direct our attention to the problem of democracy, examining the forms by which it should be directed if it is to be a true, healthy democracy answering the needs of the moment, our action shows clearly that the interest and solicitude of the Church looks not so much to its external structure and organization -- which depend on the special aspirations of each people -- as to the individual himself, who, so far from being the object and, as it were, a merely passive element in the social order, is in fact, and must be and continue to be, its subject, its foundation and its end." (Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message, 1944) Therefore, the personalistic approach to social sciences can be considered as "anthropocentic" in the sense that their subject and goal is the human person. At the same time, however, personalism, understood in this sense, does not contradict the "theocentric" conception of Christian humanism as indicated by Pope Benedict XVI: "All this is of man, because man is the subject of his own existence; and at the same time it is of God, because God is at the beginning and end of all that is good, all that leads to salvation: ‘the world or life or death or the present or the future, all are yours; and you are Christ's; and Christ is God's’ (1 Cor 3:22-23)”. (CV, 79)

Pope Benedict On Solidarity and Subsidiarity

2010-03-16T12:06:00.001-07:00

Pope Benedict XVI has encouraged the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences to contribute to the development of the Church’s social doctrine by examining the interrelationships between human dignity, common good, solidarity and subsidiarity. Pope Benedict reflected on this theme during his May 2008 Address to the Participants in the 14th Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences.

The Holy Father posed the question to the Pontifical Academy in the following terms: "How can solidarity and subsidiarity work together in the pursuit of the common good in a way that not only respects human dignity, but allows it to flourish? This is the heart of the matter which concerns you." The Holy Father begins with a definition of terms:

Human dignity is the intrinsic value of a person created in the image and likeness of God and redeemed by Christ. The totality of social conditions allowing persons to achieve their communal and individual fulfilment is known as the common good. Solidarity refers to the virtue enabling the human family to share fully the treasure of material and spiritual goods, and subsidiarity is the coordination of society’s activities in a way that supports the internal life of the local communities.

Pope Benedict then gives a subtle warning that “definitions are only the beginning. What is more, these definitions are adequately grasped only when linked organically¹ to one another and seen as mutually supportive of one another." In other words, these concepts must not be viewed in isolation to one another but are mutually supportive and interdependent. The Holy Father then describes how these related concepts can be visualized in graphical form:

We can initially sketch the interconnections between these four principles by placing the dignity of the person²at the intersection of two axes: one horizontal, representing "solidarity" and "subsidiarity", and one vertical, representing the "common good". This creates a field upon which we can plot the various points of Catholic social teaching that give shape to the common good.

Then comes another subtle warning regarding the limitations of graphic analogies that attempt to represent a "reality that is much more complex."

Indeed, the unfathomable depths of the human person and mankind’s marvellous capacity for spiritual communion – realities which are fully disclosed only through divine revelation – far exceed the capacity of schematic representation. The solidarity that binds the human family, and the subsidiary levels reinforcing it from within, must however always be placed within the horizon of the mysterious life of the Triune God (cf. Jn 5:26; 6:57), in whom we perceive an ineffable love shared by equal, though nonetheless distinct, persons (cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 42).

Horizontal and Vertical

The horizontal dimension of solidarity and subsidiarity is related to the temporal plane and is primarily concerned with the right ordering of society in view of “civil peace” and “concord among citizens”. On one hand the subsidiarity principle seeks to ensure a sufficient autonomy for individuals and lower social units. To deny this autonomy and private initiative is to stifle authentic human development and slide into unjust modes of authoritarianism. Yet this proper autonomy is not an absolute autonomy since there are reciprocal duties toward others and the common good of all. It is the fraternal bonds of solidarity that binds together all men as in a “human family” – ensuring that the needs of the “other” and the entire community are kept clearly in view. In this sense, the horizontal view of solidarity and subsidiarity strives for that proper balance between the needs of the human person as well as the needs of the community – while providing an effective safeguard against the opposite extremes of individualism or collectivism. In this sense, Pope Benedict affirms that the "principle of subsidiarity must remain closely linked to the principle of solidarity and vice versa, since the former without the latter gives way to social privatism, while the latter without the former gives way to paternalist social assistance that is demeaning to those in need." (CV, 58)

While the social scientist may be primarily concerned with the horizontal dimension, the theologian brings to light the necessary importance of the vertical dimension: “When we examine the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity in the light of the Gospel, we realize that they are not simply ‘horizontal’: they both have an essentially vertical dimension… I encourage you to survey both the ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ dimensions of solidarity and subsidiarity.” The vertical dimension helps us to see the connection between the temporal and the spiritual realms – between the natural and the supernatural:

In this regard, the tranquillitas ordinis of which Saint Augustine speaks refers to "all things": that is to say both "civil peace", which is a "concord among citizens", and the "peace of the heavenly city", which is the "perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God, and of one another in God" (De Civitate Dei, XIX, 13)…The eyes of faith permit us to see that the heavenly and earthly cities interpenetrate and are intrinsically ordered to one another, inasmuch as they both belong to God the Father, who is "above all and through all and in all" (Eph 4:6). At the same time, faith places into sharper focus the due autonomy of earthly affairs, insofar as they are "endowed with their own stability, truth, goodness, proper laws and order" (Gaudium et Spes, 36).

Nature and Grace

The horizontal and vertical dimensions are mutually supportive and analogous to how grace builds on nature. In this sense, the twin principles of solidarity and subsidiarity “have the potential to place men and women on the path to discovering their definitive, supernatural destiny. The natural human inclination to live in community is confirmed and transformed by the ‘oneness of Spirit’ which God has bestowed upon his adopted sons and daughters (cf. Eph 4:3; 1 Pet 3:8).”

Therefore, the natural virtue of solidarity – based on friendship and the recognition of the essential equality and intrinsic worth of the other – is oriented towards the perfection of fraternal and supernatural charity.

In this sense, true solidarity – though it begins with an acknowledgment of the equal worth of the other – comes to fulfillment only when I willingly place my life at the service of the other (cf. Eph 6:21). Herein lies the "vertical" dimension of solidarity: I am moved to make myself less than the other so as to minister to his or her needs (cf. Jn 13:14-15), just as Jesus "humbled himself" so as to give men and women a share in his divine life with the Father and the Spirit (cf. Phil 2:8; Mat 23:12).

Subsidiarity also has a vertical dimension insofar as the natural inclination towards family life and private associations – that “demands of higher authorities respect for these relationships” – points “toward the Creator of the social order (cf. Rom 12:16, 18).” Additionally, the natural inclinations and respect for individual responsibility and private initiative “leave space for love (cf. Rom 13:8; Deus Caritas Est, 28), which always remains ‘the most excellent way’ (cf. 1 Cor 12:31).”

We can summarize by highlighting the essential interrelationship between solidarity and subsidiarity in promoting and supporting integral human development. This perspective helps us to keep in view both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of solidarity and subsidiarity – as these are related analogous to how grace builds on nature. In Caritas in Veritate, Pope Benedict goes further by recalling the reality of "original sin" and man’s wounded nature that leaves him inclined to evil. In this sense, man is not able to build and sustain solidarity and a fraternal community by his own efforts:

Because it is a gift received by everyone, charity in truth is a force that builds community, it brings all people together without imposing barriers or limits. The human community that we build by ourselves can never, purely by its own strength, be a fully fraternal community, nor can it overcome every division and become a truly universal community. The unity of the human race, a fraternal communion transcending every barrier, is called into being by the word of God-who-is-Love. In addressing this key question, we must make it clear, on the one hand, that the logic of gift does not exclude justice, nor does it merely sit alongside it as a second element added from without; on the other hand, economic, social and political development, if it is to be authentically human, needs to make room for the principle of gratuitousness as an expression of fraternity. (Cf. CV, 34)

notes

¹In this sense, the personalist principle, solidarity and subsidiarity together form an integral part of a just social order.

²This centrality and primacy of the human person in politics and economics is commonly referred to as the personalist principle (personalism) that is founded on integral or Christian humanism. In this sense, the concept of "integral human development" is dependent upon the organically linked principles of personalism, solidarity and subsidiarity.

Religious Freedom: Disputed Questions (Part VII)

2010-02-24T09:22:00.001-08:00

Religious Freedom and the Social Kingship of Christ

I would like to conclude these reflections by taking a closer look into the relationship between religious freedom and the Social Kingship of Christ. Specifically, do the rights to religious freedom and conscience contradict the absolute rights of God? Do “modern” political systems, as such, violate the rights of the one true Church? According to some these appear to be mutually exclusive and necessarily opposed. One could summarize the essence of the argument as follows:

The Social Kingship of Christ universally demands - regardless of particular circumstances or social context – the civil recognition of the Catholic Church as the one true Church along with all of the rights and prerogatives that this entails – to the exclusion of all other religious bodies and forms of worship. Therefore, modern pluralist systems and secular democratic states deny the Social Kingship of Christ and the absolute rights of God and His Church. Catholics are forced to a practical toleration of such “modern” systems only because we do not currently have the necessary means to implement the “Social Kingship of Christ”. This is the teaching of Pope Pius IX reflected in the Syllabus.

Unfortunately, certain propositions (e.g., 77 & 78) from the Syllabus are often badly understood or taken without due regard for context, principles of interpretation and logic (Cf. The Intervention of Mgr. Dupanloup). I would propose, however, that religious freedom, in the sense we have discussed, is rooted in God’s absolute rights over man and society. Therefore, the Social Reign of Christ presupposes a social context consistent with the requirements of human freedom – in accordance with the will of God. In this sense, Christ does not truly reign in society until he first reigns freely in hearts, minds and wills.¹ When Christ reigns freely in hearts, minds and wills His reign will overflow [naturally and organically] into families, social institutions and the state itself.² What this means is that pluralist systems of government may often be required precisely in order to uphold the rights of God – who wills human freedom (individually and in a social context) as a precondition to show forth the Kingship of Christ over all creation and in particular over human societies (Cf. CCC, 2105). In order to demonstrate this more clearly we will consider a number of Catholic principles that must be taken together as a whole:

First, we should recall that man’s rights are ultimately founded upon his duties toward God. Yet human rights are not unlimited and unqualified. On the contrary, "duties set a limit on rights because they point to the anthropological and ethical framework of which rights are a part, in this way ensuring that they do not become license" (CV, 43). Therefore, man’s relative rights are ultimately rooted in God’s absolute rights – and never opposed.

Second, we may recall that God has created man in His own image and wills the natural freedom or self-determination of man as the foundation for moral freedom.³ Therefore, even in turning away from God, man retains his natural right to self-determination and freedom [immunity] from coercion in faith (Cf. DH, 2). Bishop Ketteler articulated this point as follows: “Christianity accords to man his full right of self-determination and recognizes in this right his fullest dignity and nobility. In fact, Christianity by its doctrine of eternal damnation recognizes the ultimate consequence of this right, because this teaching implies that God will even permit men to eternally contradict Him rather than violate man's sacred right to self-determination." (Cf. Ketteler, Sermon on "The Christian Concept of Human Freedom", December 17, 1848; See also: FAQ's On Religious Freedom)

Third, God requires man to be obedient to the dictates of conscience as the proximate and subjective norm of morality. Therefore, man has the corresponding right to act in obedience to conscience, within due limits (See Part II of this series).

Fourth, the right to self-determination and immunity from coercion in faith applies to all men – individually and collectively. Therefore, the civil ruler may not simply establish his own religion – to the exclusion of all others – without due regard for the religious convictions of the body politic. In other words, the Social Kingship of Christ is something to be freely and organically realized rather than something to be mechanically imposed upon society in an absolutist manner. The response to such forms of absolutism in modern times has been a steady movement to recover those legitimate and essential aspects of "democracy" especially to curb “authoritarianism [that] excludes the citizens from all effective participation in, or influence upon the formation of the will of the society. Consequently, it [absolutism] splits the nation into two categories, the rulers and the ruled, and the mutual relationship between the two either becomes purely mechanical, being governed by force, or has no more than a biological basis…On the other hand, if we keep in mind the favourite thesis of democracy – which has been expounded in all ages by outstanding Christian thinkers – namely, that the original subject of civil power derived from God is the people (not the “masses”), then the distinction between the Church and even the democratic State becomes increasingly clear…The ecclesiastical power is, indeed essentially different from the civil power, and hence its judicial power is also different from the State. The origin of the Church, unlike the origin of the State, is not to be found in the Natural Law…In one point, however, the fundamental difference between the two is particularly manifest. The establishment of the Church as a society was not effected from below, as was the case in the origin of the State, but from above…” (Cf. Pope Pius XII, AAS, 1945, p. 256; See also: On Governmental Forms)

Fifth, the Church is entrusted by God with a spiritual mission and is entitled to pursue it in full freedom and with the necessary support from the civil power.⁴ Therefore, the state has the duty to respect the full freedom and rightful autonomy of the Church. Additionally, political leaders must cooperate with the Church while ensuring her protection. In his 1953 Address to Catholic Jurists (Ci Riesce), Pope Pius XII identified the essential requirements of any Concordat between the Church and the State. Concordats are an "expression of collaboration between the Church and State...The Concordats, therefore, must assure to the Church a stable condition in right and in fact in the State with which they are concluded, and must guarantee to her full independence in the fulfillment of her divine mission." (See also: FAQ's On Church and State)

Sixth, political leaders must favor religious truth and objective moral goodness – while at the same time respecting the rights of conscience and the religious convictions of the body politic: “The Church has not just one principle to keep in mind – man’s obligation as a social being to make social profession of his religion – there are other Catholic principles: that individual persons are obliged to follow their consciences, even erroneous consciences; that no man may be constrained to accept Catholicism; and finally, that the State has the obligation to provide for the common welfare of all, not simply its Catholic citizens” (Cf. Van Noort, Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, Newman Press, 1957, pp. 382-383; See also Part IV of this series).

Seventh, while the Catholic ideal (thesis) is the perfection of Catholic unity⁵, the optimal solution in the juridical order (hypothesis) – to analogically realize the “full freedom”, “cooperation” and “favor” towards religious truth – will legitimately vary according to the just requirements of a given social context. For example, concordats between the Church and the state – while always preserving the essential immutable principles – often will vary in practical application depending upon the particular circumstances. In other circumstances the Church may prudently renounce certain acquired rights or other non-essential privileges that may be potentially detrimental to her spiritual mission or no longer considered equitable within the context of a non-Catholic or mixed population (See, for example, Pope Pius XI concerning the Lateran Treaty, A.A.S., 1929, pp. 108-109; Cf., Journet, op. cit., p. 466; Also, see Cardinal Cerejeira, patriarch of Lisbon, concerning the 1940 concordat with Portugal, November 18, 1941; Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, CUA Press, 1951, p. 163). Dr. John Rao provides some helpful insights from Taparelli in this context: “And, truth to say, one cannot artificially enforce a unity that does not exist. In such circumstances, the Church might ask for only one thing: freedom to preach, to speak, to publish, and to teach---the same freedom that would be granted to all other groups that did not manifestly violate the dictates of reason. ‘This is the protection she demands from the governments of non-Catholic peoples’, Taparelli wrote in 1850; ‘she does not ask for violent actions to promote her; she asks no benefit to suborn others; she is strong enough with her own light and efforts.’” (Cf. Rao, Theology of the Mystical Body, Ch. 4; See also: The Intervention of Mgr. Dupanloup - Part II)

Eighth, within a mixed or pluralist context, prudence and justice often dictate political systems that satisfy in a stable manner the demands of tolerance and due freedom of conscience. Far from being opposed to the Social Kingship of Christ, such systems ensure respect for human rights rooted in God’s rights as stated above. In other words, the rights of God and the Church may dictate pluralist systems for the sake of the immutable principles themselves.⁶ Additionally, the reality of a pervasive and progressive globalization has created the need for national and international structures of peaceful coexistence, tolerance and religious freedom. In this sense, Pope Pius XII affirmed that the “increasingly frequent contacts between different religious professions, mingled indiscriminately within the same nation, have caused civil authorities to follow the principles of tolerance and liberty of conscience. In fact, there is a political tolerance, a civil tolerance, a social tolerance, in regard to adherents of other religious beliefs which, in circumstances such as these, is a moral duty for Catholics.” (Pius XII, Allocution to the Roman Rota, October 6, 1946)

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to recall that Bishop von Ketteler had articulated the fundamental principles in connection with Religious Freedom in a manner wholly consistent with the teaching of the great theologians before his time (e.g., St. Thomas and Suarez).⁷ Additionally, we can recognize clear continuity between the teaching of the Bishop of Mainz and the teaching later reflected in Dignitatis Humanae (DH). Therefore, if there is any novelty or innovation to be found in Bishop Ketteler’s teaching it is certainly not at the level of immutable principles. On the other hand, we can find much value in Bishop Ketteler’s application of immutable principles to “new” contexts involving mixed populations within formerly confessional states. In my opinion, this “innovation in continuity” constitutes one of the most valuable aspects of his work – and it greatly anticipates the concepts behind the “hermeneutic of continuity” given by Pope Benedict XVI nearly 150 years later.

In this process of innovation in continuity we must learn to understand more practically than before that the Church's decisions on contingent matters…precisely because they refer to a specific reality that is changeable in itself. It was necessary to learn to recognize that in these decisions it is only the principles that express the permanent aspect, since they remain as an undercurrent, motivating decisions from within. On the other hand, not so permanent are the practical forms that depend on the historical situation and are therefore subject to change. Basic decisions, therefore, continue to be well-grounded, whereas the way they are applied to new contexts can change. (Cf. Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Roman Curia, December 22, 2005)

Back to Part VI Back to Part I

notes

¹Cf. Quas Primas, 7, 33. This aspect of the Social Kingship of Christ is considered from the subjective point of view -- where His objective dominion over all creation is duly recognized by individual hearts, minds and wills. This also corresponds to the petition in the Our Father -- that His Kingdom may come.

²This is also the triple basis of social unity: minds united in truth, wills united in the good, hearts united by the flame of charity. Christians explicitly recognize in Christ all truth, goodness and love - and therefore the basis of all true unity. At the same time, however, others who by grace of faith implicitly recognize Christ as Lord can also contribute towards the building up of a true social unity based upon truth, goodness and the reign of God's love: "The coming-together of such men to co-operate for the good of human society is not based on equivocation. It is based upon "analogical" likeness as between the practical principles, motions, and progressions implied in their common acceptance of the law of love and corresponding to the primary inclinations of human nature. And why should I, a Christian, according to whose faith a single Name has been given to men through whom they can be saved, even in the temporal order, why should I disguise the fact that this community of analogy itself supposes a primum analogatum purely and simply true; and that implicitly and ultimately everything which is authentic love, working in the world for the reconciliation of men and the common good of their life here below, tends, under forms more or less perfect, more or less pure, toward Christ, who is known to some, un- known to others?" (Cf. Maritain, The Journal of Religion, University of Chicago Press, Vol. 21, No. 4, October, 1941)

³Cf. Libertas, 1-3; In DH this is referred to as "psychological freedom" (Cf. DH, 2).

⁴Pope Pius XI identifies the evils that prompted him to initiate the Feast of Christ the King: "The right which the Church has from Christ himself, to teach mankind, to make laws, to govern peoples in all that pertains to their eternal salvation, that right was denied. Then gradually the religion of Christ came to be likened to false religions and to be placed ignominiously on the same level with them. It was then put under the power of the state and tolerated more or less at the whim of princes and rulers. Some men went even further, and wished to set up in the place of God's religion a natural religion consisting in some instinctive affection of the heart. There were even some nations who thought they could dispense with God, and that their religion should consist in impiety and the neglect of God." (Cf. Quas Primas, 24)

⁵According to Vermeersch we "may compare the thesis to an ideal, the perfect realization of which is not possible in this world...And even where complete realization cannot be obtained, it is a great blessing to come near it, and to possess in the ideal that we cherish and the reality that we accept with resignation an end of our efforts, and a rule by which we may measure our social progress" (Cf. Vermeersch, Tolerance, Benziger, 1913, pp. 252-253). In this sense, the notion of a true Catholic "confessional" state, understood as a society freely constituted on the basis of unity in the Catholic Faith, can be understood as "coming near" the absolute ideal considered in the abstract. Such a religiously united society will naturally lead to the "special civil recognition" of the Catholic Church, however, without contradicting due respect for the religious freedom of non-Catholics in their midst. (Cf. DH, 6)

⁶By way of analogy, we can compare this to the legitimate variation in economic systems depending on the context of time and place. For example, in one context just price determination may be fixed by a guild or occupational association. In another context market systems may be utilized as an efficient mechanism for just price determination. In either case, the goal of justice in pricing -- founded upon the immutable prinicple of equivalence -- remains constant. Therefore, in changing circumstances, the systems themselves may need to change for the sake of the immutable principles themselves. We find another example in the case of interest on loans. Fr. Heinrich Pesch notes: "In pastoral practice, those who take modest interest nowadays need not feel concerned, in the light of the penitentiary instructions. The new Codex luris Canonici (Can. 1543) goes further...There were those who attributed the easing of the Church’s position to a concession to the sad state of affairs which came about with capitalism, or to the hardness of men’s hearts. The theologian would have some genuine reservations about such a position. The divine moral law remains ever the same and unchangeable; and the Church, according to Catholic teaching, is its true guardian through the ages…" (Cf. My Opuscula post "Solidarist Perspectives"; Pesch, LDN, 5.2, 4, 1, 5)

⁷Cahill characterizes Ketteler's "Freedom, Authority and the Church" as a "classical expression of the Church's position" on the social question - where the question of religious freedom was thouroughly treated (along with many other related topics) within the context of the broader social question. (Cf. Cahill, The Framework of a Christian State, 1932, RCB, p. 256)

Religious Freedom: Disputed Questions (Part VI)

2010-02-11T10:42:00.001-08:00

Natural Law: A Compromise Confessional State?

We now proceed to analyze another objection to Bishop Ketteler raised by Chris Ferrara in the second installment of his three-part Remnant series. As we have seen, Bishop Ketteler follows the common teaching of Suarez and St. Thomas in placing the [absolute] limits to religious freedom in the juridical order within the confines of the natural moral law (See Part II of this series). On the other hand, those due limits to the full public and civic manifestation of religious freedom can be more restrictive within the context of a confessional state freely constituted on the basis of unity of faith (See Parts I and III of this series). This [absolute] limit to civic religious freedom is also clearly taught in Dignitatis Humanae (DH, 7). Therefore, Mr. Ferrara must concede that the official interpretation of Dignitatis Humanae is consistent with the common teaching expressed by Bishop Ketteler:

Von Ketteler would reply that his criterion for restricting the legal existence of certain sects is, as he puts it, “reason… natural morality, and… the natural order of things. No reasonable moral freedom can go so far as to destroy moral order to which everyone has a right.” As Father Harrison has pointed out, according to the relator at Vatican II (but not the infallible Magisterium) this is essentially the limitation DH would impose on “the right to religious freedom.” (Cf. Chris Ferrara, The Remnant, October 15, 2009, p. 15)

In the next breath, however, Mr. Ferrara sets himself in opposition to this traditional teaching (inclusive of St. Thomas and Suarez) concerning the absolute limit to religious freedom. The basis for this opposition to the common teaching is twofold: (1) it creates a kind of detachment or separation between morality and religious truth; (2) it equates to a compromise or “lowest common denominator” approach to religion and morality.

So, according to von Ketteler, and one reading of DH, the State has the right to repress the public activity of sects only when their tenets attack the moral order, but not when they simply preach heresy—an argument that presumes without demonstration that morality can be detached from the integrity of religious truth, which it clearly cannot be. At least seven obvious objections present themselves to this attempt at a “lowest common denominator” distinction between tolerable and intolerable religious errors. (Cf. Ferrara)

Mr. Ferrara then attempts to defend his position against the common teaching with a series of arguments:

First, according to von Ketteler’s own criterion Protestant sects ought to be restrained from propagating their errors in Catholic countries, since the inevitable tendency of Protestantism is precisely to degrade “reason, morality and the natural order of things.” (ibid)

This is certainly a false representation of Bishop Ketteler’s teaching since (as discussed previously) the spread of heresy would be forbidden in the context of a true confessional state that is freely constituted on the basis of unity in the Catholic faith (See parts I, III and V of this series). In such a religiously united context the due limits to religious freedom corresponds to ecclesiastical law. Additionally, Mr. Ferrara does not explain how the common errors of Protestantism constitute punishable violations of natural law while, as Suarez noted, the practices of Judaism and Islam do not constitute such a violation. In this sense, St. Paul indicates that pagans – not having the law of faith – are a “law to themselves” insofar as they conscientiously conform their actions to the natural moral law that is “written in their hearts” (Rom. 2:14-15). Finally, being illogical regarding supernatural aspects to religious truth is not necessarily a punishable civil offense.

Second, von Ketteler contradicts the Magisterium by limiting the authority of the State in this area to defending the bare existence of some kind of personal God, such as the Masonic Architect of the Universe, and the preservation of “natural morality,” as he calls it. (Cf. Ferrara)

Again, this is a false representation of Bishop Ketteler’s teaching since he clearly affirms the duty of Catholic rulers to give cooperation and positive support to the Church and her spiritual mission. In addition, Bishop Ketteler denounces any indifferentism on the part of civil rulers towards religious and moral truth. At the same time, however, the civil power, as such, does not have an unlimited scope of authority to apply coercive force in all matters pertaining to religious and supernatural truth – as this properly belongs to the domain of the Church. (See part IV of this series)

Third, natural law needs the support of divine law, the revealed will of God in Sacred Scripture and Tradition as enunciated by an infallible teaching authority, if the commands of the natural law are not to be drowned out in a welter of dissenting opinions advanced by fallen men whose reason is darkened by Original Sin…The divine law cannot be separated from the moral life of the rightly ordered State any more than it can from the life of the rightly ordered individual soul. To transgress the divine law is to undermine morality… In short, the State must defend divine law for the sake of morality itself. (Cf. Ferrara)

Certainly Bishop Ketteler nowhere denies the necessity of supernatural grace, divine revelation and the Magisterium of the Church as a divinely constituted teaching authority. The point is that the civil power, as such, does not have the legitimate authority to use coercive power in any of these areas. The state must cooperate and support the Church in these areas as stated above. Therefore, the civil authorities should do all in their power to favor morality and religious truth without violating the limits and legitimate use of their coercive power. Here it is necessary to reflect on the teaching of Pope Pius XII concerning the limits to human authority and coercive power in religious matters: "Could God, although it would be possible and easy for Him to repress error and moral deviation, in some cases choose the "non impedire" without contradicting His infinite perfection? Could it be that in certain circumstances He would not give men any mandate, would not impose any duty, and would not even communicate the right to impede or to repress what is erroneous and false? A look at things as they are gives an affirmative answer…Moreover, God has not given even to human authority such an absolute and universal command in matters of faith and morality. Such a command is unknown to the common convictions of mankind, to Christian conscience, to the sources of Revelation and to the practice of the Church.” (Pope Pius XII, Address to Catholic Jurists, 1953)

Fourth, the minimalist natural religion and “natural morality” von Ketteler would have the State defend by restraining its violators does not actually exist: it has no dogmas, no church to preach it, no Magisterium to define it. (Cf. Ferrara)

On the contrary, the natural moral law is a reality that God has inscribed onto all hearts.¹ In addition, the state has the duty and corresponding right to uphold these laws for the sake of the common good. Can fallen man become confused about the moral law giving rise to the necessity of positive revelation and a divinely constituted teaching authority? Absolutely! Again, the state must favor religious truth and Catholic rulers should support and defend the mission of the Church, however, without going beyond the natural limits that God has imposed on the civil power. In other words, the moral duty to favor the true religion does not imply the native right to the use of coercive power in this domain -- even if such a coercive power can legitimately extend to religious matters, per accidens.² Additionally, Bishop Ketteler notes that the scope of civil authority, as such, does not extend to "supernatural truths of revelation". The Bishop then adds that authority "can be extended if the Church chooses to confer more powers, as the Church did grant additional rights to the ancient Christian rulers – powers which they then exercised in the name of the Church."³ (Cf. Religious Freedom Part II)

Fifth, how would von Ketteler propose that the State defend belief in “a personal God” against sects alleged to attack it? Will the “personal God” whose existence the State defends be a Trinity, a Father, a Great Spirit, a generic Creator or all of the above? (Cf. Ferrara)

Here we must once again recall that the natural moral law dictates the [absolute] limit to religious freedom. The questions posed by Ferrara above presupposes that the objective criterion of the natural moral law is beyond the grasp of man – lacking the common grammar necessary to pursue the natural end of the state (Cf. Rom. 2:14-15). Fr. Higgins notes that the “natural law indicates only the broadest outline of the mode of worshiping God. But there is a vast array of systems by which the one true God is worshiped” (Cf. Higgins, Man as Man: The Science and Art of Ethics, TAN Publishers, p. 185). At the same time, however, the natural law indicates those vices opposed to true religion including: indifference, relativism, irreligion, blasphemy, sacrilege, simony, perjury, superstition, idolatry, divination and magic (Cf. Higgins, op cit., pp. 186-189; Fr. Fagothey, Right and Reason, TAN, pp. 271-272). These vices against religion can be known by the light of natural reason and the natural law and are objectively harmful to the state. Therefore, the civil power has the duty to favor and promote true religious virtue and the legitimate authority to apply coercion when necessary against such vices in view of the common good.

Sixth, when disputes arise over whether a sect is really guilty of professing one of von Ketteler’s repressible errors—“denial of a personal God,” “foster[ing] crass materialism,” or teachings “which jeopardize morality”—to what authority would the State have recourse in determining the impermissible variations of the “personal God” tenet, the forbidden “crass materialism,” or the unacceptable moral opinions? If not the Catholic Church, then who? And if the Church, have we not returned to the concept of the Catholic confessional state? (Cf. Ferrara)

It is unclear whether Ferrara is referring to the context of a true confessional Catholic state, an absolutist regime, or a secular state with a mixed population. In the former case, doctrinal “disputes” are settled by the authority of the Church. Within the context of an absolutist regime religious and moral questions are settled by the will of the ruler -- following the principle of the so-called "divine right of kings" or adopting the principle of Louis XIV: L’Etat c’est moi (I am the state). Within the context of a pluralist or mixed secular state, however, the “disputes” concerning the objective criterion of the moral law must be resolved by reasoned public debate. This has nothing to do with positivistic convention based on artificial "consensus". Rather, it involes a natural and necessary process of reasoning and discernment regarding the objective content of the natural moral law and its prudential application to concrete circumstances. Taparelli expressed a similar view as noted by Dr. John Rao: “What happens if a society suffers an obvious, severe division of opinion regarding religious truth, as in any modern pluralist society? Every Catholic in such circumstances, the Civiltà argued, should strive to re-Catholicize the society in question with the greatest possible vigor. Nevertheless, the Catholic living under these conditions of disunity could demand from the State only those restrictions on error that were commonly accepted by everyone as being rational and natural” (Cf. Rao, Theology of the Mystical Body, Ch. 4). The Church plays a crucial role in this process by making her voice heard and by enlightening the consciences of Catholics and all men of good will. For their part, the Catholic laity has its own crucial role to play including the duty and right to engage in the “apostolate in the social milieu, that is, the effort to infuse a Christian spirit into the mentality, customs, laws, and structures of the community in which one lives…so that they attract all to the love of the true and the good and finally to the Church and to Christ” (AA, 13). (See also part IV of this series)

Seventh, today an enormous variety of religious sects fall into the category even von Ketteler would deem intolerable and deserving of repression. But since modern society, having rejected the organic union of Church and State, is no longer united concerning the existence, nature or attributes of God or the moral principles from which the sects have long since defected in condoning divorce, contraception, abortion, adultery, premarital sex, homosexual relations, etc., on what ground would von Ketteler stand, were he were alive in 2009, to insist that the State must restrain the propagation of the errors he deemed intolerable in 1862 as threats to “reason, natural morality, and the natural order of things”? (Cf. Ferrara)

As we have seen, Bishop Ketteler laments the disunity of the faith and its consequences to the state and civil society. Furthermore, having recognized the de facto disunity it is no longer legitimate to employ a mode of coercion that is proper to true confessional states. Were Bishop Ketteler alive today he would no doubt speak as he did within the context of a mixed Germany. He would speak out in defense of the Church and religious and moral truth. He would encourage the Catholic faithful to take up their crucial role in the apostolate in the social milieu. In summary, Bishop Ketteler would continue to do now what he had done then.

Back to Part V Forward to Part VII

notes

¹We can also note here that the natural law, properly understood, is necessarily open to the transcendent and the truths given by way of positive divine revelation.

²The implication here is that religious and spiritual matters can accidentally and temporarily assume a temporal character. In such special cases of necessity, the civil power may be justified - by virtue of its own unique title - to the use coercive power in religious matters -- but never exercised contrary to the objective moral order.

³This corresponds to the temporal power acting as "secular arm" to the Church within the context of of confessional or sacral state.

The Peaceful Co-existence of Rites

2010-01-30T10:03:00.001-08:00

In Summorum Pontificum, Pope Benedict XVI fully restored the ancient use of the Latin Rite so that it can once again take up its “proper place” within the Church. Indeed, in his introductory letter to the Bishops the Holy Father indicated that the co-existence of two forms of the Roman Rite can be “mutually enriching”. One of the most striking aspects of the Motu Proprio is established in the very first article. The co-existence of the two Roman Missals correspond to two expressions (Lex orandi) of the same Catholic Faith (Lex credendi).

Art 1. The Roman Missal promulgated by Paul VI is the ordinary expression of the 'Lex orandi' (Law of prayer) of the Catholic Church of the Latin rite. Nonetheless, the Roman Missal promulgated by St. Pius V and reissued by Bl. John XXIII is to be considered as an extraordinary expression of that same 'Lex orandi,' and must be given due honour for its venerable and ancient usage. These two expressions of the Church's Lex orandi will in no any way lead to a division in the Church's 'Lex credendi' (Law of belief). They are, in fact two usages of the one Roman rite.

Of course, there remains some dispute among traditionalists whether this is really the case. What would Archbishop Lefebvre say if he were still alive today? We can gain some insight into his thinking by recalling what he wrote to Dr. Saventhem on September 17, 1976. The Archbishop explains why he felt he had to reject the New Mass in such harsh terms. For him, the abandonment and practical suppression of the old Mass in favor of a new Mass signaled the attempt to impose a new and substantially different Lex credendi.

The fact is, it was necessary for me to denounce the new rites as “bastard” rites and to say that the new rite of Mass is “the symbol of a new faith, a Modernist faith”; and one of the chief reasons for that was the rigor of the attempt to proscribe the old rites. That rigor can be explained on the hypothesis that the purpose was to drive out of the Church, along with those venerable rites, the doctrines of which they are the expression.

Now, if only the old Mass could recover its “proper place” within the life of the Church it would prove the continuity of the one Lex credendi.

If the proscription of our old rites were lifted, that could be taken as a sign that Rome does not wish to impose on us, by means of a completely altered lex orandi, a new law of faith. And if, thenceforward, those venerable rites recovered, in the lived liturgy of the Church, the rights and honors due to them, that would be striking evidence that the Church called “Conciliar” allows us to profess the same faith, and to draw from the same sacramental sources, as the Church of all time…

The Archbishop then expresses his hope for the peaceful co-existence of the rites where people would be free to adopt one or the other form according to their spiritual needs.

For the universal Church I hope, as you do, for the peaceful co-existence of the pre- and post-conciliar rites. Priests and people could then choose to which “rite family” they would belong. Time would then let us know God’s judgement on their comparative values for truth and for their salutary effect on the Catholic Church and on the whole of Christendom. (Cf. Davies, Apologia Pro Marcel Lefebvre, Vol. 1, pp. 293-294)

Religious Freedom: Disputed Questions (Part V)

2010-01-29T12:57:00.001-08:00

Variable Application of “Due-Limits”

In this installment we will take a closer look at how the application of the due limits to religious freedom will vary according to the requirements of a given social context. Bishop Ketteler has articulated some key principles in this area.

In the first place, Bishop Ketteler establishes that religious unity is a blessing for society. Additionally, he establishes that societies have a natural right to preserve and protect those bonds of social unity (i.e., their common faith) from corruption. Consequently, in a context where there is lacking true religious unity among the body politic the temporal authority, as such, has no justification or foundation in natural law to employ coercive power in matters of supernatural faith (i.e., religious truth that is beyond the reach of unaided natural reason). In this sense, Bishop Ketteler says that “treating heresy as a civil matter is no longer legitimate once the unity of the Faith has been shattered. Disunity destroys the essential prerequisites…” Therefore, within the context of a mixed society where religious unity is lacking, civil rulers have the obligation to protect the religious freedom of everyone (Catholic and non-Catholic citizens), within the due limits of the natural moral law. In this sense, Bishop Ketteler refers to the situation of Germany in his day when he wrote that “…today we will have to bear with each other as the best we can, and the State will have the obligation, above all, to preserve the religious freedom of all.” Here we must pause to consider an objection raised by Chris Ferrara who rejects Ketteler’s teaching on this point as “pure liberalism”. The main thrust of Ferrara's argument goes as follows:

Without even defining the term religious freedom in the first place, von Ketteler has moved from acknowledging the validity of “natural laws” protecting the faith of the Christian people from error in “those times” to an “obligation” on the part of the State not to enact or enforce such laws any longer…Notice the non sequitur implicit in the argument: Since protection of the true religion by admittedly “natural laws” has become impracticable in Catholic countries because they are no longer religiously united, therefore everyone in Catholic countries must have “religious freedom”…Now, if the current non-enforceability of “natural laws” defending true religion implied a correlative general “freedom” from such laws rather than a strictly limited toleration dictated by political prudence, then the subjects of civil authority would logically have to be given “freedom” not to be prevented from committing any offense whose punishment is deemed impractical because the subjects no longer agree that the prohibited conduct is wrong. (Cf. The Remnant, October 15, 2009, p. 14)

The root of the misunderstanding seems to be a lack of due appreciation for the variable application of immutable principles according to the requirements of a given social context (see Part I of this series). What this means is that the “due limits” to religious freedom will necessarily vary (i.e., they are not univocally applied) insofar as a given country is either united by a common faith or composed of members from various religious traditions. In a country composed of Catholics the “due limits” to religious freedom will naturally correspond to the norms given by ecclesiastical law (e.g., the spread of heresy will be prohibited). This does not violate the religious freedom of citizens since Catholics freely bind themselves by their baptismal promises. Nor does it violate the [due] religious freedom of non-Catholics residing in such a religiously united Catholic country. In this case the exercise of the natural right to religious freedom is juridically limited from its full public and civic expression in view of preserving the unity of a common faith (see Part III of this series). As noted above, religously united societies have a natural right to employ legitimate means in order to protect and preserve such a religious unity. On the other hand, in the context of a “mixed” society the due limits to religious freedom will correspond to the requirements given by the [objective] natural moral law. The reason is that all men (Christians and non-Christians) are subject to the natural moral law insofar as it has been inscribed [promulgated] by God onto the hearts of all men. Additionally, no natural society can sustain itself apart from obedience to the natural law that God has inscribed onto all hearts.¹ Therefore, for the sake of the common good, societies have the duty and corresponding right to uphold the natural moral law even in religious matters. The objective character of the natural moral law rules out any notion of moral relativism or subjectivism. One who violates the fundamental precepts of the natural moral law and strays from right reason – even for supposedly religious reasons – can legitimately be restrained by civil authorities for the sake of the common good and the good of individual citizens.

Back to Part IV Forward to Part VI

notes

¹This does not in any way diminish the importance and necessity of positive divine law or supernatural truth. What this does imply, however, is that the Church has competence in matters pertaining to the supernatural truths of revelation and it belongs to the Church to bring these truths to bear upon society by enlightening consciences. For its part, the State has an obligation to cooperate with and support the Church in the accomplishment of her divine mission (see Part IV of this series).

The Goal of Ecumenism

2010-01-15T12:42:00.001-08:00

In his plenary address to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (January 15, 2010), Pope Benedict XVI affirmed that the successor of Peter is the primary guardian and defender of the sacred deposit. His ministry towards unity involves unity of faith above all else so that there be one flock and one shepherd. Ecumenism, in the proper sense of the term, is nothing more than an outward manifestation of this constant ministry towards unity. In other words, the ultimate goal of ecumenism is the “full and visible communion of the disciples of the Lord”. For Pope Benedict XVI, the Apostolic Constitution Anglicanorum Ceotibus -- far from being contrary to true ecumenism -- represents an example of its ultimate aim towards the perfection of visible Catholic unity. In this manner, Pope Benedict XVI once again defends "continuity" with respect to Tradition and Vatican II while dispelling false notions (rupture) with respect to ecumenism.

Ecumenism: Progression of Stages

This “ministry towards unity” is always present, however, it need not be carried out in exactly the same (practical) manner in every particular circumstance. Nor must it necessarily take place suddenly or all at once. What this means is that the practical guidelines or norms for ecumenical activity can be revised as deemed prudent by the Holy See. In this sense, the Vatican II Decree on Ecumenism -- while preserving the continuity of immutable principles -- can be seen as an update to the practical guidelines for ecumenical activity that were in place prior to Vatican II. The Vatican II decree gives a broad outline for the various practical steps or stages of ecumenical activity oriented towards full visible unity in the Catholic Church (UR, 4).

Stage 1: Charity in Truth

“…first, every effort to avoid expressions, judgments and actions which do not represent the condition of our separated brethren with truth and fairness and so make mutual relations with them more difficult…”

Stage 2: Dialogue

One does not engage in "dialogue" merely for its own sake. The purpose of such theological exchanges is mutual understanding in order to overcome those differences that represent obstacles to full Catholic unity -- one faith, one baptism, one Lord...

“…then, ‘dialogue’ between competent experts from different Churches and Communities… In such dialogue, everyone gains a truer knowledge and more just appreciation of the teaching and religious life of both Communions…”

Stage 3: Cooperation

Christians should work together to build on the level or degree of unity that exists between them. In this way, the various Christian communities ought to join together in causes that promote Christian and moral values for the good of individuals and society: life, marriage, freedom of religion in the public square, etc.

“In addition, the way is prepared for cooperation between them in the duties for the common good of humanity which are demanded by every Christian conscience; and, wherever this is allowed, there is prayer in common.”

Stage 4: Conversion of Hearts

This is conversion in the sense of an inward change of heart that all Christians are called to make. Pope Benedict XVI notes that the newer formula for the imposition of ashes on Ash Wednesday "reminds us that conversion is meant to be a deep and lasting abandonment of our sinful ways in order to enter into a living relationship with Christ, who alone offers true freedom, happiness and fulfilment." Additionally, the traditional or "extraordinary" form of the Divine Office makes it clear that conversion is a daily calling for Catholics (Converte nos, Deus, salutaris noster; Make us turn to Thee, O God our Savior) so that our actions do not scandalize others presenting further obstacles to unity.

“Finally, all are led to examine their own faithfulness to Christ's will for the Church and accordingly to undertake with vigor the task of renewal and reform.”

Stage 5: Final Preparation and Reconciliation

The various preliminary stages above are supposed to lead to conversion in the sense of formal enterance into the Catholic Church (i.e., "full and visible communion"). Therefore, this last step is not considered ecumenism, strictly speaking, but rather is considered as the ultimate goal of ecumenism.

“When such actions are undertaken prudently and patiently by the Catholic faithful, with the attentive guidance of their bishops, they promote justice and truth, concord and collaboration, as well as the spirit of brotherly love and unity. This is the way that, when the obstacles to perfect ecclesiastical communion have been gradually overcome, all Christians will at last, in a common celebration of the Eucharist, be gathered into the one and only Church in that unity which Christ bestowed on His Church from the beginning. We believe that this unity subsists in the Catholic Church as something she can never lose, and we hope that it will continue to increase until the end of time… However, it is evident that, when individuals wish for full Catholic communion, their preparation and reconciliation is an undertaking which of its nature is distinct from ecumenical action. But there is no opposition between the two, since both proceed from the marvelous ways of God.”

O GOD, Who settest straight what has gone astray, and gatherest together what is scattered, and keepest what Thou hast gathered together; we beseech Thee in Thy mercy to pour down on Christian people the grace of union with Thee, that, putting disunion aside and joining themselves to the true Shepherd of Thy Church, they may be able to render Thee worthy service. Through our Lord. (Collect, Mass For The Unity of The Church, 1962 Missal)

Religious Freedom: Disputed Questions (Part IV)

2010-01-08T14:51:00.001-08:00

Temporal and Spiritual

This segment will focus on the nature and relation between the temporal and spiritual powers in connection with the religious freedom debate. We will also take a more detailed look at Bishop Ketteler’s teaching in response to certain criticisms raised by Mr. Ferrara in The Remnant (Cf. Part I in the edition of September 30, 2009). Specifically, Mr. Ferrara criticizes Bishop Ketteler for having a defective conception of the distinction and relationship between the temporal and spiritual powers. According to Ferrara, Ketteler would “compartmentalize” the temporal power to the extent that it becomes completely indifferent in religious matters and totally aloof with regard to its obligations towards religious truth and the Church. According to Ferrara, the Bishop of Mainz advocates a brand of “separation” that excludes any kind of mutual support or harmonious and reciprocal cooperation between the two distinct powers (e.g., as compared to the orderly union that exists between the body and soul – each performing its distinct functions according to its nature and competence in view of the welfare of the whole person). The Church, however, insists upon the distinction of powers in order to assert her rightful autonomy and to keep absolutist rulers (often times these are rulers with the best of intentions) in check or from arrogating to themselves an authority that does not properly belong to them according to the nature and scope of the temporal office. Yet this distinction of competencies and jurisdiction does not involve a “separation” that excludes their necessary mutual cooperation in view of the temporal and spiritual welfare of their common subjects. Perhaps the best way to clarify the matter is to present Bishop Ketteler in his own words. Before doing so, however, it would be appropriate to briefly survey some key aspects regarding the distinction of powers and their orderly connection.

The “Separation” of Powers

The principle of the “separation” of powers was first alluded to by Our Lord in His distinction between the things that belong to Ceaser and those that belong to God (Matthew 22:21). Cardinal Ratzinger, in contrasting Eastern and Western traditions, quotes Pope Gelasius I who explains why Christ had not consolidated and delegated all authority, both spiritual and temporal, to a single human power.

"In Byzantium, the empire and the Church were virtually identified with each other, and the emperor was also the head of the Church. He understood himself as the vicar of Christ and bore the official title "king and priest" from the sixth century onward, following the example of Melchizedek, who was both king and priest (Gen, 14:18). After Constantine left Rome and the emperors no longer resided in the earlier imperial capital, it was possible for the autonomous position of the bishop of Rome as successor of Peter and head of the Church to develop there, and the doctrine of the dual authority was taught in Rome from the beginning of the Constantinian epoch. The emperor and the pope each had an authority of his own, and neither of them possessed the totality of power. Pope Gelasius I (492-496) formulated the Western view in his famous letter to Emperor Anastasius, and even more clearly in his fourth treatise, in which he responds to the Byzantine use of the typology of Melchizedek by emphasizing that it is only in Christ that the two authorities are united: 'It is Christ himself, because of human weakness (superbia!), who separated the two offices for the subsequent ages, so that no one might exalt himself' (chap. 11). The Christian emperors require the priests (pontifices) for things pertaining to eternal life. In turn, the priests adhere to the ordinances promulgated by the emperor for the temporal course of affairs. In secular matters the priests must follow the laws of the emperor, who is installed in office by God's decree, but in divine matters the emperor must submit to the priests. This introduced a separation and distinction of powers that was to be immensely important for the subsequent development of Europe, laying the foundation of that which is typically Western. Since such demarcations did not suppress the desire on both sides to possess the totality of power or the yearning to subordinate the other side to its own authority, this principle of separation was also the source of unending suffering." (Cf. Cardinal Ratzinger, Address to the Italian Senate in Rome, May, 2004)

The “separation” of powers in this sense is intended to provide a kind of “balance of power” in such a way that promotes and preserves the principle of the “rule of law” while providing an effective check against tyranny (Cf. CCC, 1904; ST. i-ii, 90, 1). Father Vermeersch articulates this principle as follows:

“Everywhere and always we insist on the distinction between the domain of religion and the domain of civil authority. We maintain that above each of these there is an independent and sovereign authority, in order by this very distinction and this balance of power to set up a bulwark against tyranny and provide a refuge for liberty.” (Vermeersch, Tolerance, Benziger, 1913, p. 256)

The Scope of each Power and their Orderly Connection

The respective scope of authority for the spiritual and temporal powers was clearly articulated by Pope Leo XIII in the following terms:

The Almighty, therefore, has given the charge of the human race to two powers, the ecclesiastical and the civil, the one being set over divine, and the other over human, things. Each in its kind is supreme, each has fixed limits within which it is contained, limits which are defined by the nature and special object of the province of each, so that there is, we may say, an orbit traced out within which the action of each is brought into play by its own native right. (Pope Leo XIII, Immortale Dei)

What exactly does this mean? Basically, we are to understand from this that Church and State are each “perfect” societies that are ontologically distinct (i.e., separate in a metaphysical sense). At the same time, however, the Church and the State are intended by God to complement each other in view of man’s supernatural and temporal welfare (i.e., united in a moral sense). Pope Pius XII gives further explanation of this teaching:

This last difference between the two societies, based upon their respective ends, undoubtedly excludes that violent subjection of the Church to the State…But it does not exclude every kind of union between the two societies…Such a view would…leave out of consideration the fact that the Church and the State both have their origin in God and that both are concerned with the same subject – human beings…All this could not and did not escape the attention of Pope Leo XIII when, in his encyclical Immortale Dei…he defined clearly the limits of the two societies in terms of their ends, observing that the proximate and special end of the State is to care for man’s earthly prosperity, while that of the Church is to procure their heavenly and eternal welfare. (Pius XII, Allocution to the Roman Rota, October 29, 1947)

The two distinct societies, therefore, are intended by God to cooperate and complement one another in view of the welfare of the whole Man and all men. In order for Church and State to accomplish their respective spiritual and temporal missions, Pope Leo XIII indicates that they should observe the principles of an “orderly connection” analogous to that between body and soul. Each performs its own function (within its sphere of competence) in view of the good of the entire man. One power has competence in the civil and political order while the other is concerned above all with man’s eternal life and matters of a sacred character.

There must, accordingly, exist between these two powers a certain orderly connection, which may be compared to the union of the soul and body in man. The nature and scope of that connection can be determined only, as We have laid down, by having regard to the nature of each power, and by taking account of the relative excellence and nobleness of their purpose. One of the two has for its proximate and chief object the well-being of this mortal life; the other, the everlasting joys of heaven. Whatever, therefore in things human is of a sacred character, whatever belongs either of its own nature or by reason of the end to which it is referred, to the salvation of souls, or to the worship of God, is subject to the power and judgment of the Church. Whatever is to be ranged under the civil and political order is rightly subject to the civil authority. Jesus Christ has Himself given command that what is Caesar's is to be rendered to Caesar, and that what belongs to God is to be rendered to God. (Pope Leo XIII, Immortale Dei)

This “orderly connection” presupposes that there exists a mutual cooperation between the two powers where each fulfills its own proper function in view of the spiritual and temporal welfare of man. Therefore, we need to carefully distinguish the sense in which the two powers are united from the sense in which there is a distinct separation. In other words, there is never a total separation but only when considered under a certain aspect. We will now refer back to Bishop Ketteler’s teaching who throws additional light on this subject.

Church and State: Union and Separation

Bishop Ketteler begins by distinguishing the two senses of union and separation with respect to the two powers. By virtue of the mutual cooperation that ought to exist it is never appropriate to exaggerate the aspect of separation into an unqualified and total separation.

“The quest for the freedom of the Church is often referred to as separation of church and state. Used in one sense, this concept gives no cause for concern, since it comes to grips with and puts to an end some of the practices which have obscured the real difference in the functions of church and state. So far as a separation in the essential relationship between church and state is concerned, the Catholic cannot even consider it. Predictably, our enemies have seized upon the ambiguity in this term. They have made wrong use of it the only use; and they have drawn conclusions which are not only totally unjustified but even completely detrimental to both Church and state. To the Church’s demands for its freedom, these people answer: Good, we’ll separate Church from the state as you demand and give the Church its freedom. But then the state must divorce itself completely from the Church and leave the Church completely to its own resources. This requires, among other things, that the schools too will have to be separated from the Church and made entirely into state institutions. Such proposals are then activated as though they had to follow as logical consequences of the separation of Church and state. Regretably, Catholics too have allowed themselves to be misled by such tactics. A brief examination of the matter will clarify it and show how untrue and deceptive these supposedly “logical” consequences are.

The relationship of Church and state does not have to do with whether state rather than Church officials will manage ecclesiastical affairs. There is an entirely different and deeper meaning. Autonomy of the Church has nothing at all to do with separation of Church and state. If we demand of the absolutist state authority that it restore certain rights to the family, the community, the corporation, so that these are able to operate in their proper spheres without interference, it doesn’t occur to anyone to call that a separation of the family, of the community, of the corporation from the state, and to conclude that the state has divorced itself completely from these institutions. Church and state because of their essence cannot be completely separated, because in God’s overall plan for order, they belong together. They are necessary supports for each other, and they ought therefore to cooperate in serving God’s purposes to promote the salvation of mankind. It is a totally superficial way of looking at the relationship between Church and state to regard as separation of Church and state the consignment of a few minor rights to the Church, which of their very nature belong to her in any case. That is a hollow play on words used to deceive people and as a front for actions which are bound to harm both the Church and the state. As a marriage is not separated because the husband does what a man ought to do and the wife does what she ought to do, so Church and state tend to their own proper functions. If the preservation of the liberties which the Church seeks is separation, then it is a separation which necessarily leads to unity. It is our deepest conviction that by the safeguarding of their proper autonomies, Church and state are not separated; rather they are truly and firmly united.

The Church can and may not separate itself from the state, because the Church cannot separate itself from anything which comes from God. She has to respect the state as a Divine arrangement for helping mankind reach its proper destiny. She has to require of her members that they conform to the demands of the state insofar as these conform to the Divine plan. She must use all of the spiritual resources at her command to foster the welfare of the state, rejoice in the orderly conduct of the state’s business, and griev when the state’s essential processes are somehow disrupted. Finally, she must serve notice to one and all that whoever opposes temporal authority opposes God and merits condemnation. (Romans 13:2)

The state may not remain indifferent to the Church but has an obligation to protect the rights of the Church as well as provide positive support.

At the same time, the state authority cannot separate itself from the Church without failing in its own essential duties. The state must safeguard the rights of the Church just as it has to protect the right of all who are in its care. The preservation of justice is the God-given mission of the state, and justice must be preserved for all concerned. The state has an obligation to look upon the Church with benevolent concern and support her in accomplishing her tasks. This is a part of the state’s responsibilities. These responsibilities come from God and therefore they stem from the very nature of the state’s authority.

These duties of the state flow from the moral law – God demands it. In addition, the duty of the state towards the Church (and other legally established religious communities) arises from its duty to respect the religious convictions of the body politic.

The state must see to it that the Church's rights are safeguarded not merely because God demands this, but because the state's own well-being requires it. If it separates itself from the Church and from the religious convictions of its subjects, it separates itself from God and thereby destroys its own foundation.

Finally, the state is obligated to protect these rights and to support the Church on behalf of its own citizens. They have a right to expect that the state will respect their religious convictions, and to the protection and support of their ecclesiastical society. The state is not some arbitrary abstraction which floats on clouds but rather a reality determined according to the needs of the people who make it up. Therefore, to separate it from their highest interests represents delinquency to duty on the part of state authority.

What I have said here regarding the obligation of the state to protect the rights of the Church and to support it, is meant to apply not only to the Catholic Church. It applies to any religious society once it is recognized as such by the state, provided only that such a society upholds the requirements of natural morality and honors the one true God, as we discussed earlier.

Bishop Ketteler concludes by denouncing that erroneous notion of total separation between Church and state while highlighting the duty of the state towards religion and the religious convictions of its people.

That opinion regarding the relationship of church and state, which goes contrary to all sound thinking by suggesting that the state could separate itself from the Church, and have the latter go completely on its own without protection of its rights and without any assistance, is one that is widely propagated by a part of the press and by certain popular spokesman. It is therefore urgent that we rise up in opposition to it and remind the public authorities of their responsibilities toward religion and to their constituents". (Taken from Ketteler, The Social Teachings of Wilhelm Immanuel von Ketteler, Translated by Rupert J. Ederer, University Press of America, 1981, pp. 241-243)

Continutity of Principles

Man has the duty to seek out and adhere to religious truth. Furthermore, he has the corresponding right to fulfill his moral and religious duties. Therefore, this necessary religious freedom can only be properly understood in continuity with the traditional teaching regarding the “moral duty of men and societies towards the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ.”

“On their part, all men are bound to seek the truth, especially in what concerns God and His Church, and to embrace the truth they come to know, and to hold fast to it. This Vatican Council likewise professes its belief that it is upon the human conscience that these obligations fall and exert their binding force...Religious freedom, in turn, which men demand as necessary to fulfill their duty to worship God, has to do with immunity from coercion in civil society. Therefore it leaves untouched traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ.” (DH, 1)

This duty towards the good and the true applies to all men – even those vested with political authority. That is why political leaders must “favor” religious truth – not only for the sake of their own soul – but also for the sake of others and the common good.

All who rule, therefore, would hold in honor the holy name of God, and one of their chief duties must be to favor religion, to protect it, to shield it under the credit and sanction of the laws, and neither to organize nor enact any measure that may compromise its safety. (Pope Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, 6)

Government therefore ought indeed to take account of the religious life of the citizenry and show it favor, since the function of government is to make provision for the common welfare. (DH, 3)

Aside from affirming the "traditional Catholic doctrine", and perhaps in part due to its limited scope, Dignitatis Humanae does not treat in detail how Catholic political leaders should fulfill their duty towards favoring the true religion and the one Church of Christ. This theme, however, is taken up in greater detail by the decree Apostilicam Actuositatem on the apostolate of the laity.

The apostolate in the social milieu, that is, the effort to infuse a Christian spirit into the mentality, customs, laws, and structures of the community in which one lives, is so much the duty and responsibility of the laity that it can never be performed properly by others…The laity fulfill this mission of the Church in the world especially by conforming their lives to their faith so that they become the light of the world as well as by practicing honesty in all their dealings so that they attract all to the love of the true and the good and finally to the Church and to Christ…Catholics should feel themselves obliged to promote the true common good. Thus they should make the weight of their opinion felt in order that the civil authority may act with justice and that legislation may conform to moral precepts and the common good. Catholics skilled in public affairs and adequately enlightened in faith and Christian doctrine should not refuse to administer public affairs since by doing this in a worthy manner they can both further the common good and at the same time prepare the way for the Gospel. (AA, 13)

The Catholic political leader, therefore, must take into account two complimentary principles in this context. First, he must show positive favor to the Catholic faith and the Church.¹ At the same time, however, he must favor religious truth in such a way that respects the duties and rights of conscience in religious matters. In other words, he may not impose religion on his subjects but rather must respect their religious convictions while gently striving to freely “attract all to the love of the true and the good and finally to the Church and to Christ”.

Back to Part III Forward to Part V

notes

¹See also the 1998 statement by the USCCB on "Living the Gospel of Life" (especially paragraphs 24, 25, 29, 31): "Catholics who are privileged to serve in public leadership positions have an obligation to place their faith at the heart of their public service..."

Religious Freedom: Disputed Questions (Part III)

2009-12-18T12:56:00.001-08:00

Private and Public

A common objection to the Vatican II decree Dignitatis Humanae (DH) is that the right to religious freedom for non-Catholics is supposedly limited to the private domain. The decree is sometimes rejected on the premise that in Catholic countries only Catholics enjoyed the right to worship publicly. As proof of this claim we are typically given examples such as Catholic Spain where the “public manifestation” of non-Catholic worship was prohibited by law. For some, Spain’s restrictive laws suggest that there can be no such thing as a natural right to public worship, as such. In order to reconcile this apparent contradiction we will have to refer to some principles covered in Part I.

The Church does not prescribe a fixed policy or a one-size-fits-all juridical solution for each particular case. The circumstances must be carefully considered in view of both the [due] rights of individual citizens to religious freedom (a natural right) and the [due] rights of society attempting to preserve the common good. But what if the common good of civil society is largely based on the unity of a common faith (e.g., Catholic Spain)? It would appear in such cases that we could be faced with the problem of conflicting rights.

In theory there is no conflict of rights insofar as a perfectly Catholic country is one populated exclusively by Catholics. In this case all citizens are freely baptized into the Catholic faith and freely submit to the jurisdictional and coercive authority of the Church. The problem of “conflicting” rights arises only when the unity of faith begins to erode and society is composed of Catholic and non–Catholic citizens. In this case, the political authorities have two basic options that the Church leaves to their own prudential self-determination in view of the common good. To illustrate this point we can consider the 20^th century examples of Spain and Ireland. Each had formulated its own distinctive juridical solution adapted to the just requirements of its own particular circumstances (hypothesis) in view of the spiritual and temporal welfare of its citizens and the common good of all.

Catholic Spain

We can consider Catholic Spain under the Franco regime as an example where the policy of limited religious freedom was adopted for non-Catholics. The restrictive laws in this case were oriented towards preserving the character of a sacral state constituted on the basis of unity in the Catholic faith. In the case of repression of the “public manifestation” of non-Catholic worship, there must still be respected a sufficient degree of religious freedom to enable individuals to fulfill their duty to profess their faith in an outward and social manner – even if not “publicly” in the fullest sense.¹ By virtue of the natural law, man has the duty and corresponding right to make external profession of his faith in accordance with his social nature:

“The Natural Law commands each individual to render internal and external worship to God...The obligation of divine worship does not only bind man as an individual; it binds him especially as a social being. Religion is not confined to the hidden recesses of the soul or the privacy of one's room. It bears a social character and obligation.” (Fr. Thomas J. Higgins, S.J., Man as Man: The Science and Art of Ethics, TAN Publishers, 1958, 1992, pp. 183-184)

Therefore, even Catholic Spain allowed non-Catholics to establish churches or quasi-public places for common worship insofar as these refrained from “external ceremonies or manifestations” (Cf. Art 6 of the Charter of the Spanish People). In other words, such non-Catholic churches or communities were not supposed to parade down main-street or openly proselytize Catholics in an otherwise Catholic country. In this sense "private worship" was understood as something involving more than mere individual worship restricted to the privacy of the home. On the other hand, "public worship" in its fullest sense included the notion of national or civic worship, as such. Therefore, non-Catholics residing in Spain were expected to regulate the active use or exercise of their natural right to religious freedom in such a way that also preserves the integrity of the religious unity and Catholic character of Spain. General Franco described the situation as follows:

“In Spain non-Catholic confessions enjoy liberty and are protected by the article of the Charter of the Spanish People which respects liberty of conscience. Protestant churches now exist in the same places of Spain where they existed under other regimes, though they are necessarily few, since the religion of almost the totality of the Spanish people is Catholic and the majority of the few who do not profess it are atheists, thereby reducing Protestants to foreigners or persons of foreign origin or people who have lived for many years outside of Spain”. (Cf. La vanguardia Espanola, August 19, 1947; Hughey, Religious Freedom in Spain, Kingsgate Press, London, 1955, p. 148)

Therefore, the full right to both private and public worship presupposes full citizenship while any limitation imposed on “public” worship presupposes “foreigner” status. In this sense it is important to note that only Catholics were considered to be Spanish citizens while non-Catholics were considered as “foreigners”.² This is an important legal distinction in light of the 78^th proposition of the Syllabus of Pope Pius IX. Cardinal Newman explains the relevance of the distinction of foreigner status:

“…the men who were forbidden the public exercise of their religion were foreigners, who had no right to be in a country not their own at all, and might fairly have conditions imposed upon them during their stay there…” (Cf. Newman, Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, 1875)

Therefore, the legal restriction against the public manifestation of non-Catholic worship (including propaganda or proselytism) by foreigners was adopted in view of conserving the principle of Catholic unity in Spain. Such unity of faith is a blessing that nations have a right to protect by all legitimate means. The situation was different, however, in Spanish controlled territories in Africa where Muslims were granted full religious freedom in private and in public. It is also particularly interesting to note that the Islamic religious communities were not only granted full freedom of worship but official support from the government (Cf. Dario de Barcelona, October 27, 1953, p. 9; Hughey, Op. cit., p. 158).

Ireland

We can consider the Irish constitution of 1937 as an example where the policy of full religious freedom is recognized for all citizens within the context of a mixed population. The constitution is considered “secular” inasmuch as it does not establish or endow any state religion, however, the Constitution recognizes the “public worship” due to Almighty God and the respect and honor due to religion. The Constitution also recognizes the special status of the Catholic Church as the “guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority” of the body politic. This special status, therefore, is not one mechanically imposed on the body politic by the political authorities in the sense of a state absolutism. On the contrary, the special status of the Church is duly “recognized” by the state in virtue of the Faith professed by the vast majority of its citizens. At the same time, however, due to the mixed character of the population, the state recognizes other churches and denominations already firmly established as of the time of the constitution. The constitution also provides for full religious freedom (private and public) subject to the requirements of public order and morality (due limits). Furthermore, the constitution guarantees against any type of discrimination based on religious profession and guarantees the rightful autonomy of the Church and other religious communities.

This juridical solution was deemed necessary given the context of a mixed population lacking unity of faith among the body politic. Pope Pius XII praised the Irish constitution as being founded on natural law principles where fundamental human rights (including religious freedom in private and in public)³ were guaranteed to every citizen:

“Your constitution is intended to be an instrument of prudence, justice and charity at the service of a community which has never, through its long Christian history, had any doubt about the internal, as well as the temporal implications, of that common good which it professes to seek through the conjoined prayer, toil and oftentimes heroic sacrifice of its children. Grounded on the bedrock of the natural law, those fundamental human prerogatives which your Constitution undertakes to assure to every citizen, within the limits of order and morality, could find no ampler, no safer guarantee against the godless forces of subversion, the spirit of faction and violence, than mutual trust between the authorities of church and state, independent of each other, in its own sphere, but as it were allied for the common welfare in accordance with the principles of Catholic faith and doctrine…” (Cf. Bruce Francis Biever, “Religion, Culture, and Values”, Ayer Publishing, 1976, p. 295)

Restraint vs. Compulsion

The civil restraint against the public expression of non-Catholic worship placed on foreigners in Catholic nations does not equate to “compulsion” in the faith. For example, the limited restrictions noted in Catholic Spain above allowed a certain quasi-public form of worship that enabled non-Catholics to worship socially and in common with fellow believers. On the other hand, to completely deny this basic (even limited) freedom to worship socially as demanded by the very nature of man could lead to forms of practical compulsion (Cf. Higgins above). This fact was alluded to by Suarez when he taught that non-Christians could not be refused the practice of their religion within the limits of the natural moral law. He noted that Catholic rulers had no right to deny Jews or Muslims their places of worship or to prevent them from observing their religious practices therein. He then concluded that this position is “supported by the fact that such a ban would involve, to some extent, forcing people to accept the Faith; and that is never permitted.”

If man is compelled by nature to worship socially then he is practically compelled in faith upon denying him access to his places of worship. That is like denying a Jew all access to kosher foods and pretending that it involves no practical compulsion towards eating non-kosher foods. Man’s nature compels him to worship socially just as it compels him to eat. Pope Leo XIII touches on this point in Immortale Dei. The Pope first recalls the general guiding principle:

While the Church considers that it is not right to put the various forms of worship on the same footing as the true religion, it does not follow that she condemns heads of States who, with a view to acheiving good or preventing evil, in practice allow these various creeds each to have their own place in the State.

The Pope then immediately follows this by linking it to the principle against compulsion in the faith.

It is indeed the custom of the Church to take the greatest care to ensure that no one shall be forced to embrace the Catholic faith against his will, for, as St. Augustine wisely observes, a man can believe only of his own free will.

Jeremiah Newman rightly notes that “while affirming that the ideal is religious unity, he [Pope Leo XIII] explicitly allows that a system of pluralism may have to be adopted by a State so as to ensure freedom of faith and avoidance of coercion” (Cf. Jeremiah Newman, Studies in Political Morality, Scepter, 1963, pp. 276-277). In fact, this “system of pluralism” is exactly what Pope Pius XII praised in the Irish constitution of 1937 within the context of a mixed population. In other words, the juridical solution in question complied with the demands of natural law and the just requirements of the particular circumstances.

The Principle of Reciprocity

Even in the context of a Catholic state, we should not overlook the principles of equity and reciprocity towards non-Catholics. The Catholic Encyclopedia recalls this important principle in the teaching of Pope Gregory IX:

The same measure of respect which a Catholic claims for his religion must be shown by him to the religious convictions of non-Catholics. Here obtains the principle which Gregory IX once recommended in a Brief (6 April, 1233), addressed to the French bishops concerning the attitude of Christians towards the Jews: "Est autem Judæis a Christianis exhibenda benignitas, quam Christianis in Paganismo existentibus cupimus exhiberi" (Christians must show towards Jews the same good will which we desire to be shown to Christians in pagan lands). (Cf. Auvray, "Le régistre de Grégoire IX", n. 1216.) Whoever claims tolerance must likewise show tolerance. (Cf. Catholic Encyclopedia, 1912)

This principle is also recalled by Mgr. Dupanloup (Bishop of Orleans) where he noted that it has traditionally been practiced by the Popes even in the heart of Rome.

Never have the Popes condemned those governments who considered it their duty to inscribe this tolerance, this liberty upon the constitutions, according to the necessity of the times. What do I say? The Pope practices it himself at Rome. “Error is the evil, and not the law, which, with a good intention, tolerates error.” This is what I have read in a book lately printed at Rome, under the eyes of the Index, and it is what Pius IX deigned to say to me during the last winter. “The Jews and Protestants,” he said, “are free and quiet with us. The Jews have their synagogue in the Ghetto, and the Protestants in their temple at ‘Porto del Popolo,’ the gate of the people.” (Cf. Opuscula post on The Intervention of Mgr. Dupanloup, Part III)

Back to Part II Forward to Part IV

notes

¹In this sense, the "special civil recognition" given to the Catholic Church in Spain is not opposed to the due respect for the religious freedom of non-Catholics residing in Spain. (Cf. DH, 6)

²Foreigners presumably have citizenship and recourse to another "homeland" that they can avail themselves to. The modern phenomenon of globalization, however, raises new and interesting questions. For example, what are the religious duties and rights of "migrant workers" and at what point do foreigners and immigrants come to be considered as permanent citizens with all of its corresponding duties and rights? Pope Benedict recently spoke on this complex question of migration and immigration in the modern context of globalization:
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/migration/documents/hf_ben-xvi_mes_20100927_world-migrants-day_en.html

³Pope Pius XII affirmed that the right to religious freedom in private and in public is a fundamental human right. (Cf. Pius XII, Radio Message of December 24, 1942)

Thanksgiving and Christ the King

2009-11-20T17:05:00.001-08:00

During this time of year it seems fitting to reflect on the meaning of the American Thanksgiving Holiday. What should Catholics think of Thanksgiving and is it compatible with the doctrine on the social Kingship of Christ? Can we recognize Christ's reign in a country that deliberately has no established state Church? Does the “secular” character of our nation imply irreligion and state atheism? Is legislation in America supposed to proceed by way of positivistic convention without any objective criterion or reference to the laws of God? Pope Pius XI affirmed that if the "rulers of nations wish to preserve their authority, to promote and increase the prosperity of their countries, they will not neglect the public duty of reverence and obedience to the rule of Christ."¹ Indeed, during his recent visit to the United States, Pope Benedict XVI gives answer to these questions by recalling an important aspect of our national heritage:

From the dawn of the Republic, America’s quest for freedom has been guided by the conviction that the principles governing political and social life are intimately linked to a moral order based on the dominion of God the Creator. (Pope Benedict XVI, Address at the White House, Washington, D.C., April 16, 2008)

Thanksgiving Proclamation

To get a better sense of this it seems helpful to turn to the first Thanksgiving Proclamation decreed by George Washington during his first year as President. The formal institution of the national Thanksgiving holiday was intended as a means for America to fulfill the "duty of all nations" towards the "Lord and Ruler of Nations"² in a public manner that promotes the "knowledge and practice of true religion and virtue". This Proclamation was given by Washington "in the year of our Lord", 1789.³

WHEREAS it is the duty of all nations to acknowledge the providence of Almighty God, to obey His will, to be grateful for His benefits, and humbly to implore His protection and favour; and Whereas both Houses of Congress have, by their joint committee, requested me "to recommend to the people of the United States a DAY OF PUBLICK THANSGIVING and PRAYER, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God, especially by affording them an opportunity peaceably to establish a form of government for their safety and happiness:"

NOW THEREFORE, I do recommend⁴ and assign THURSDAY, the TWENTY-SIXTH DAY of NOVEMBER next, to be devoted by the people of these States to the service of that great and glorious Being who is the beneficent author of all the good that was, that is, or that will be; that we may then all unite in rendering unto Him our sincere and humble thanks for His kind care and protection of the people of this country previous to their becoming a nation; for the signal and manifold mercies and the favorable interpositions of His providence in the course and conclusion of the late war; for the great degree of tranquility, union, and plenty which we have since enjoyed;-- for the peaceable and rational manner in which we have been enable to establish Constitutions of government for our safety and happiness, and particularly the national one now lately instituted;-- for the civil and religious liberty with which we are blessed, and the means we have of acquiring and diffusing useful knowledge;-- and, in general, for all the great and various favours which He has been pleased to confer upon us.

And also, that we may then unite in most humbly offering our prayers and supplications to the great Lord and Ruler of Nations and beseech Him to pardon our national and other transgressions;-- to enable us all, whether in publick or private stations, to perform our several and relative duties properly and punctually; to render our National Government a blessing to all the people by constantly being a Government of wise, just, and constitutional laws, discreetly and faithfully executed and obeyed; to protect and guide all sovereigns and nations (especially such as have shewn kindness unto us); and to bless them with good governments, peace, and concord; to promote the knowledge and practice of true religion and virtue,⁵ and the increase of science among them and us; and, generally to grant unto all mankind such a degree of temporal prosperity as he alone knows to be best.

GIVEN under my hand, at the city of New-York, the third day of October, in the year of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-nine.

(signed) G. Washington

President Lincoln renewed this same spirit by his Thanksgiving Proclamation of 1863 wherein he decreed: "It is the duty of nations as well as of men to own their dependence upon the overruling power of God; to confess their sins and transgressions in humble sorrow, yet with assured hope that genuine repentance will lead to mercy and pardon; and to recognize the sublime truth, announced in the Holy Scriptures and proven by all history, that those nations are blessed whose God is the LORD⁶…It has seemed to me fit and proper that God should be solemnly, reverently and gratefully acknowledged, as with one heart and one voice, by the whole American people".

The season of Thanksgiving provides a very good opportunity for all Americans of good will to participate in rendering worship to God in a public and civic context.⁷ Americans who participate in Thanksgiving according to the spirit indicated by Washington and Lincoln (in truth, solemnly, reverently, and with grateful hearts) can help to fulfill the social and civic duty towards Christ the King as the Lord and Ruler of Nations.⁸ Finally, the Thanksgiving holiday serves as a good reminder for all Americans to answer the "universal call to love" in order that "love may reign supreme".⁹

Almighty God, who hast given us this good land for our heritage; We humbly beseech Thee that we may always prove ourselves a people mindful of Thy favor and glad to do Thy will. Bless our land with honourable industry, sound learning, and pure manners. Save us from violence, discord, and confusion; from pride and arrogancy, and from every evil way. Defend our liberties, and fashion into one united people the multitudes brought hither out of many kindreds and tongues. Endue with the spirit of wisdom those to whom in Thy Name we entrust the authority of government, that there may be justice and peace at home, and that, through obedience to Thy law, we may show forth Thy praise among the nations of the earth. In the time of prosperity, fill our hearts with thankfulness, and in the day of trouble, suffer not our trust in Thee to fail; Amen. (Prayer taken from the Thanksgiving Proclamation of 1940 decreed by Franklin D. Roosevelt)

notes

¹Quas Primas, 18

²Christians explicitly recognize Christ as the Lord and Ruler of Nations. At the same time, others who by grace of faith implicitly recognize Christ as Lord and Ruler of Nations can also contribute towards the building up of the reign of God's love: "The coming-together of such men to co-operate for the good of human society is not based on equivocation. It is based upon "analogical" likeness as between the practical principles, motions, and progressions implied in their common acceptance of the law of love and corresponding to the primary inclinations of human nature. And why should I, a Christian, according to whose faith a single Name has been given to men through whom they can be saved, even in the temporal order, why should I disguise the fact that this community of analogy itself supposes a primum analogatum purely and simply true; and that implicitly and ultimately everything which is authentic love, working in the world for the reconciliation of men and the common good of their life here below, tends, under forms more or less perfect, more or less pure, toward Christ, who is known to some, un- known to others?" (Cf. Maritain, The Journal of Religion, University of Chicago Press, Vol. 21, No. 4, October, 1941)

³The custom to close official documents explicitly "in the year of our Lord" is another reference to Christ as the "Lord and Ruler of Nations".

⁴The national holiday is given in such a manner that promotes and supports true religion and objective morality. The political authority, however, does not go beyond his competence by using means of coercion in religious matters. Rather, the citizens are expected to fulfill the civic duties of religion to the "Lord and Ruler of Nations" in the spirit of their faith and according to its particular prescriptions. Such particular prescriptions of religion are subject to the authority of the spiritual power and beyond the scope and competence of the temporal power, as such. This distinction of office and competence is sometimes indicated by the phrase of the "separation of Church and State" where the proper scope (and limits) of each power was often emphasised by American colonialists who sought to escape absolutist rulers operating under the guise of the so-called "divine right of kings" with its principle of "cuis regio, eius religio".

⁵Note that the "secular" form of state does not imply the errors of "secularism". Even without an established state religion there was no concept of "separation of Church and State" in the sense of religious indifferentism. On the contrary, we find in the Thanksgiving Proclamations a positive support for (true) religion and objective norms of morality. Such a care for truth in religion and objective morality is far removed from relativistic and positivistic conceptions. The so-called "separation" of Church and state in the United States can only be understood in the sense that would seek to safeguard citizens from absolutism and unjust coercion by the state in religious matters.

⁶Lincoln states that the "duty of nations" involves recognizing the truth of God's reign given by divine revelation and proven by historical facts.

⁷Pope Pius XII had given the following encouragement to American Catholics for their participation in the national holiday: "This year you have chosen, and chosen well, to amass your resources during a week characterized in your country by the dominant note of thanksgiving to God. The highest authority of the State has summoned you – and what an ennobling and refreshing summons it is to hear in the world today – to pause in the midst of your varied occupations and to render thanks to Almighty God…" (Pope Pius XII, broadcast to the children of America, November 23, 1947)

⁸President Andrew Johnson includes the following quotation in his Thanskgiving Proclamation of 1866: "In offering these national thanksgivings, praises, and supplications we have the divine assurance that 'the Lord remaineth a king forever; them that are meek shall He guide in judgment and such as are gentle shall He learn His way; the Lord shall give strength to His people, and the Lord shall give to His people the blessing of peace.'

⁹Cf. President George W. Bush, Thanksgiving Proclamations, 2005 and 2007. The Christian themes of charity, brotherly love and the "universal call to love" have often appeared in the Thanksgiving Proclamations. For example, see President William McKinley, 1897: "On this day of rejoicing and domestic reunion, let our prayers ascend to the Giver of every good and perfect gift, for the continuance of His love and favor to us, that our hearts may be filled with charity and good will, and that we may be ever worthy of His beneficent concern." Also see Theodore Roosevelt, 1904: "We are thankful for all that has been done for us in the past, and we pray that in the future we may be strengthened in the unending struggle to do our duty fearlessly and honestly, with charity and good will, with respect for ourselves and with love toward our fellow-men." Also see Lyndon Johnson, 1965: "On that day, let us gather in our homes and in our places of worship to thank God for His generosity. Let us make ourselves worthy of that generosity by pledging to Him our everlasting devotion. And let us pray to Him that the forces of violence, indifference and intolerance may soon vanish from the face of the earth so that peace and understanding and love may reign supreme."

Religious Freedom: Disputed Questions (Part II)

2009-11-13T13:08:00.001-08:00

Religious Duties and Rights

An important theme that often arises is the question relative to religious duties and rights considered both from the subjective and objective points of view. We can gain some important insights into this question by looking at what St. Thomas teaches concerning the natural paternal rights for the religious education of children (S.T., ii-ii, 10, 12). Within the objective limits of the natural moral law, I maintain that all men have the duty and corresponding natural right to educate their children according to their religious convictions. Now this point raises some controversy. For example, Fr. Laisney (SSPX) has criticized this statement and affirms instead that “far from having a right to educate them in a wrong religion, they are in danger of eternal damnation if they deprive their children to the means of salvation!” The following letter in response to Fr. Laisney attempts to clarify matters.

Letter in Response to Fr. Laisney

Some aspects of Fr. Laisney’s letter in the October 31 issue of The Remnant left me feeling rather perplexed. To begin with I would like to give further clarity to my statement that “all men have the duty and corresponding natural right to educate their children according to their religious convictions”. I merely wish to assert here that, in the objective natural order of things, it is the duty of parents to educate their children in "matters relating to God" in accordance with the "parent's reason". This is something altogether different than a so-called right to teach error. That is why I followed up with the clarification that the “right is not founded on error, per se, but can continue to exist in spite of error for the sake of a superior good…for the sake of natural justice.” St. Thomas gives the following response to an objection (dealing with the religious education of children by non-Catholic parents):

“...it is the parents' duty to look after the salvation of their children, especially before they come to the use of reason…Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason, under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of the child in all matters relating to God” (S.T., ii-ii, 10, 12).

That is not to imply that such a natural right can be exercised in an unqualified manner. On the contrary, the “due limits” of the objective moral order always apply and remain in force. In other words, even though the unbaptized are not subject to the spiritual jurisdiction and coercive authority that the Church legitimately exercises over her members, the natural rights of unbelievers must be exercised in a manner that fully conforms to the objective natural moral law. (Cf. Ketteler who explains this concept in more detail by referencing the teaching of Suarez; Tract. de Fide Disp. 18 Sect. III, n. 4, 7, 9, 10)

According to Fr. Laisney, my problem is rooted in an erroneous notion of moral law and he goes on to say that the“moral law does NOT command to obey an erroneous conscience; it rather forbids that which is objectively wrong and forbids to act against one’s conscience”. The implication here is that the objective moral law itself contains both objective and subjective aspects insofar as it also commands obedience to conscience as the subjective norm of morality. The subjective aspect is necessarily part of the objective moral order since “man perceives and acknowledges the imperatives of the divine law through the mediation of conscience” (DH, 3). Therefore, the moral theologians have always held that one must be obedient to a certain conscience – and this holds true for the invincibly erroneous conscience.

“Everyone is obliged to follow his conscience whether it commands or forbids some action, not only when it is true but also when it is in invincible error”. (Cf. Prummer, Handbook of Moral Theology, 1957, n. 139)

Archbishop Lefebvre puts it very plainly: “To act against one's honestly erroneous conscience is to sin”. (Cf. Religious Liberty Questioned, Angelus Press, p. 10) In this context, I am simply asserting the corollary that one has a moral right, within the limits of the objective moral order, to avoid such a sin. In other words, the moral law confers the moral right to fulfill ones moral obligations. In this sense, the moral law cannot contradict itself by commanding and forbidding the same thing (principle of non-contradiction). Cardinal Newman puts it very simply: “conscience has rights because it has duties”. (Cf. Newman, Letter to the Duke of Norfolk)

Fr. Laisney then goes on to say that an erroneous conscience is simply “perplexed” and that one “must NOT ACT, but rather educate one’s conscience, so as to correct it”. Aside from the fact that a perplexed conscience is something altogether different than a certain but invincibly erroneous conscience, such a notion presupposes that one always knows what one does not know. Obviously, this is absurd given the nature of an invincibly erroneous conscience. Fr. Austin Fagothey makes this point clear:

Hence a certain conscience must be obeyed, not only when it is correct, but even when it is invincibly erroneous. Conscience is the only guide a man has for the performance of concrete actions here and now. But an invincibly erroneous conscience cannot be distinguished from a correct conscience. Therefore if one were not obliged to follow a certain but invincibly erroneous conscience, one would not be obliged to follow a certain and correct conscience. But one is obliged to follow a certain and correct conscience. Therefore one is also obliged to follow a certain but invincibly erroneous conscience.¹

Fr. Fagothey continues to explain why the interior will-act can be good (i.e., men of good-will) in spite of one’s objective error.

The basic reason for this conclusion is that the will depends on the intellect to present the good to it. The will act is good if it tends to the good presented by the intellect, bad if it tends to what the intellect judges evil. Invincible error in the intellect does not change the goodness or badness of the will-act, in which morality essentially consists. (Cf. Fr. Austin Fagothey, S.J., Right and Reason: Ethics in Theory and Practice, 1953, TAN Reprint, 2000, p. 214)²

Fr. Laisney concludes that “the right to educate one’s children in religious matters never gives a right to educate in a wrong religion, but only in the true religion”. Again, we are not talking about a right to teach error, as such. I think it is important to highlight here that natural rights and the right to fulfill one’s moral obligations persist in spite of one’s honest religious error. Following St. Thomas, Pope Pius XI teaches that the paternal duty and corresponding right to educate, according to the spirit of one’s Faith, is rooted in the natural law:

“Parents who are earnest and conscious of their educative duties, have a primary right to the education of the children God has given them in the spirit of their Faith, and according to its prescriptions. Laws and measures which…fail to respect this freedom of the parents go against natural law, and are immoral.” (Pius XI, Mit Brennender Sorge, 1937)

Therefore, it seems to me dangerous to diminish the subjective aspect to the objective moral order by denying the natural right of non-Catholic parents to educate their children in accordance with their religious convictions, however, within the due limits of the objective moral order. Again, the right is not founded on error (i.e., error, per se, has no rights) with respect to positive divine law, but continues to exist in spite of it and can be legitimately exercised by non-Catholics within the limits of the objective natural moral law. In the final analysis, I am simply repeating what Archbishop Lefebvre indicated relative to this question: "To the natural duty of educating their children corresponds the right of the parents to raise their children according to their own religious conviction…You cannot take the children from the Islamic education of their parents against their will without, at the same time, depriving the parents of their natural objective right of educating their children". (Cf. Religious Liberty Questioned, pp. 12, 15) In other words, this “natural objective right” can only be exercised by man through the mediation of conscience and therefore it is legitimately fulfilled according to the parent’s reason and in the spirit of their Faith, however, within the limits of the objective moral order. [End of Letter]

Towards Convergence

Archbishop Lefebvre seems to provide some helpful criterion that can help opposing parties move toward convergence on this issue. For example, in Religious Liberty Questioned, he concedes that “followers of a religion which, without superstitions, renders some sort of natural worship to God as He can be known by the light of natural reason, ignoring without guilt the dogmas of the true religion – such people do benefit from a natural objective right to practice their religion” (op. cit., p. 15). We can identify three key elements to the criterion outlined by Archbishop Lefebvre for this positive natural objective right to practice one’s religion:

· Belief in a personal God (without superstition, idolatry or magical beliefs)

· Worship that conforms to natural reason (natural moral law)

· Honest error with respect to the supernatural truths of divine revelation (positive divine law)

Therefore, in principle, Archbishop Lefebvre allows for the possibility of objective natural rights that are in conformity with reason and the objective natural moral law while being (honestly and without guilt) contrary -- at least materially if not formally -- to the particular prescriptions of positive divine law.³ While Archbishop Lefebvre considered this in the hypothetical, we can recognize the fundamental consistency between his criteria and the teaching of St. Thomas, Suarez and Ketteler.

Suarez, following the teaching of St. Thomas divides the unbaptized into two classes:

"It appears as though the religious practices of the unbelievers, notably all of the unbaptized as, e.g., pagans and Mohammedans, may not be tolerated in Christian nations since they involve superstition and injury to the honor that is owed to the true God, whose honor Christian rulers have an obligation to uphold. St. Thomas, however, rightly distinguishes two kinds of religious practices: there are those which go against reason and against God insofar as he can be recognized through nature and through the natural powers of the soul, e.g., the worship of idols, etc. Others are contrary to the Christian religion and to its commands not because they are evil in themselves or contrary to reason as, for example, the practices of Jews and even many of the customs of Mohammedans and such unbelievers who believe in one true God”.

The religious practices of the first class of unbeliever should generally not be tolerated unless greater evils would ensue.

Regarding the first, the Church may not tolerate them on the part of her own unbelieving subjects. But that is merely the general principle. It may happen often that Christian rulers cannot prevent even such practices without causing greater harm to the nation and to the Christian inhabitants. In that case, the ruler may tolerate such evil with a clear conscience on the basis of what Christ said to the servant who asked the master whether they should remove the weeds from the field. He replied, 'No, or perhaps while you are gathering the tares you will root up the wheat with them.'

The religious practices of the second class, however, must be tolerated insofar as they conform to the natural moral law. This type of unbeliever, according to Archbishop Lefebvre’s criterion, enjoys the natural objective right to practice their religion.

As regards the other religious practices of unbelievers which go contrary to Christian beliefs but not counter to natural reason, there is no doubt but that the unbelievers, even though they are subjects, may not be forced to abandon them. Rather the Church has to tolerate them. St. Gregory addressed himself clearly to this problem regarding Jews, and he forbade anyone to deprive them of their synagogues or to prevent them from observing their religious practices therein. (Lib. I Epistol. 34) Elsewhere he reaffirmed that no one should prevent Jews from participating in their religious observances. (Lib. II. Ep. 15) The reason is that such observances do not in themselves violate the natural law, and therefore, the temporal power of even a Christian ruler does not confer a right to forbid them. Such action would be based on the fact that what is being done goes contrary to the Christian Faith, but that is not enough to compel those who are not subject to the spiritual authority of the Church. This opinion is also supported by the fact that such a ban would involve, to some extent, forcing people to accept the Faith; and that is never permitted. (Suarez, op.cit.)

Some Key Observations

Based on all of this we are able to derive some important conclusions. Within the objective moral order we find an essential relationship and necessary interplay between the objective and subjective orders whereby objective norms of morality (e.g., precepts of the natural law, positive divine law, positive human law) give rise to subjective duties and their corresponding rights. We can also derive an important conclusion with respect to the status of Catholics, non-Catholic Christians and the unbaptized within the objective moral order. While all men are subject to the natural moral law, in responding to the universal call to Faith, one formally becomes subject to the particular prescriptions of positive divine law by way of passage through the door of baptism upon making a free act of supernatural Faith.⁴ Additionally, the Church has spiritual jurisdiction over the baptized and exercises legitimate coercive authority over her visible members by way of ecclesiastical law.

Back to Part I Forward to Part III

notes

¹Fr. Higgins puts it this way: "If a man is not obliged to follow an invincibly erroneous conscience; then he is not obliged to follow a correct conscience. Precisely because the error is invincible a man has no means of detecting it. Hence he cannot distinguish between a correct conscience and an invincibly erroneous conscience. Both are the same to him. Hence if he must obey in one case, he must obey in the other". (Higgins, Man as Man, The Science and Art of Ethics, 1958, TAN Reprint 1992, p. 135)

²Therefore, one can perform a morally good action (i.e., a good interior will act) by doing something objectively evil or based on objective error. This does not make the "object" good in itself from the objective point of view. What is good in this sense is the morality of the interior will act. Fr. Higgins makes the same point as follows: "The same conclusion follows from a consideration of the will act. The will act becomes good or bad inasmuch as it embraces an object, not as the object is in itself, but as the object is presented by the intellect as good or bad". (Higgins, Man as Man, The Science and Art of Ethics, 1958, TAN Reprint 1992, p. 135)

³Cf. S.T. i-ii, q.19, art.10; This is something of a paradox since there can be no contradiction in the laws of God. At the same time, however, we can recognize that man's participation in the eternal law by way of natural law is often analogical and proportional to the limitations of his natural reason. While faith and supernatural truth is above unaided natural reason they are related by an analogical connection - and it is in this sense that faith and reason are never opposed (Cf. DZ, 1796).

⁴St. Thomas indicates that the divine positive law of the New Testament is a "law of faith written on the hearts of believers". While the natural law is written into the heart of all men according to their nature, the New Law is instilled in man and added to his nature by the gift of grace. (Cf. S.T. i-ii, 106, 1) In this sense, the unbaptized must conform their actions to the objective moral order insofar as they are subject to the natural moral law: "For when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law; these, having not the law, are a law to themselves. Who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them: and their thoughts between themselves accusing or also defending one another..." (Rom. 2: 14-15)